Azure
Your Azure cloud
Servers, storage, databases and who can change them
Measured score
25
Partial assessment · 15 left out of the score
Needs attention (21)
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Block anonymous container access
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 blob container in subscription "Contoso Production" has Blob or Container anonymous-access settings. Effective public access depends on the account setting and network restrictions and was not demonstrated by this check.
What to do
Set publicAccess to None on each container. If anonymous access is genuinely required, document it as an exception with rationale.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Container public access level
Storage account → Containers → [container] → Change access level
Now: Container→Should be: Private (None)
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Storage account → Containers → [container]
- Change access level → Private (no anonymous access) → OK
PowerShell
az storage container set-permission --account-name <storage> --name <container> --public-access off
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- stcontosofiles/customer-exports — publicAccess: Container
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
If account-level anonymous access and network controls also permit the request, an attacker could read accessible blobs. Container mode can permit blob listing; Blob mode alone does not. This configuration check does not demonstrate successful access or data theft.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Block RDP from the internet
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows RDP (TCP/3389) from the internet.
What to do
Restrict the source to specific IP ranges, or replace with Azure Bastion. Ransomware crews commonly get in this way, so fix this first if you see it.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Inbound RDP (TCP/3389) source
Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
Now: Source: * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0→Should be: Source: specific IP range, or remove rule and use Azure Bastion
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
- Source: change to specific IP range or remove the rule
- Deploy Azure Bastion for admin access (no RDP exposed publicly).
PowerShell
az network nsg rule update --nsg-name <nsg> -g <rg> --name <rule> --source-address-prefixes <allowed-ip>
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- nsg-contoso-web — Rule: allow-rdp allows TCP/3389 from internet
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
An attacker who finds RDP open to the internet can try stolen or guessed passwords against it directly. One successful sign-in gives them a remote desktop on the machine, a common starting point for ransomware.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Block SSH from the internet
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows SSH (TCP/22) from the internet.
What to do
Restrict the source to specific IP ranges, or replace direct SSH access with Azure Bastion / VPN.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Inbound SSH (TCP/22) source
Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
Now: Source: * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0→Should be: Source: specific IP range, VirtualNetwork, or use Azure Bastion
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
- Source: change from '*'/'Internet' to specific IP range or 'VirtualNetwork'
- Save. For admin access at scale, deploy Azure Bastion per VNet.
PowerShell
az network nsg rule update --nsg-name <nsg> -g <rg> --name <rule> --source-address-prefixes <allowed-ip-range>
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- nsg-contoso-web — Rule: allow-ssh allows TCP/22 from internet
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Public-internet SSH is scanned 24/7. Credential stuffing and lateral-movement chains often start here.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Narrow SQL firewall rules
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 broad firewall rule on SQL Servers in subscription "Contoso Production".
What to do
Remove the all-IPs / all-Azure-services rule. Use VNet rules (private endpoints) or narrow IP allowlists scoped to the specific clients that need access.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
SQL Server firewall rules
SQL server → Security → Networking
Now: 1 broad rule (e.g. allow-all: All IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0 → 255.255.255.255))→Should be: No 0.0.0.0/0 or AllowAllWindowsAzureIps rules; use private endpoints or narrow IP allowlists
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- SQL Server → Security → Networking
- Public network access: Selected networks (or Disabled if using private endpoints only)
- Remove rules with 0.0.0.0/0 → 255.255.255.255 or the 'AllowAllWindowsAzureIps' rule.
- Add specific IP ranges for the clients that legitimately need access.
PowerShell
az sql server firewall-rule delete --server <server> -g <rg> --name <rule>
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- sql-contoso-prod — Rule: allow-all (All IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0 → 255.255.255.255))
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Internet-reachable SQL is brute-forced for weak admin credentials and probed for known SQL Server CVEs. AllowAllWindowsAzureIps in particular makes the server reachable from any Azure tenant's compute.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Register MFA for everyone who controls Azure
What this means
1 account that can control your Azure resources has no MFA method registered, so a stolen or guessed password is enough to sign in to it. That access covers a whole subscription. 1 guest also holds these roles. A guest's MFA is set up in their own organization, so it is not judged here; "Review guest role assignments" lists guests with a role of their own.
What to do
Have the person behind each account listed sign in and set up an MFA method, such as Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey. Remove the role from any account that no longer needs it.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- About 10 minutes
Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
MFA methods of accounts with Azure roles
Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods
Now: 1 account with an Azure role has no MFA method→Should be: Every account with an Azure role has an MFA method
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Ask the person behind each account listed to sign in at https://aka.ms/mysecurityinfo and add Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey.
