Saved assessment
All results
188 results across this scan's environments. Select a finding for its evidence and next actions.
- SeriousIdentity · Needs a look
Enable Security Defaults or Conditional Access
Security Defaults is disabled. 2 policies reviewed. No universal MFA baseline candidate was established. A universal legacy-authentication block was not established.
Review finding → - SeriousIdentity · Needs a look
Require MFA for all users
No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for modern user sign-ins was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.
Review finding → - SeriousIdentity · Needs a look
Require MFA for admins
No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for the 14 reference administrator roles (every role Microsoft marks privileged is one of the 14 reference roles) was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. Policy "Require MFA for admins" would meet it but leaves out 1 reference administrator role (Conditional Access Administrator). This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.
Review finding → - SeriousApps & Consent · Needs fixing
Restrict user app consent
User consent is fully open — any user can grant any OAuth app any permission including Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, and Directory.ReadWrite.All. This is the worst possible consent posture and the basis for illicit-consent attacks.
Review finding → - SeriousExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Close exposed management ports
1 remote-management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. Each is a direct attack surface — credential spray, exploit kits, and ransomware affiliates routinely scan the entire IPv4 space for these. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - SeriousExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Close exposed database ports
1 database endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. This is the textbook 'leaked MongoDB' / 'open Elasticsearch' scenario — treat every one as a potential data-breach incident waiting to be discovered. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - SeriousExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Certificates past their expiry date
1 certificate(s) on record have passed their expiry date. The record may be older than this scan, so a certificate may have been renewed since. If it has not, browsers and apps refuse to connect to that service. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Block anonymous container access
1 blob container in subscription "Contoso Production" has Blob or Container anonymous-access settings. Effective public access depends on the account setting and network restrictions and was not demonstrated by this check.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Block RDP from the internet
1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows RDP (TCP/3389) from the internet.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Block SSH from the internet
1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows SSH (TCP/22) from the internet.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Narrow SQL firewall rules
1 broad firewall rule on SQL Servers in subscription "Contoso Production".
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousIdentity · Needs a look
Block legacy authentication
No supported baseline for a legacy-authentication block was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.
Review finding → - SeriousIdentity · Needs fixing
Block device code flow
Nothing in this tenant blocks device code flow. An attacker starts the flow, sends the victim a genuine microsoft.com sign-in page and a genuine 8-character code, and the victim — who sees no fake domain and no suspicious attachment — completes MFA for them. The access token lands with the attacker, already MFA-satisfied.
Review finding → - SeriousIdentity · Needs fixing
Restrict guest invitations
ANY user (including guests themselves) can invite new guests. A single compromised account or rogue guest can create persistent attacker-controlled guest accounts. This is the loosest possible setting.
Review finding → - SeriousEmail · Needs fixing
Enforce DMARC
contoso.com: DMARC is published but set to p=none for contoso.com — monitoring mode only. Spoofed email is not blocked. Move to p=quarantine after reviewing reports. Also checked: contoso.onmicrosoft.com (warn).
Review finding → - SeriousEmail · Needs fixing
SPF includes a name that has no SPF record
SPF issues for contoso.com: Record ends in ~all (soft fail) — receivers typically deliver but mark as suspicious. Move to -all for stronger protection. spf.protection.outlook.com is named in the record and has no SPF record, or more than one. A receiver that gets as far as that name returns PermError, and SPF effectively fails open.
Review finding → - SeriousEmail · Needs fixing
No DKIM signing key published
No DKIM signing key is published for contoso.com under Microsoft 365's two names, selector1 and selector2. Mail from contoso.com is not signed in your own name. Microsoft 365 still signs the mail it sends, but under your onmicrosoft.com name, which does not count for DMARC. So DMARC for contoso.com rests on SPF alone, and SPF breaks when mail is forwarded.
Review finding → - SeriousDevices · Needs fixing
Fix noncompliant devices
2 of 5 devices (40%) are actively non-compliant. Each represents a control you've defined that's currently being violated.
Review finding → - SeriousDevices · Needs fixing
Require BitLocker on Windows
2 Windows devices report BitLocker disabled. Each unencrypted device is a data-breach incident waiting for a theft or loss.
