DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

Run it on your own tenant →

Azure

Your Azure cloud

Servers, storage, databases and who can change them

Measured score

25

Partial assessment · 15 left out of the score

67Total
21Need attention
12In good shape
19Do not apply
15Not verified
4Critical
6High
0Suppressed

Needs attention (21)

  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Block anonymous container access

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 blob container in subscription "Contoso Production" has Blob or Container anonymous-access settings. Effective public access depends on the account setting and network restrictions and was not demonstrated by this check.

    What to do

    Set publicAccess to None on each container. If anonymous access is genuinely required, document it as an exception with rationale.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Container public access level

    Storage account → Containers → [container] → Change access level

    Now: Container→Should be: Private (None)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Storage account → Containers → [container]
    2. Change access level → Private (no anonymous access) → OK

    PowerShell

    az storage container set-permission --account-name <storage> --name <container> --public-access off

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    If account-level anonymous access and network controls also permit the request, an attacker could read accessible blobs. Container mode can permit blob listing; Blob mode alone does not. This configuration check does not demonstrate successful access or data theft.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Block RDP from the internet

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows RDP (TCP/3389) from the internet.

    What to do

    Restrict the source to specific IP ranges, or replace with Azure Bastion. Ransomware crews commonly get in this way, so fix this first if you see it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Inbound RDP (TCP/3389) source

    Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]

    Now: Source: * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0→Should be: Source: specific IP range, or remove rule and use Azure Bastion

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
    2. Source: change to specific IP range or remove the rule
    3. Deploy Azure Bastion for admin access (no RDP exposed publicly).

    PowerShell

    az network nsg rule update --nsg-name <nsg> -g <rg> --name <rule> --source-address-prefixes <allowed-ip>

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    An attacker who finds RDP open to the internet can try stolen or guessed passwords against it directly. One successful sign-in gives them a remote desktop on the machine, a common starting point for ransomware.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Block SSH from the internet

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows SSH (TCP/22) from the internet.

    What to do

    Restrict the source to specific IP ranges, or replace direct SSH access with Azure Bastion / VPN.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Inbound SSH (TCP/22) source

    Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]

    Now: Source: * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0→Should be: Source: specific IP range, VirtualNetwork, or use Azure Bastion

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
    2. Source: change from '*'/'Internet' to specific IP range or 'VirtualNetwork'
    3. Save. For admin access at scale, deploy Azure Bastion per VNet.

    PowerShell

    az network nsg rule update --nsg-name <nsg> -g <rg> --name <rule> --source-address-prefixes <allowed-ip-range>

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Public-internet SSH is scanned 24/7. Credential stuffing and lateral-movement chains often start here.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Narrow SQL firewall rules

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 broad firewall rule on SQL Servers in subscription "Contoso Production".

    What to do

    Remove the all-IPs / all-Azure-services rule. Use VNet rules (private endpoints) or narrow IP allowlists scoped to the specific clients that need access.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    SQL Server firewall rules

    SQL server → Security → Networking

    Now: 1 broad rule (e.g. allow-all: All IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0 → 255.255.255.255))→Should be: No 0.0.0.0/0 or AllowAllWindowsAzureIps rules; use private endpoints or narrow IP allowlists

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. SQL Server → Security → Networking
    2. Public network access: Selected networks (or Disabled if using private endpoints only)
    3. Remove rules with 0.0.0.0/0 → 255.255.255.255 or the 'AllowAllWindowsAzureIps' rule.
    4. Add specific IP ranges for the clients that legitimately need access.

    PowerShell

    az sql server firewall-rule delete --server <server> -g <rg> --name <rule>

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • sql-contoso-prod — Rule: allow-all (All IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0 → 255.255.255.255))

    How an attacker would use it

    Internet-reachable SQL is brute-forced for weak admin credentials and probed for known SQL Server CVEs. AllowAllWindowsAzureIps in particular makes the server reachable from any Azure tenant's compute.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Register MFA for everyone who controls Azure

    What this means

    1 account that can control your Azure resources has no MFA method registered, so a stolen or guessed password is enough to sign in to it. That access covers a whole subscription. 1 guest also holds these roles. A guest's MFA is set up in their own organization, so it is not judged here; "Review guest role assignments" lists guests with a role of their own.