- To confirm: Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods.
- If an account no longer needs the access: Azure portal → Subscriptions → [subscription] → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments, and remove it.
- If a script or a device signs in with the account, not a person: move that job to a service principal or managed identity, which Microsoft recommends for automation.
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Scan to Email ([email protected]) — No MFA method registered. Owner over all of subscription "Contoso Production"
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Microsoft asks for MFA to sign in to the Azure portal and to change anything in Azure. An account with no method is asked to set one up, and whoever signs in with the password, its owner or someone who stole it, is the one who sets it up, unless a policy protects registering sign-in methods (see "Protect MFA registration"). From then on they hold that account's Azure access.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Limit subscription Owners
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
7 Owners on subscription "Contoso Production" exceeds Microsoft's recommended maximum of 3. Any one of these accounts, if compromised, gives an attacker full control of the subscription. People who are only eligible for Owner through PIM are not counted.
What to do
Review each Owner and demote to a scoped role (Contributor, User Access Administrator) where possible.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
7 evidence rowsTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Owner role assignments
Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments
Now: 7 Owners→Should be: At most 3 Owners
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
- Filter to role: Owner
- For each assignment, evaluate if a less-privileged role suffices (Contributor for ops, Reader for monitoring, User Access Administrator for IAM-only).
Evidence · 7 recorded items
- Dana Whitfield — Principal type: User
- Marcus Lee — Principal type: User
- Priya Raman — Principal type: User
- Tom Okafor — Principal type: User
- Sarah Brennan — Principal type: User
- Scan to Email — Principal type: User
- Fabrikam support — Principal type: User
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
An Owner can read all resources, modify any configuration, and reassign roles. One compromised Owner credential = full subscription takeover.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Restrict storage network access
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows access from all networks.
What to do
Set the network firewall default action to Deny, add specific IP / VNet allowlists, and remove any IP rule that covers every address.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Firewall default action
Storage account → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
Now: Allow (all networks)→Should be: Deny (selected networks)
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Storage account → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
- Public network access → Enabled from selected virtual networks and IP addresses
- Add the IPs / VNets that legitimately need access → Save
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- stcontosofiles — defaultAction: Allow; publicNetworkAccess: Enabled
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
With the firewall set to allow all networks, and unless public network access is turned off, the storage endpoint accepts connections from any network, and a storage account's address sits under a public domain. A leaked SAS token or account key then works from anywhere. The firewall is what would stop a stolen token being used from outside.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Restrict Key Vault network access
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" accepts connections from any network.
What to do
Limit each Key Vault to the networks that need it, or disable public network access and use private endpoints.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Public network access
Key Vault → Networking
Now: Allow public access from all networks→Should be: Specific virtual networks and IP addresses, or disabled with private endpoints
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Key Vault → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
- Allow public access from specific virtual networks and IP addresses, and add the ones that need the vault
- Or disable public access and configure private endpoints under Private endpoint connections.
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- kv-contoso-prod — publicNetworkAccess: Enabled; firewall default action: none set
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Unless the vault's firewall limits it, public network access lets a stolen service principal secret or a compromised admin session be used against the vault from outside your private network, to read whatever keys and secrets that identity is allowed to read. Limiting the vault to private endpoints is what would stop a stolen credential being used from outside.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Require HTTPS on App Services
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 App Service in subscription "Contoso Production" allows plaintext HTTP.
What to do
Toggle 'HTTPS Only' to On for each App Service.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
HTTPS Only
App Service → Settings → TLS/SSL settings → Protocol settings
Now: Off→Should be: On
Open in the admin portal ↗PowerShell
az webapp update --name <name> --resource-group <rg> --https-only true
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- app-contoso-portal — kind: app
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Plaintext HTTP exposes session cookies, auth tokens, and API keys to any network observer (coffee-shop Wi-Fi, compromised ISP hop, on-path attacker). Captured cookies replay sessions without password reuse.
- SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Back up virtual machines
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
In subscription "Contoso Production": 1 of 1 virtual machine has no Azure Backup protection at all. No Recovery Services vault or Backup vault exists anywhere in the scanned subscriptions, so there is no Azure-native restore point for any of these machines. If these machines are protected by a third-party backup product such as Veeam, Datto or Rubrik, that protection leaves no trace in Azure Resource Manager and is invisible to this scan — in that case this finding can be dismissed.