Review finding → - SeriousDevices · Needs fixing
Require compliant devices
No Conditional Access policy requires a compliant device for any application. Your compliance evaluation is purely descriptive — it tells you who's non-compliant but doesn't prevent non-compliant (or attacker-controlled, unenrolled) devices from accessing corp data.
Review finding → - Logging & Alerting · Not verified
Enable the unified audit log
Whether the unified audit log is ingesting can't be read with our read-only Graph access — it's an Exchange/Purview setting. Confirm it in about a minute with the PowerShell command below; if it returns False you have no forensic trail and should enable it immediately.
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Register MFA for everyone who controls Azure
1 account that can control your Azure resources has no MFA method registered, so a stolen or guessed password is enough to sign in to it. That access covers a whole subscription. 1 guest also holds these roles. A guest's MFA is set up in their own organization, so it is not judged here; "Review guest role assignments" lists guests with a role of their own.
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Limit subscription Owners
7 Owners on subscription "Contoso Production" exceeds Microsoft's recommended maximum of 3. Any one of these accounts, if compromised, gives an attacker full control of the subscription. People who are only eligible for Owner through PIM are not counted.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Restrict storage network access
1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows access from all networks.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Restrict Key Vault network access
1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" accepts connections from any network.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Require HTTPS on App Services
1 App Service in subscription "Contoso Production" allows plaintext HTTP.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - SeriousAzure · Needs fixing
Back up virtual machines
In subscription "Contoso Production": 1 of 1 virtual machine has no Azure Backup protection at all. No Recovery Services vault or Backup vault exists anywhere in the scanned subscriptions, so there is no Azure-native restore point for any of these machines. If these machines are protected by a third-party backup product such as Veeam, Datto or Rubrik, that protection leaves no trace in Azure Resource Manager and is invisible to this scan — in that case this finding can be dismissed.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
Require MFA to join or register devices
The tenant device-registration MFA switch is off and no enabled Conditional Access policy targets the register-or-join-device user action. Other sign-in protections may still apply; this identifies a gap in dedicated registration MFA controls.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
User MFA registration gaps
MFA is not registered for 2 of 9 assessed non-admin member accounts (22%) in Microsoft's report. This is a registration gap, not proof that a password-only sign-in would succeed.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
MFA registration is not protected
Anyone who gets the password of an account that has no MFA yet can register their own phone as its second step, and keep signing in as that person. No Conditional Access policy in force protects registering sign-in methods.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
Require phishing-resistant MFA for admins
No Conditional Access policy requires phishing-resistant MFA for admins. They can sign in with a text code or an app approval, which a fake sign-in page can relay.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs a look
Admins can stay signed in for weeks
Your administrators can stay signed in for weeks. If someone steals a signed-in session, it keeps working until it expires. No Conditional Access policy limits how long their sessions last.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs a look
Find sign-ins where no second factor was required
3 successful sign-ins by 2 accounts in the last 30 days required only one factor. Microsoft did not require a second factor. The person may still have used Windows Hello or a passkey, and a policy may have relied on a managed device, so check why before changing anything.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs a look
Conditional Access policies stuck in Report-only
1 policy has sat in Report-only for 60+ days — the oldest for 95 days. Report-only evaluates the policy on every sign-in, writes the verdict to the sign-in log, and then lets the sign-in through anyway. These policies appear in the portal as configured protection and enforce nothing. Either promote them to On or turn them Off, so the policy list reflects what is actually being enforced.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs a look
Review recent privileged changes
2 privileged changes were made in your tenant. 1 of these granted an app access or added credentials to an app identity — the two changes that let someone back in after a password reset. Every item below is also normal administration; the point is to confirm each one was you or your IT provider. Reviewed 12 days of audit history.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