    What to do

    Have the person behind each account listed sign in and set up an MFA method, such as Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey. Remove the role from any account that no longer needs it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    MFA methods of accounts with Azure roles

    Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods

    Now: 1 account with an Azure role has no MFA method→Should be: Every account with an Azure role has an MFA method

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Ask the person behind each account listed to sign in at https://aka.ms/mysecurityinfo and add Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey.
    2. To confirm: Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods.
    3. If an account no longer needs the access: Azure portal → Subscriptions → [subscription] → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments, and remove it.
    4. If a script or a device signs in with the account, not a person: move that job to a service principal or managed identity, which Microsoft recommends for automation.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Microsoft asks for MFA to sign in to the Azure portal and to change anything in Azure. An account with no method is asked to set one up, and whoever signs in with the password, its owner or someone who stole it, is the one who sets it up, unless a policy protects registering sign-in methods (see "Protect MFA registration"). From then on they hold that account's Azure access.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Limit subscription Owners

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    7 Owners on subscription "Contoso Production" exceeds Microsoft's recommended maximum of 3. Any one of these accounts, if compromised, gives an attacker full control of the subscription. People who are only eligible for Owner through PIM are not counted.

    What to do

    Review each Owner and demote to a scoped role (Contributor, User Access Administrator) where possible.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    7 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Owner role assignments

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments

    Now: 7 Owners→Should be: At most 3 Owners

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
    2. Filter to role: Owner
    3. For each assignment, evaluate if a less-privileged role suffices (Contributor for ops, Reader for monitoring, User Access Administrator for IAM-only).

    Evidence · 7 recorded items

    How an attacker would use it

    An Owner can read all resources, modify any configuration, and reassign roles. One compromised Owner credential = full subscription takeover.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Restrict storage network access

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows access from all networks.

    What to do

    Set the network firewall default action to Deny, add specific IP / VNet allowlists, and remove any IP rule that covers every address.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Firewall default action

    Storage account → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks

    Now: Allow (all networks)→Should be: Deny (selected networks)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Storage account → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
    2. Public network access → Enabled from selected virtual networks and IP addresses
    3. Add the IPs / VNets that legitimately need access → Save

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    With the firewall set to allow all networks, and unless public network access is turned off, the storage endpoint accepts connections from any network, and a storage account's address sits under a public domain. A leaked SAS token or account key then works from anywhere. The firewall is what would stop a stolen token being used from outside.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Restrict Key Vault network access

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" accepts connections from any network.

    What to do

    Limit each Key Vault to the networks that need it, or disable public network access and use private endpoints.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Public network access

    Key Vault → Networking

    Now: Allow public access from all networks→Should be: Specific virtual networks and IP addresses, or disabled with private endpoints

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Key Vault → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
    2. Allow public access from specific virtual networks and IP addresses, and add the ones that need the vault
    3. Or disable public access and configure private endpoints under Private endpoint connections.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • kv-contoso-prod — publicNetworkAccess: Enabled; firewall default action: none set

    How an attacker would use it

    Unless the vault's firewall limits it, public network access lets a stolen service principal secret or a compromised admin session be used against the vault from outside your private network, to read whatever keys and secrets that identity is allowed to read. Limiting the vault to private endpoints is what would stop a stolen credential being used from outside.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Require HTTPS on App Services

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 App Service in subscription "Contoso Production" allows plaintext HTTP.