What to do
Create (or reuse) a Recovery Services vault in the same region and enable backup on each machine with a daily policy. For machines that already have a policy, repair the stopped or failing job rather than re-enrolling.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- About 20 minutes
- Before you change it
- Backup adds storage cost proportional to the protected data and retention period, and the first full backup places load on the VM's disks. Nothing about the running workload changes.
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Backup
Virtual machine → Operations → Backup
Now: Not configured→Should be: Enabled, with a healthy daily recovery point
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Business Continuity Center (or Backup center) → Backup
- Datasource type: Azure Virtual machines → select or create a Recovery Services vault
- Choose a backup policy (the default daily policy retains 30 days) → Enable backup
- For machines that already show a policy: Backup → Backup jobs, and resolve the failing or stopped job
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- vm-contoso-web01 — No Azure Backup protected item found in any Recovery Services or Backup vault
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Ransomware operators delete or encrypt what they can reach and then price the ransom against your ability to restore. A machine with no recovery point removes the only option that does not involve paying — and a backup job that has been silently stopped is the version of this the victim discovers on the worst possible day.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Use managed identities
What this means
0% managed-identity coverage on compute (0 of 2). Target ≥80%.
What to do
Enable system-assigned managed identity on each compute resource that authenticates to other Azure services. Removes the need to store credentials in app config / Key Vault references.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Managed identity (Identity blade)
Azure portal → Virtual machines / App Services → [resource] → Identity → System assigned → On
Now: 0% coverage (0/2 resources have managed identity enabled)→Should be: ≥80% of compute resources with system-assigned managed identity enabled
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Virtual machines / App Services → [resource]
- Identity blade → System assigned → On → Save
- Update the resource's app code to use DefaultAzureCredential (idiomatic for both Azure SDKs).
Evidence · 2 recorded items
- vm-contoso-web01 — VM in rg1
- app-contoso-portal — AppService in rg1
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Without managed identity, app code stores connection strings, SP secrets, or Key Vault SAS tokens in config files, environment variables, or App Settings — all of which routinely leak via logs, error pages, deployment artifacts, and compromised pipelines. Managed identity tokens are short-lived and never touch app config.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Limit service principal scope
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
Subscription "Contoso Production": 1 app holds Contributor over all of it. An app's secret or certificate can leak, and whoever has it gets this access.
What to do
Demote each service principal to a scoped role on only the resource group(s) it actually needs. Use Reader for monitoring-only ones. Remove User Access Administrator and Role Based Access Control Administrator unless the app's job is to manage access.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Service principal role assignments (subscription scope and above)
Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments → filter Type=Service principal
Now: 1 app with Contributor over the whole subscription→Should be: Service principals scoped to specific resource group(s) — none holds these roles at the subscription, a management group or the root
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
- Filter by Type: Service principal
- For each one listed: remove the assignment and re-assign at the specific resource group it needs. An assignment held at a management group or the root is removed there, not on the subscription.
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- contoso-deploy-pipeline — Role: Contributor (subscription-level)
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Service principal secrets can leak through CI/CD job logs, source control, third-party integrations and container images. Contributor can change any resource in the subscription.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Enable Key Vault purge protection
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" lacks purge protection.
What to do
Enable both soft delete (retains deleted vaults/keys for 90 days) AND purge protection (prevents force-delete during retention).
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Soft delete + purge protection
Key Vault → Properties
Now: Soft delete on, purge protection: off→Should be: Both enabled
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Key Vault → Properties
- Soft-delete → Enabled (cannot be disabled once on — Microsoft default since 2020)
- Purge protection → Enabled (irreversible — confirm before enabling on prod vaults)
PowerShell
az keyvault update --name <vault> --enable-purge-protection true
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- kv-contoso-prod — Soft delete on, purge protection: off
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
An attacker with vault contributor rights deletes (and without purge protection, purges) keys to lock the legitimate owner out of encrypted data — a destructive extortion play. Soft delete + purge protection guarantee a 90-day recovery window even against insider abuse.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Use private endpoints for storage
What this means
0% of storage accounts use private endpoints (0 of 1). Target ≥80%.
What to do
Add private endpoints to storage accounts that hold sensitive data. Then disable public network access on those accounts.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Private endpoint connections
Storage account → Networking → Private endpoint connections
Now: 0% coverage (0/1)→Should be: ≥80% coverage
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Storage account → Networking → Private endpoint connections → + Private endpoint
- Bind to a subnet in your application's VNet
- After private endpoint is connected: Public network access → Disabled.