Emergency access (break-glass) accounts
No Global Administrator is excluded from any enabled Conditional Access policy: all 2 standing Global Administrators are inside the same policy set that governs everyone else. A mistyped policy, an expired federation certificate or an MFA provider outage would lock every administrator out of this tenant at once, and recovery then runs through Microsoft support rather than through you. This is an availability risk, not a vulnerability — nothing here is exploitable; the escape hatch is simply missing. Assessed 2 standing Global Administrators against 1 enabled Conditional Access policy; 1 report-only policy was ignored because a report-only policy cannot block a sign-in. We checked excludeUsers, excludeGroups (expanded transitively) and excludeRoles on every enabled policy. Entra ID has no attribute marking an account as break-glass, so this check looks for the configuration Microsoft's emergency-access guidance asks for — a cloud-only account with a standing Global Administrator assignment, explicitly excluded from every enabled Conditional Access policy that would otherwise apply to it, and with no interactive sign-in in the last 90 days. An account whose sign-in activity could not be read is not counted. Weaker signals (no licences, no mailbox, naming convention) are shown per account but do not decide the result, because a forgotten former-employee admin looks identical on those.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
Limit what ordinary users can create
Ordinary users can register applications and create security groups. These are Microsoft's defaults, and an attacker who gets into one ordinary account can do the same.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs fixing
Admin accounts with mailboxes
3 privileged accounts have a mailbox. Best practice is dedicated cloud-only admin accounts with NO mailbox — that way phishing the admin requires guessing a UPN that's not in any directory, never appears as a sender, and is never on a public CC.
Review finding → - Should fixIdentity · Needs a look
Sign out idle web sessions
No idle session timeout is set. Someone who walks away from a shared or home computer leaves Outlook on the web, SharePoint and the admin centers signed in.
Review finding → - Should fixEmail · Needs fixing
MTA-STS not published
contoso.com receives mail but has no MTA-STS policy. Sending servers fall back to opportunistic TLS, which an on-path attacker can strip (STARTTLS downgrade) to read or alter inbound email in transit — including password resets and invoices.
Review finding → - Should fixEmail · Needs a look
Turn on anti-phishing protection
Judged: Office365 AntiPhish Default. Office365 AntiPhish Default: EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection are all false, so no impersonation protection covers your people or domains. 1 to tighten.
Review finding → - Should fixEmail · Needs a look
Enable Safe Links
Judged: Built-In Protection Policy. Built-In Protection Policy: AllowClickThrough is true (people can click through to a flagged site). 1 to tighten. Exceptions to Built-in protection, and which people a preset policy covers, are not readable through Microsoft's configuration snapshots.
Review finding → - Should fixEmail · Needs a look
Detected phishing is not quarantined
Judged: Default. Mail Microsoft detects as phishing goes to people's Junk Email folder, where they can still open it, instead of quarantine. 1 to tighten.
Review finding → - Should fixSharing & Collaboration · Needs fixing
Restrict OneDrive sync to domain-joined devices
OneDrive sync is permitted on ANY device. Users can install OneDrive on personal laptops, home desktops, or borrowed machines and pull a full local copy of all files they can access. That data then escapes all tenant controls — BitLocker, remote wipe, CA, audit logging.
Review finding → - Should fixSharing & Collaboration · Needs a look
Restrict Teams external access
Judged: Global. Global: AllowFederatedUsers is true and AllowedDomains is empty, so Teams external access is open to every Teams organization. 1 to tighten.
Review finding → - Should fixApps & Consent · Needs a look
Enable the admin consent workflow
Admin consent workflow is DISABLED. If you've restricted user consent (recommended), users currently have no in-product way to request admin approval — they'll either go without legitimate apps or look for workarounds (personal accounts, shadow IT).
Review finding → - Should fixApps & Consent · Needs fixing
Long-lived app credentials
1 app credential(s) have validity longer than 1 year. Industry guidance is to rotate every 12 months; long-lived secrets that leak (via committed source code, support tickets, screenshots) remain exploitable for years.
Review finding → - Should fixApps & Consent · Needs a look
Review delegated app consent grants
1 dangerous delegated scope was granted for individual users. No classified tenant-wide dangerous grant was found.
Review finding → - Should fixDevices · Needs fixing
Set compliance policies per platform
1 OS platform with enrolled devices has no assigned compliance policy: iOS. Devices on these platforms cannot be evaluated for compliance, so CA policies requiring 'compliant device' will treat them inconsistently.