    What to do

    Toggle 'HTTPS Only' to On for each App Service.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    HTTPS Only

    App Service → Settings → TLS/SSL settings → Protocol settings

    Now: Off→Should be: On

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    az webapp update --name <name> --resource-group <rg> --https-only true

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Plaintext HTTP exposes session cookies, auth tokens, and API keys to any network observer (coffee-shop Wi-Fi, compromised ISP hop, on-path attacker). Captured cookies replay sessions without password reuse.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Back up virtual machines

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    In subscription "Contoso Production": 1 of 1 virtual machine has no Azure Backup protection at all. No Recovery Services vault or Backup vault exists anywhere in the scanned subscriptions, so there is no Azure-native restore point for any of these machines. If these machines are protected by a third-party backup product such as Veeam, Datto or Rubrik, that protection leaves no trace in Azure Resource Manager and is invisible to this scan — in that case this finding can be dismissed.

    What to do

    Create (or reuse) a Recovery Services vault in the same region and enable backup on each machine with a daily policy. For machines that already have a policy, repair the stopped or failing job rather than re-enrolling.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Backup adds storage cost proportional to the protected data and retention period, and the first full backup places load on the VM's disks. Nothing about the running workload changes.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Backup

    Virtual machine → Operations → Backup

    Now: Not configured→Should be: Enabled, with a healthy daily recovery point

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Business Continuity Center (or Backup center) → Backup
    2. Datasource type: Azure Virtual machines → select or create a Recovery Services vault
    3. Choose a backup policy (the default daily policy retains 30 days) → Enable backup
    4. For machines that already show a policy: Backup → Backup jobs, and resolve the failing or stopped job

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • vm-contoso-web01 — No Azure Backup protected item found in any Recovery Services or Backup vault

    How an attacker would use it

    Ransomware operators delete or encrypt what they can reach and then price the ransom against your ability to restore. A machine with no recovery point removes the only option that does not involve paying — and a backup job that has been silently stopped is the version of this the victim discovers on the worst possible day.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Use managed identities

    What this means

    0% managed-identity coverage on compute (0 of 2). Target ≥80%.

    What to do

    Enable system-assigned managed identity on each compute resource that authenticates to other Azure services. Removes the need to store credentials in app config / Key Vault references.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Managed identity (Identity blade)

    Azure portal → Virtual machines / App Services → [resource] → Identity → System assigned → On

    Now: 0% coverage (0/2 resources have managed identity enabled)→Should be: ≥80% of compute resources with system-assigned managed identity enabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Virtual machines / App Services → [resource]
    2. Identity blade → System assigned → On → Save
    3. Update the resource's app code to use DefaultAzureCredential (idiomatic for both Azure SDKs).

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • vm-contoso-web01 — VM in rg1
    • app-contoso-portal — AppService in rg1

    How an attacker would use it

    Without managed identity, app code stores connection strings, SP secrets, or Key Vault SAS tokens in config files, environment variables, or App Settings — all of which routinely leak via logs, error pages, deployment artifacts, and compromised pipelines. Managed identity tokens are short-lived and never touch app config.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Limit service principal scope

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production": 1 app holds Contributor over all of it. An app's secret or certificate can leak, and whoever has it gets this access.

    What to do

    Demote each service principal to a scoped role on only the resource group(s) it actually needs. Use Reader for monitoring-only ones. Remove User Access Administrator and Role Based Access Control Administrator unless the app's job is to manage access.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Service principal role assignments (subscription scope and above)

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments → filter Type=Service principal

    Now: 1 app with Contributor over the whole subscription→Should be: Service principals scoped to specific resource group(s) — none holds these roles at the subscription, a management group or the root

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
    2. Filter by Type: Service principal
    3. For each one listed: remove the assignment and re-assign at the specific resource group it needs. An assignment held at a management group or the root is removed there, not on the subscription.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • contoso-deploy-pipeline — Role: Contributor (subscription-level)

    How an attacker would use it

    Service principal secrets can leak through CI/CD job logs, source control, third-party integrations and container images. Contributor can change any resource in the subscription.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Enable Key Vault purge protection

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" lacks purge protection.