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- stcontosofiles — No private endpoint configured
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Publicly reachable storage accounts widen the credential-leak attack surface: a single leaked SAS token, account key, or service principal secret becomes immediately exploitable from anywhere on the internet. Private endpoints constrain reachability to the VNet.
- Should fixNeeds a lookYour Azure cloud
Require Entra-only sign-in for SQL
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 SQL Server in subscription "Contoso Production" still accepts SQL logins next to Entra sign-in.
What to do
Move applications and people to Entra sign-in, then turn on Microsoft Entra-only authentication for each server.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
- Before you change it
- Anything still connecting with a SQL login stops working as soon as this is on, including the server's own SQL admin login. Find those connections first.
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Support only Microsoft Entra authentication for this server
SQL server → Security → Microsoft Entra ID
Now: SQL logins and Entra sign-in→Should be: Entra sign-in only
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- SQL server → Security → Microsoft Entra ID
- Confirm an Entra admin is set
- Tick Support only Microsoft Entra authentication for this server → Save
PowerShell
az sql server ad-only-auth enable --resource-group <rg> --name <server>
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- sql-contoso-prod — azureADOnlyAuthentication: false, so SQL logins still work
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
A SQL login is a password with no second factor and no Conditional Access. If one leaks from a connection string, it works from wherever the firewall allows.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Alert on critical operations
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
Subscription "Contoso Production" has no Activity Log alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes.
What to do
Create an Activity Log alert for each kind of change listed, with this subscription in its scope, and send it to an action group that emails the people who look after security.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
2 evidence rowsTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Activity Log alert rules
Azure portal → Monitor → Alerts → + Create → Alert rule
Now: No alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes→Should be: An alert for role assignment changes and one for security and policy changes
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Monitor → Alerts → + Create → Alert rule
- Scope: this subscription
- Condition: Signal type = Activity Log → choose operation → save
- Action group: email/SMS/webhook to security on-call
PowerShell
# Repeat per critical operation: az monitor activity-log alert create -n "Alert-${operation}" -g <rg> --scope /subscriptions/<sub-id> --condition category=Administrative operationName=${operation}Evidence · 2 recorded items
- Role assignment changes — Operation: Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
- Security and policy changes — Any one of these operations: Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write, Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete, Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write, Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete, Microsoft.Security/pricings/write, Microsoft.Security/policies/write
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Granting a role and switching off a security control are what an attacker does to keep access and avoid being seen. Without an alert, these changes sit in the Activity Log until someone happens to read it.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Forward the Activity Log
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
Subscription "Contoso Production" does not send its Activity Log anywhere, so Azure deletes it after 90 days.
What to do
Add a diagnostic setting to the subscription that sends at least the Administrative and Security categories to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Subscription diagnostic setting (Activity Log export)
Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Activity log → Export Activity Logs → Add diagnostic setting
Now: No diagnostic setting→Should be: At least one diagnostic setting that sends the Administrative and Security categories to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Activity log
- Export Activity Logs (in the top toolbar)
- Add diagnostic setting → tick every category, or at least Administrative and Security → choose a destination: a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub → Save
PowerShell
az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription create --subscription 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 --name ActivityLog-to-LA --location global --workspace <workspace-id> --logs '[{"category":"Administrative","enabled":true},{"category":"Security","enabled":true},{"category":"ServiceHealth","enabled":true},{"category":"Alert","enabled":true},{"category":"Recommendation","enabled":true},{"category":"Policy","enabled":true},{"category":"Autoscale","enabled":true},{"category":"ResourceHealth","enabled":true}]'Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Contoso Production — No subscription-level diagnostic settings configured
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Azure's native Activity Log retains only 90 days. Unless it is exported somewhere else as well, an attacker's role assignments, NSG edits, or resource deletions older than 90 days can no longer be investigated, because the evidence has aged out.
- Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Enable Defender for Cloud plans
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
Subscription "Contoso Production" has no paid Defender for Cloud plan (only the free configuration recommendations are active).
What to do
Enable at least Defender for Cloud Servers + Storage at Standard tier — they catch the highest-impact attack patterns (server EDR, ransomware on storage).
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Defender for Cloud workload plans
Microsoft Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Contoso Production → Defender plans
Now: No paid plan (configuration recommendations only)→Should be: ≥Servers Plan 2 + Storage Standard (catches the highest-impact attack patterns)
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- portal.azure.com → Microsoft Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Contoso Production → Defender plans
- Enable: Servers Plan 2 (or Plan 1), Storage, SQL servers on machines, App Service
- Save.