Review finding → - Should fixDevices · Needs a look
Onboard devices to Defender
4 Windows devices are enrolled in Intune but no Defender for Endpoint or Defender for Business license is detected on the tenant. Endpoints run with built-in AV only — no EDR signal feeds your security team.
Review finding → - Should fixLogging & Alerting · Needs fixing
Use a monitored notification mailbox
Tenant notification contact gaps: No 'Technical contact' email(s) configured — service health incidents and major change announcements go to the tenant's original sign-up contact only; No Security & Compliance notification contact configured — security advisories from Microsoft (including breach notifications) may not reach your security team. Use monitored shared mailboxes ([email protected], alerts@) so notifications survive personnel changes.
Review finding → - Should fixExternal Attack Surface · Needs a look
Certificates expiring within 30 days
1 certificate(s) expire within 30 days — schedule replacement. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - Should fixExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Self-signed TLS certificates
2 public-facing service(s) use self-signed certificates. Users get security warnings, and the certificate provides no authentication of identity — making MitM attacks indistinguishable from normal connection. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - Should fixExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Mail-capable lookalike domains
1 domain close to contoso.com was registered in the last year and is set up for email. New lookalikes set up for email are a common start to invoice fraud. Check that you recognise each one.
Review finding → - Should fixExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Retire outdated TLS versions
1 public service(s) still offer deprecated SSL/TLS protocols. These are vulnerable to downgrade attacks (an on-path attacker forces the weak version), fail PCI-DSS, and break for modern clients. Disable everything below TLS 1.2. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - Should fixExternal Attack Surface · Needs fixing
Patch internet-facing services
3 CVE match(es) across the internet-facing footprint — 3 not scored. No severity score was found for any of them; that does not make them minor. Each is inferred from software a public index saw on the address, not tested against the service. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Use managed identities
0% managed-identity coverage on compute (0 of 2). Target ≥80%.
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Limit service principal scope
Subscription "Contoso Production": 1 app holds Contributor over all of it. An app's secret or certificate can leak, and whoever has it gets this access.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Enable Key Vault purge protection
1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" lacks purge protection.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Use private endpoints for storage
0% of storage accounts use private endpoints (0 of 1). Target ≥80%.
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs a look
Require Entra-only sign-in for SQL
1 SQL Server in subscription "Contoso Production" still accepts SQL logins next to Entra sign-in.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Alert on critical operations
Subscription "Contoso Production" has no Activity Log alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Forward the Activity Log
Subscription "Contoso Production" does not send its Activity Log anywhere, so Azure deletes it after 90 days.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Should fixAzure · Needs fixing
Enable Defender for Cloud plans
Subscription "Contoso Production" has no paid Defender for Cloud plan (only the free configuration recommendations are active).
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Review local administrator defaults for device join
Review the local administrator defaults for device join: the join policy adds all Global Administrators as local administrators; the join policy adds all joining users as local administrators. Confirm these assignments match your device-management needs; this policy read does not establish current local group membership.
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Review the tenant setting for Windows LAPS backups
Microsoft Entra password backup for Windows LAPS is disabled. Review whether you manage supported Windows devices and use Entra for backups. This does not establish shared passwords, missing rotation, or the absence of another password-management solution.
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Do not expire passwords
Password expiry is not set on 2 of 2 domains. Microsoft documents that a password is then valid for 90 days. Setting it to never expire removes the doubt.
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Keep password lockout and banned passwords tight
Password protection could be tighter: the custom banned password list is empty. Password spraying tries a few likely passwords against many accounts, and these two controls decide how much each guess costs.
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Decide who can create Microsoft 365 Groups
Every user can create Microsoft 365 Groups. This is Microsoft's default, and it is a choice rather than a mistake: each group is a Team, a SharePoint site and a mailbox that nobody reviews when it is made.
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Finish the authentication methods migration
The move to stronger sign-in methods is unfinished: the registration campaign is off.