    What to do

    Enable both soft delete (retains deleted vaults/keys for 90 days) AND purge protection (prevents force-delete during retention).

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Soft delete + purge protection

    Key Vault → Properties

    Now: Soft delete on, purge protection: off→Should be: Both enabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Key Vault → Properties
    2. Soft-delete → Enabled (cannot be disabled once on — Microsoft default since 2020)
    3. Purge protection → Enabled (irreversible — confirm before enabling on prod vaults)

    PowerShell

    az keyvault update --name <vault> --enable-purge-protection true

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    An attacker with vault contributor rights deletes (and without purge protection, purges) keys to lock the legitimate owner out of encrypted data — a destructive extortion play. Soft delete + purge protection guarantee a 90-day recovery window even against insider abuse.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Use private endpoints for storage

    What this means

    0% of storage accounts use private endpoints (0 of 1). Target ≥80%.

    What to do

    Add private endpoints to storage accounts that hold sensitive data. Then disable public network access on those accounts.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Private endpoint connections

    Storage account → Networking → Private endpoint connections

    Now: 0% coverage (0/1)→Should be: ≥80% coverage

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Storage account → Networking → Private endpoint connections → + Private endpoint
    2. Bind to a subnet in your application's VNet
    3. After private endpoint is connected: Public network access → Disabled.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Publicly reachable storage accounts widen the credential-leak attack surface: a single leaked SAS token, account key, or service principal secret becomes immediately exploitable from anywhere on the internet. Private endpoints constrain reachability to the VNet.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookYour Azure cloud

    Require Entra-only sign-in for SQL

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 SQL Server in subscription "Contoso Production" still accepts SQL logins next to Entra sign-in.

    What to do

    Move applications and people to Entra sign-in, then turn on Microsoft Entra-only authentication for each server.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Before you change it
    Anything still connecting with a SQL login stops working as soon as this is on, including the server's own SQL admin login. Find those connections first.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Support only Microsoft Entra authentication for this server

    SQL server → Security → Microsoft Entra ID

    Now: SQL logins and Entra sign-in→Should be: Entra sign-in only

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. SQL server → Security → Microsoft Entra ID
    2. Confirm an Entra admin is set
    3. Tick Support only Microsoft Entra authentication for this server → Save

    PowerShell

    az sql server ad-only-auth enable --resource-group <rg> --name <server>

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    A SQL login is a password with no second factor and no Conditional Access. If one leaks from a connection string, it works from wherever the firewall allows.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Alert on critical operations

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production" has no Activity Log alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes.

    What to do

    Create an Activity Log alert for each kind of change listed, with this subscription in its scope, and send it to an action group that emails the people who look after security.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Activity Log alert rules

    Azure portal → Monitor → Alerts → + Create → Alert rule

    Now: No alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes→Should be: An alert for role assignment changes and one for security and policy changes

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Monitor → Alerts → + Create → Alert rule
    2. Scope: this subscription
    3. Condition: Signal type = Activity Log → choose operation → save
    4. Action group: email/SMS/webhook to security on-call

    PowerShell

    # Repeat per critical operation:
    az monitor activity-log alert create -n "Alert-${operation}" -g <rg> --scope /subscriptions/<sub-id> --condition category=Administrative operationName=${operation}

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • Role assignment changes — Operation: Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
    • Security and policy changes — Any one of these operations: Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write, Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete, Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write, Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete, Microsoft.Security/pricings/write, Microsoft.Security/policies/write

    How an attacker would use it

    Granting a role and switching off a security control are what an attacker does to keep access and avoid being seen. Without an alert, these changes sit in the Activity Log until someone happens to read it.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Forward the Activity Log

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production" does not send its Activity Log anywhere, so Azure deletes it after 90 days.