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Contoso Production — Servers: not configured; Storage: not configured; SQL: not configured; App Service: not configured; Key Vault: not configured; Containers: not configured; Resource Manager: not configured; Defender CSPM: not configured
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Free tier provides configuration recommendations but no runtime detection: no EDR on servers, no ransomware-on-storage detection, no SQL injection detection. An attacker working there raises no Defender alert, though the Activity Log still records changes to Azure resources.
- MinorNeeds a lookYour Azure cloud
Require TLS 1.2 on storage
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" still has its minimum TLS version set below 1.2. Azure Storage stopped accepting TLS 1.0 and 1.1 on 3 February 2026, so the setting no longer lets older connections in. Set it to 1.2 so it matches.
What to do
Set minimumTlsVersion to TLS1_2 on each storage account.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Minimum TLS version
Storage account → Configuration → Minimum TLS version
Now: TLS1_0→Should be: TLS1_2
Open in the admin portal ↗PowerShell
az storage account update --name <name> --resource-group <rg> --min-tls-version TLS1_2
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- stcontosofiles — minimumTlsVersion: TLS1_0
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Azure Storage no longer accepts TLS 1.0 or 1.1, so this setting does not weaken connections today. Audits and Azure Policy still read it, and will report the account as allowing old TLS until it is changed.
- MinorNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud
Encrypt VM disks
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
Encryption at host is off on 1 virtual machine in subscription "Contoso Production", so its temporary disk and caches are not encrypted. Azure already encrypts its managed disks.
What to do
Enable encryption-at-host on each VM (preferred — requires VM stop). For VMs that can't stop, fall back to Azure Disk Encryption (BitLocker / dm-crypt), which Microsoft plans to retire in September 2028.
- Who does it
- Whoever runs your Azure
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Encryption at host
Virtual machine → Disks → Additional settings (or per-disk Encryption settings)
Now: Off. Azure encrypts the managed disks; temporary disks and caches are not encrypted→Should be: On, or Azure Disk Encryption
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Stop the VM (required for encryption-at-host)
- portal.azure.com → Virtual machines → [VM] → Disks → Additional settings
- Encryption at host → Enabled → Save → Start VM
PowerShell
az vm update --name <vm> --resource-group <rg> --set securityProfile.encryptionAtHost=true
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- vm-contoso-web01 — No encryption-at-host or Azure Disk Encryption configured
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Azure always encrypts managed disks in storage, but that does not cover temp disks or disk caches. Whatever the VM writes there, which can include credentials and tokens, is not encrypted at rest until encryption at host is on.
Not verified (15)
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Review guest role assignments
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
8 direct role assignments reviewed in Contoso Production; 0 direct guest-user assignments and 8 unresolved assignments. Group-mediated access, PIM eligibility and external member accounts are outside this check. Guest status alone does not establish weak authentication or unnecessary access.
How to check it
Review the named guest's business need, role scope, expiration and authentication requirements. Preserve legitimate access and use access reviews where appropriate.
Technical detailssetting, evidence
The setting
Guest role assignment review
Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments
Now: 0 confirmed; 8 unresolved assignments→Should be: Business-approved, appropriately scoped guest access
Open in the admin portal ↗Learn more ↗Evidence · 8 recorded items
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- support_fabrikam.example#EXT#@contoso.onmicrosoft.com — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- contoso-deploy-pipeline — Contributor at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Review deleted-principal role assignments
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
8 direct role assignments reviewed in Contoso Production; 0 confirmed deleted-principal assignments and 8 unresolved assignments. Missing names and directory lookup failures are not proof of deletion. A soft-deleted principal may be restored; verify its lifecycle before cleanup.
How to check it
Confirm the exact principal ID, assignment ID and scope with the identity owner before removing an assignment. Do not bulk-delete assignments based on missing display names.
Technical detailssetting, evidence
The setting
Principal lifecycle review
Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments
Now: 0 confirmed; 8 unresolved assignments→Should be: Confirmed principal lifecycle and reviewed assignments
Open in the admin portal ↗Learn more ↗Evidence · 8 recorded items
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- support_fabrikam.example#EXT#@contoso.onmicrosoft.com — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- contoso-deploy-pipeline — Contributor at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Rotate service principal credentials
What this means
This control could not be evaluated: Credential metadata was not collected for Azure role principals. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Enable blob soft delete
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
This scan could not read the blob soft delete setting of 1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production".