Review finding → - MinorIdentity · Needs a look
Give every Global Administrator an outside contact
1 of 2 enabled Global Administrators has no contact route outside the tenant: no alternate email on another domain and no phone number. If the tenant is locked or breached, your own team has no way to reach that admin from the directory.
Review finding → - MinorEmail · Needs a look
TLS-RPT not published
contoso.com has no TLS-RPT record, so you get no reports when senders fail to deliver over TLS — you'd be blind to an active downgrade or a broken MX certificate.
Review finding → - MinorSharing & Collaboration · Needs a look
Block guest re-sharing
Guests may pass on items shared with them, but only to guests who already exist in your directory (you have none).
Review finding → - MinorApps & Consent · Needs a look
Expired app credentials still present
1 expired credential(s) are still attached to app registrations. Cleanup hygiene — they can't be used but they clutter your credential inventory.
Review finding → - MinorExternal Attack Surface · Needs a look
DNSSEC not enabled
contoso.com does not publish DNSSEC (no DS record in the parent zone). Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison a resolver's cache or sit on the network path can forge answers for your domain — redirecting mail (MX) or web traffic (A) to infrastructure they control.
Review finding → - MinorAzure · Needs a look
Require TLS 1.2 on storage
1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" still has its minimum TLS version set below 1.2. Azure Storage stopped accepting TLS 1.0 and 1.1 on 3 February 2026, so the setting no longer lets older connections in. Set it to 1.2 so it matches.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - MinorAzure · Needs a look
Turn off storage shared key access
1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows shared key access, because it has no value set and Microsoft's default is to allow it.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - MinorAzure · Needs fixing
Encrypt VM disks
Encryption at host is off on 1 virtual machine in subscription "Contoso Production", so its temporary disk and caches are not encrypted. Azure already encrypts its managed disks.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Identity · Does not apply
Remediate users flagged as at risk
Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).
Review finding → - Identity · Does not apply
Block risky sign-ins
Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).
Review finding → - Identity · Does not apply
Accounts with credentials in known breaches
Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).
Review finding → - Identity · Does not apply
Hold admin roles through PIM, not permanently
Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Use PIM for privileged roles
Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Limit Global Administrators
2 Global Administrators — within Microsoft's recommended range of 2-4.
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Remove stale guest accounts
No stale guest accounts. (0 enabled guests, all active within 90 days.)
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Keep trusted locations to your own networks
1 trusted location(s), none with a public range of 65,536 addresses or more.
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Stop sign-ins that still use legacy authentication
No interactive sign-in in the last 30 days used a legacy protocol. Background sign-ins by mail apps are logged separately and were not read.
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Conditional Access exclusions have outgrown break-glass
No account is excluded from this tenant's 1 policy that requires MFA or blocks legacy sign-in. Worth noting the other way round: with no break-glass exclusion, a misconfigured policy can lock every administrator out of the tenant.
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Keep guest accounts out of admin roles
None of the 3 accounts in privileged admin roles is an enabled guest.
Review finding → - Identity · Does not apply
Disable admin password expiration
This check is retired. It flagged administrator accounts whose password never expires, which is what Microsoft, CISA and CIS recommend. The tenant's password expiry setting is now reported by "Do not expire passwords".
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Allow only strong MFA methods
Microsoft Authenticator is enabled for all users, and text message and voice call sign-in are not open to all users. Microsoft requires number matching on every Authenticator push, so there is no setting for it to check.
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Guard groups that hold admin roles
No role-assignable groups exist, so no group is a path to a directory role.
Review finding → - Identity · In good shape
Remove stale admin accounts
All 3 privileged accounts have signed in successfully within the last 90 days.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Route mail through Microsoft 365
MX correctly points to Exchange Online Protection.
Review finding → - Email · Does not apply
Make sure your MTA-STS policy actually works
No mail-receiving domain publishes an MTA-STS record, so there's no policy file to validate.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Block external auto-forwarding
Judged: Default. Default has AutoForwardingMode Automatic, Microsoft's default, which behaves as Off; CIS asks for Off set explicitly.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Enable Safe Attachments
Judged: Built-In Protection Policy, EXOAtpPolicyForO365. Safe Attachments is on and blocks or detonates attachments before delivery. Exceptions to Built-in protection, and which people a preset policy covers, are not readable through Microsoft's configuration snapshots.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Enable anti-malware and auto-purge
Judged: Anti-malware policy Default, Content filter policy Default. Zero-hour auto purge is on for malware, phishing and spam, and the file-type filter is on.