    What to do

    Add a diagnostic setting to the subscription that sends at least the Administrative and Security categories to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Subscription diagnostic setting (Activity Log export)

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Activity log → Export Activity Logs → Add diagnostic setting

    Now: No diagnostic setting→Should be: At least one diagnostic setting that sends the Administrative and Security categories to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Activity log
    2. Export Activity Logs (in the top toolbar)
    3. Add diagnostic setting → tick every category, or at least Administrative and Security → choose a destination: a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub → Save

    PowerShell

    az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription create --subscription 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 --name ActivityLog-to-LA --location global --workspace <workspace-id> --logs '[{"category":"Administrative","enabled":true},{"category":"Security","enabled":true},{"category":"ServiceHealth","enabled":true},{"category":"Alert","enabled":true},{"category":"Recommendation","enabled":true},{"category":"Policy","enabled":true},{"category":"Autoscale","enabled":true},{"category":"ResourceHealth","enabled":true}]'

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Azure's native Activity Log retains only 90 days. Unless it is exported somewhere else as well, an attacker's role assignments, NSG edits, or resource deletions older than 90 days can no longer be investigated, because the evidence has aged out.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Enable Defender for Cloud plans

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production" has no paid Defender for Cloud plan (only the free configuration recommendations are active).

    What to do

    Enable at least Defender for Cloud Servers + Storage at Standard tier — they catch the highest-impact attack patterns (server EDR, ransomware on storage).

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Defender for Cloud workload plans

    Microsoft Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Contoso Production → Defender plans

    Now: No paid plan (configuration recommendations only)→Should be: ≥Servers Plan 2 + Storage Standard (catches the highest-impact attack patterns)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Microsoft Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Contoso Production → Defender plans
    2. Enable: Servers Plan 2 (or Plan 1), Storage, SQL servers on machines, App Service
    3. Save.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • Contoso Production — Servers: not configured; Storage: not configured; SQL: not configured; App Service: not configured; Key Vault: not configured; Containers: not configured; Resource Manager: not configured; Defender CSPM: not configured

    How an attacker would use it

    Free tier provides configuration recommendations but no runtime detection: no EDR on servers, no ransomware-on-storage detection, no SQL injection detection. An attacker working there raises no Defender alert, though the Activity Log still records changes to Azure resources.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookYour Azure cloud

    Require TLS 1.2 on storage

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" still has its minimum TLS version set below 1.2. Azure Storage stopped accepting TLS 1.0 and 1.1 on 3 February 2026, so the setting no longer lets older connections in. Set it to 1.2 so it matches.

    What to do

    Set minimumTlsVersion to TLS1_2 on each storage account.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Minimum TLS version

    Storage account → Configuration → Minimum TLS version

    Now: TLS1_0→Should be: TLS1_2

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    az storage account update --name <name> --resource-group <rg> --min-tls-version TLS1_2

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Azure Storage no longer accepts TLS 1.0 or 1.1, so this setting does not weaken connections today. Audits and Azure Policy still read it, and will report the account as allowing old TLS until it is changed.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookYour Azure cloud

    Turn off storage shared key access

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows shared key access, because it has no value set and Microsoft's default is to allow it.

    What to do

    Find out what still signs in with an account key or a SAS token signed by one, move it to Entra, then turn shared key access off.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Before you change it
    Anything that signs in with an account key or a SAS signed by one gets a 403. Check first for Azure Files without Entra permissions, Azure Cloud Shell file shares, Storage Explorer on file shares, and any service that connects with a connection string.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Allow storage account key access

    Storage account → Settings → Configuration

    Now: Allowed→Should be: Disabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Storage account → Monitoring → Metrics: split Transactions by Authentication to see what uses shared keys
    2. Move those applications to Entra sign-in or a user delegation SAS
    3. Storage account → Settings → Configuration → Allow storage account key access → Disabled → Save

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • stcontosofiles — allowSharedKeyAccess not set, which Microsoft treats as allowed

    How an attacker would use it

    Account keys end up in connection strings, config files and scripts. One leaked key reads and writes everything in the account with no sign-in to alert on.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Encrypt VM disks

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    Encryption at host is off on 1 virtual machine in subscription "Contoso Production", so its temporary disk and caches are not encrypted. Azure already encrypts its managed disks.