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Disable public blob access
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
This control could not be evaluated: 1 storage account lacked readable, explicit configuration evidence; 0 exceeded this scan's direct-read limit. Readable accounts retain their individual results. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Require HTTPS on storage
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
This control could not be evaluated: 1 storage account lacked readable, explicit configuration evidence; 0 exceeded this scan's direct-read limit. Readable accounts retain their individual results. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Review App Service authentication
What this means
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Turn off password deployment on App Services
What this means
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Turn off unencrypted FTP on App Services
What this means
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Turn off remote debugging on App Services
What this means
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Require TLS 1.2 on App Services
What this means
This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Set a spending alert on each subscription
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
This scan could not read the budgets of subscription "Contoso Production".
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Configure diagnostic settings
What this means
This scan could not read the diagnostic settings of 1 storage account, 1 key vault, 1 SQL server and 1 network security group.
How to check it
This scan does not read this setting yet, so running it again will not change this result. To check it yourself: [Resource] → Monitoring → Diagnostic settings, in the Azure portal.
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Send Defender for Cloud alerts to someone who reads them
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
This scan could not read who Defender for Cloud emails about security alerts in subscription "Contoso Production".
How to check it
Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.
Technical details
- Not verifiedYour Azure cloud
Assign the security benchmark
Subscription:Contoso ProductionWhat this means
The Microsoft cloud security benchmark is not assigned on subscription "Contoso Production" itself. This scan cannot tell whether a management group above the subscription assigns it.
How to check it
This scan does not read this setting yet, so running it again will not change this result. To check it yourself: in the Azure portal, open Policy → Assignments, set the scope to the management groups above this subscription, and look for Microsoft cloud security benchmark. If it is not there, assign it on the tenant root management group, which covers every subscription.
In good shape (12)
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Narrow overbroad custom roles
No custom role allows every action or lets its holders change who has access.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Limit User Access Administrators
Nobody holds User Access Administrator over a whole scanned subscription.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Use RBAC for Key Vaults
No key vault relies on access policies.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Remove public IPs from VMs
No VMs have directly attached public IPs.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Retire unsupported OS versions
The virtual machine runs an operating system that still gets security updates (Windows Server 2016).
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Block database ports from the internet
No NSGs expose database ports to the internet.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Remove allow-any firewall rules
No NSG rule lets every port in from the internet.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Block SMB, RPC and WinRM from the internet
No NSGs allow SMB, RPC or WinRM from the internet.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Clean up orphaned network resources
All 2 network resources in the scanned subscriptions (interfaces, public IPs, security groups) are attached to something.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Set an Entra admin for SQL
All SQL Servers have an Azure AD admin configured.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Encrypt SQL databases
All user SQL databases have TDE enabled.
- In good shapeYour Azure cloud
Enable SQL threat protection
All SQL Servers have Advanced Threat Protection enabled.
Does not apply (19)
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Use PIM for privileged roles
Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Keep other Azure Backup items working
No Azure Backup item other than a virtual machine was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Protect backup vaults from deletion
No backup vault was found in the scanned subscriptions, so there is nothing to protect here.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Delete unattached managed disks
No managed disk was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Onboard VMs to Defender
Defender for Servers is not on in the subscription that holds your virtual machine, so this scan cannot use it to see whether it has endpoint protection.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Turn off password sign-in on Linux machines
No Linux virtual machine was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Enable WAF on Application Gateway
No Application Gateway was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Enable DDoS Protection
No virtual network was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Attach a WAF to Front Door
No Front Door was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Public IP inventory
No public IP address was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Use Entra sign-in for point-to-site VPN
No virtual network gateway was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Limit which networks can reach Cosmos DB
No Cosmos DB account was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Close PostgreSQL and MySQL servers to the internet
No PostgreSQL or MySQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Enforce SSL on MySQL
No MySQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Enforce SSL on PostgreSQL
No PostgreSQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Turn off the unencrypted Redis port
No Azure Cache for Redis was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Retain logs for 90+ days
No Log Analytics workspace was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Enable Defender auto-provisioning
Microsoft retired the Log Analytics agent in November 2024 and switched off its automatic installation, which is the setting this check read. There is nothing left to turn on, so this check no longer reports a result.
- Does not applyYour Azure cloud
Top Defender recommendations
Subscription:Contoso ProductionDefender for Cloud returned no plans for subscription "Contoso Production", so there are no recommendations to read there.