Review finding → - Email · Not verified
Remove stale allow-list entries
Whether the Tenant Allow/Block List has stale or permanent (no-expiration) allow entries — but Microsoft only exposes this setting through PowerShell, or through a preview API we don't yet depend on. Verify with Exchange Online PowerShell using the command below — it takes about a minute.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Remove risky mail flow rules
No transport rules are configured.
Review finding → - Email · Not verified
Tag external senders
Whether the External sender tag is enabled tenant-wide — but Microsoft only exposes this setting through PowerShell, or through a preview API we don't yet depend on. Verify with Exchange Online PowerShell using the command below — it takes about a minute.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Keep the IP allow list narrow
Judged: Default. The IP allow list is empty and Microsoft's safe list is off.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Set outbound spam limits
Judged: Default. Default allows 500 external recipients an hour, 1000 internal an hour and 1000 a day, then BlockUserForToday.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Restrict inbound mail connectors
No inbound connectors are configured; whether Direct Send is rejected is not readable through Microsoft's snapshots.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Remove risky inbox rules
Scanned 12 mailboxes; no external-forwarding or alert-hiding inbox rules found.
Review finding → - Email · In good shape
Turn off SMTP AUTH for the organization
SMTP AUTH is off for the organization; individual mailboxes can still turn it on, and that is not read here.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Restrict SharePoint external sharing
SharePoint external sharing is appropriately restricted (existingExternalUserSharingOnly).
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · Not verified
Default share links to view-only
Whether new sharing links default to View or Edit is a SharePoint tenant setting that Microsoft Graph does not return — but Microsoft only exposes this setting through PowerShell, or through a preview API we don't yet depend on. Verify with SharePoint Online PowerShell (Get-SPOTenant) using the command below — it takes about a minute.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · Does not apply
Expire anonymous sharing links
Anonymous (Anyone) links are not allowed by the tenant external sharing setting — link expiration does not apply.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Disable SharePoint legacy authentication
SharePoint legacy authentication protocols are disabled.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Restrict OneDrive external sharing
OneDrive external sharing is appropriately scoped. It is capped at your tenant-wide external sharing setting (existingExternalUserSharingOnly), and Microsoft enforces that OneDrive can only be equal to or more restrictive than SharePoint.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Restrict cross-tenant collaboration
Cross-tenant collaboration is restricted in both directions.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Block personal Teams accounts
Judged: Global. Your people can start chats with personal Teams accounts, but personal accounts cannot start one with them.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Restrict Teams shared channels
B2B Direct Connect inbound is blocked tenant-wide (Microsoft default). Specific partner tenants can be allowlisted as needed.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Restrict anonymous meeting join
Judged: Global. In the Global meeting policy, anonymous people can join but wait in the lobby: they are not admitted automatically, cannot start a meeting, and phone callers do not bypass the lobby.
Review finding → - Sharing & Collaboration · In good shape
Restrict Teams custom apps
Judged: Global. AllowSideLoading is false in the Global policy, so sideloading is off there. The tenant-wide switch for custom apps is not readable through Microsoft's configuration snapshots. All third-party apps are allowed unless blocked.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Keep owners of powerful apps to app administrators
None of the 0 app(s) registered in this tenant holds a high-risk Microsoft Graph application permission.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Review high-risk app permissions
2 apps that are yours or a vendor's were reviewed. 0 have known broad application grants. 0 need additional permission review. This checks grants, not effective access; API-specific restrictions and business need require review.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Review apps that hold admin roles
No enabled app outside Microsoft's own holds a privileged admin role.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Retire dormant app identities that still hold access
All 2 app identities outside Microsoft's own first-party service principals have signed in within the last 90 days.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Review new outside apps given access
No app from another organization was given access to company data in the last 30 days.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Credentials attached to service principals
Reviewed 2 third-party and customer apps; no credentials that could sign in as an app are attached to any service principal.