    What to do

    Enable encryption-at-host on each VM (preferred — requires VM stop). For VMs that can't stop, fall back to Azure Disk Encryption (BitLocker / dm-crypt), which Microsoft plans to retire in September 2028.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Encryption at host

    Virtual machine → Disks → Additional settings (or per-disk Encryption settings)

    Now: Off. Azure encrypts the managed disks; temporary disks and caches are not encrypted→Should be: On, or Azure Disk Encryption

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Stop the VM (required for encryption-at-host)
    2. portal.azure.com → Virtual machines → [VM] → Disks → Additional settings
    3. Encryption at host → Enabled → Save → Start VM

    PowerShell

    az vm update --name <vm> --resource-group <rg> --set securityProfile.encryptionAtHost=true

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Azure always encrypts managed disks in storage, but that does not cover temp disks or disk caches. Whatever the VM writes there, which can include credentials and tokens, is not encrypted at rest until encryption at host is on.

    Learn more ↗

Not verified (15)

  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Review guest role assignments

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    8 direct role assignments reviewed in Contoso Production; 0 direct guest-user assignments and 8 unresolved assignments. Group-mediated access, PIM eligibility and external member accounts are outside this check. Guest status alone does not establish weak authentication or unnecessary access.

    How to check it

    Review the named guest's business need, role scope, expiration and authentication requirements. Preserve legitimate access and use access reviews where appropriate.

    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    Guest role assignment review

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments

    Now: 0 confirmed; 8 unresolved assignments→Should be: Business-approved, appropriately scoped guest access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 8 recorded items

    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • support_fabrikam.example#EXT#@contoso.onmicrosoft.com — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • contoso-deploy-pipeline — Contributor at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    Learn more ↗
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Review deleted-principal role assignments

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    8 direct role assignments reviewed in Contoso Production; 0 confirmed deleted-principal assignments and 8 unresolved assignments. Missing names and directory lookup failures are not proof of deletion. A soft-deleted principal may be restored; verify its lifecycle before cleanup.

    How to check it

    Confirm the exact principal ID, assignment ID and scope with the identity owner before removing an assignment. Do not bulk-delete assignments based on missing display names.

    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    Principal lifecycle review

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments

    Now: 0 confirmed; 8 unresolved assignments→Should be: Confirmed principal lifecycle and reviewed assignments

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 8 recorded items

    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • [email protected] — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • support_fabrikam.example#EXT#@contoso.onmicrosoft.com — Owner at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    • contoso-deploy-pipeline — Contributor at /subscriptions/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 · Principal: unknown
    Learn more ↗
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Rotate service principal credentials

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: Credential metadata was not collected for Azure role principals. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Enable blob soft delete

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    This scan could not read the blob soft delete setting of 1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production".

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Disable public blob access

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: 1 storage account lacked readable, explicit configuration evidence; 0 exceeded this scan's direct-read limit. Readable accounts retain their individual results. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Require HTTPS on storage

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: 1 storage account lacked readable, explicit configuration evidence; 0 exceeded this scan's direct-read limit. Readable accounts retain their individual results. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Review App Service authentication

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Turn off password deployment on App Services

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Turn off unencrypted FTP on App Services

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Turn off remote debugging on App Services

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Require TLS 1.2 on App Services

    What this means

    This control could not be evaluated: App Service child configuration was not collected from a valid inventory. No conclusion is drawn either way — this is not a pass.

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Set a spending alert on each subscription

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    This scan could not read the budgets of subscription "Contoso Production".

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Configure diagnostic settings

    What this means

    This scan could not read the diagnostic settings of 1 storage account, 1 key vault, 1 SQL server and 1 network security group.

    How to check it

    This scan does not read this setting yet, so running it again will not change this result. To check it yourself: [Resource] → Monitoring → Diagnostic settings, in the Azure portal.

  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Send Defender for Cloud alerts to someone who reads them

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    This scan could not read who Defender for Cloud emails about security alerts in subscription "Contoso Production".

    How to check it

    Re-run the scan. If this persists, confirm the scanning service principal still holds the Reader role on every subscription in scope and that the relevant resource providers are registered.

    Technical details
  • Not verifiedYour Azure cloud

    Assign the security benchmark

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    The Microsoft cloud security benchmark is not assigned on subscription "Contoso Production" itself. This scan cannot tell whether a management group above the subscription assigns it.

    How to check it

    This scan does not read this setting yet, so running it again will not change this result. To check it yourself: in the Azure portal, open Policy → Assignments, set the scope to the management groups above this subscription, and look for Microsoft cloud security benchmark. If it is not there, assign it on the tenant root management group, which covers every subscription.

In good shape (12)
  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Narrow overbroad custom roles

    No custom role allows every action or lets its holders change who has access.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Limit User Access Administrators

    Nobody holds User Access Administrator over a whole scanned subscription.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Use RBAC for Key Vaults

    No key vault relies on access policies.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Remove public IPs from VMs

    No VMs have directly attached public IPs.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Retire unsupported OS versions

    The virtual machine runs an operating system that still gets security updates (Windows Server 2016).

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Block database ports from the internet

    No NSGs expose database ports to the internet.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Remove allow-any firewall rules

    No NSG rule lets every port in from the internet.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Block SMB, RPC and WinRM from the internet

    No NSGs allow SMB, RPC or WinRM from the internet.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Clean up orphaned network resources

    All 2 network resources in the scanned subscriptions (interfaces, public IPs, security groups) are attached to something.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Set an Entra admin for SQL

    All SQL Servers have an Azure AD admin configured.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Encrypt SQL databases

    All user SQL databases have TDE enabled.

  • In good shapeYour Azure cloud

    Enable SQL threat protection

    All SQL Servers have Advanced Threat Protection enabled.

Does not apply (19)
  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Use PIM for privileged roles

    Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Keep other Azure Backup items working

    No Azure Backup item other than a virtual machine was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Protect backup vaults from deletion

    No backup vault was found in the scanned subscriptions, so there is nothing to protect here.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Delete unattached managed disks

    No managed disk was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Onboard VMs to Defender

    Defender for Servers is not on in the subscription that holds your virtual machine, so this scan cannot use it to see whether it has endpoint protection.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Turn off password sign-in on Linux machines

    No Linux virtual machine was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Enable WAF on Application Gateway

    No Application Gateway was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Enable DDoS Protection

    No virtual network was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Attach a WAF to Front Door

    No Front Door was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Public IP inventory

    No public IP address was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Use Entra sign-in for point-to-site VPN

    No virtual network gateway was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Limit which networks can reach Cosmos DB

    No Cosmos DB account was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Close PostgreSQL and MySQL servers to the internet

    No PostgreSQL or MySQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Enforce SSL on MySQL

    No MySQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Enforce SSL on PostgreSQL

    No PostgreSQL server was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Turn off the unencrypted Redis port

    No Azure Cache for Redis was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Retain logs for 90+ days

    No Log Analytics workspace was found in the scanned subscriptions, so this check does not apply.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Enable Defender auto-provisioning

    Microsoft retired the Log Analytics agent in November 2024 and switched off its automatic installation, which is the setting this check read. There is nothing left to turn on, so this check no longer reports a result.

  • Does not applyYour Azure cloud

    Top Defender recommendations

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    Defender for Cloud returned no plans for subscription "Contoso Production", so there are no recommendations to read there.