Review finding → - Apps & Consent · In good shape
Tighten app registration redirect URIs
All 1 redirect URI across 1 app registration are exact https addresses (or documented native-client loopback entries), and no app issues access tokens via the implicit flow. Redirect URI hostnames were not cross-checked against dangling DNS records on this scan, because no subdomain takeover data was available — treat that dimension as unassessed rather than clear.
Review finding → - Devices · In good shape
Remove stale devices
All 5 enrolled devices have synced in the last 30 days.
Review finding → - Devices · Does not apply
Require FileVault on Macs
No Macs enrolled in Intune.
Review finding → - Devices · In good shape
Protect apps on mobile devices
Assigned app-protection configuration was found for iOS and Android. Review other platforms and actual deployment before concluding that all mobile access is protected.
Review finding → - Devices · Not verified
Resolve high-severity alerts
The Defender alerts queue could not be read. Unresolved alerts and detection coverage are unknown; this does not establish whether Defender is provisioned or monitoring the tenant.
Review finding → - Logging & Alerting · In good shape
Enable mailbox auditing
Judged: Organization configuration. Mailbox auditing is on by default for the organization. Whether individual mailboxes bypass it is not read.
Review finding → - Logging & Alerting · Not verified
Set security alert recipients
Whether the high-severity Defender alert policies have email notifications enabled with monitored recipients — but Microsoft only exposes this setting through PowerShell, or through a preview API we don't yet depend on. Verify with Exchange Online PowerShell using the command below — it takes about a minute.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · In good shape
External attack-surface inventory
Discovered 3 internet-facing IP(s) across 1 domain(s), with 6 unique port(s) open. 0 host(s) sit behind a CDN.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · In good shape
Lock down exposed admin panels
No admin panel was recognised on 2 HTTP services with a title, server header or banner, as indexed by Shodan; 1 other web service had no HTTP metadata and was not assessed.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Does not apply
Remove dangling DNS records
No verified domains were available to enumerate subdomains for.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Does not apply
Send recommended security headers
No probed web assets to evaluate (enable asset fingerprinting and declare your web/portal URLs).
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · In good shape
Registered lookalike domains
11 more domains close to contoso.com are registered and not flagged: 5 are set up for email but were registered over a year ago, so they are most likely unrelated businesses; 6 are not set up for email. They are listed so you can check that you recognise them.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Not verified
Stay off threat blocklists
The malware blocklist (URLhaus) could not be downloaded on this scan, so your 4 hostname(s) were not checked.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · In good shape
Keep domain registration healthy
No problem found in 1 domain registration(s).
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Does not apply
Keep the public website on software its maker still supports
The home page of contoso.com could not be read from outside (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so there was no announced software to judge.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Does not apply
Send the website's home page with browser protections switched on
The home page of contoso.com gave no page to judge (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so its browser protections were not read.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Does not apply
Keep the website's platform and plugins up to date
The home page of contoso.com gave no page to read (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so the parts it is built from were not listed.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · In good shape
Resolve flagged hosts
None of your internet-facing hosts carry a high-risk Shodan tag (compromised, malware, database, ics, …).
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Does not apply
Keep the website's PHP on a release with the latest security fixes
The home page of contoso.com could not be read from outside (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so whether it runs PHP is not known.
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · In good shape
Keep internet-facing servers on a supported version
None of the 7 internet-facing service(s) on record announced a Windows or Exchange version, so nothing was found to be past support. A server that announces no version cannot be judged from outside.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Narrow overbroad custom roles
No custom role allows every action or lets its holders change who has access.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Review guest role assignments
8 direct role assignments reviewed in Contoso Production; 0 direct guest-user assignments and 8 unresolved assignments. Group-mediated access, PIM eligibility and external member accounts are outside this check. Guest status alone does not establish weak authentication or unnecessary access.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Review deleted-principal role assignments
8 direct role assignments reviewed in Contoso Production; 0 confirmed deleted-principal assignments and 8 unresolved assignments. Missing names and directory lookup failures are not proof of deletion. A soft-deleted principal may be restored; verify its lifecycle before cleanup.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Rotate service principal credentials
This control could not be evaluated: Credential metadata was not collected for Azure role principals. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Limit User Access Administrators
Nobody holds User Access Administrator over a whole scanned subscription.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Enable blob soft delete
This scan could not read the blob soft delete setting of 1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production".
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Use RBAC for Key Vaults
No key vault relies on access policies.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Disable public blob access
This control could not be evaluated: 1 storage account lacked readable, explicit configuration evidence; 0 exceeded this scan's direct-read limit. Readable accounts retain their individual results. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Require HTTPS on storage
This control could not be evaluated: 1 storage account lacked readable, explicit configuration evidence; 0 exceeded this scan's direct-read limit. Readable accounts retain their individual results. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Review App Service authentication
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Turn off password deployment on App Services
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Turn off unencrypted FTP on App Services
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Turn off remote debugging on App Services
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Require TLS 1.2 on App Services
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Keep other Azure Backup items working
No Azure Backup item other than a virtual machine was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Protect backup vaults from deletion
No backup vault was found in the scanned subscriptions, so there is nothing to protect here.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Delete unattached managed disks
No managed disk was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Onboard VMs to Defender
Defender for Servers is not on in the subscription that holds your virtual machine, so this scan cannot use it to see whether it has endpoint protection.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Remove public IPs from VMs
No VMs have directly attached public IPs.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Turn off password sign-in on Linux machines
No Linux virtual machine was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Retire unsupported OS versions
The virtual machine runs an operating system that still gets security updates (Windows Server 2016).
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Enable WAF on Application Gateway
No Application Gateway was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Enable DDoS Protection
No virtual network was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Attach a WAF to Front Door
No Front Door was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Block database ports from the internet
No NSGs expose database ports to the internet.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Remove allow-any firewall rules
No NSG rule lets every port in from the internet.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Block SMB, RPC and WinRM from the internet
No NSGs allow SMB, RPC or WinRM from the internet.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Clean up orphaned network resources
All 2 network resources in the scanned subscriptions (interfaces, public IPs, security groups) are attached to something.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Public IP inventory
No public IP address was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Use Entra sign-in for point-to-site VPN
No virtual network gateway was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Limit which networks can reach Cosmos DB
No Cosmos DB account was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Close PostgreSQL and MySQL servers to the internet
No PostgreSQL or MySQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Enforce SSL on MySQL
No MySQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Enforce SSL on PostgreSQL
No PostgreSQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Turn off the unencrypted Redis port
No Azure Cache for Redis was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Set an Entra admin for SQL
All SQL Servers have an Azure AD admin configured.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Encrypt SQL databases
All user SQL databases have TDE enabled.
Review finding → - Azure · In good shape
Enable SQL threat protection
All SQL Servers have Advanced Threat Protection enabled.
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Set a spending alert on each subscription
This scan could not read the budgets of subscription "Contoso Production".
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Configure diagnostic settings
This scan could not read the diagnostic settings of 1 storage account, 1 key vault, 1 SQL server and 1 network security group.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Retain logs for 90+ days
No Log Analytics workspace was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Enable Defender auto-provisioning
Microsoft retired the Log Analytics agent in November 2024 and switched off its automatic installation, which is the setting this check read. There is nothing left to turn on, so this check no longer reports a result.
Review finding → - Azure · Does not apply
Top Defender recommendations
Defender for Cloud returned no plans for subscription "Contoso Production", so there are no recommendations to read there.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Send Defender for Cloud alerts to someone who reads them
This scan could not read who Defender for Cloud emails about security alerts in subscription "Contoso Production".
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - Azure · Not verified
Assign the security benchmark
The Microsoft cloud security benchmark is not assigned on subscription "Contoso Production" itself. This scan cannot tell whether a management group above the subscription assigns it.
Subscription: Contoso Production
Review finding → - External Attack Surface · Not verified
Publish a security contact (security.txt)
contoso.com/.well-known/security.txt could not be read from outside (HTTP 301), so whether a security contact is published is not known.
Review finding →