DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

Run it on your own tenant →

Identity

Who can get in

Passwords, second sign-in steps, admin accounts

Measured score

25

Assessed results

39Total
25Need attention
9In good shape
5Do not apply
3Critical
3High
0Suppressed

Needs attention (25)

  • SeriousNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Enable Security Defaults or Conditional Access

    What this means

    Security Defaults is disabled. 2 policies reviewed. No universal MFA baseline candidate was established. A universal legacy-authentication block was not established.

    What to do

    Ask your IT administrator to review the existing baseline and its exceptions. Use Security Defaults or tested Conditional Access policies appropriate to the tenant.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    3 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    Identity protection baseline

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 3 recorded items

    • Security Defaults: Disabled
    • Require MFA for admins — MFA: Does not include all users; Legacy authentication: Does not include all users; Client application coverage is incomplete or unspecified; The grant does not establish a block
    • Block legacy authentication — MFA: Policy is not enforcing; Client application coverage is incomplete or unspecified; The grant does not establish mandatory MFA; Legacy authentication: Policy is not enforcing
    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Require MFA for all users

    What this means

    No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for modern user sign-ins was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Require MFA for admins

    What this means

    No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for the 14 reference administrator roles (every role Microsoft marks privileged is one of the 14 reference roles) was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. Policy "Require MFA for admins" would meet it but leaves out 1 reference administrator role (Conditional Access Administrator). This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • Require MFA for admins — Reference admin roles not included: Conditional Access Administrator
    • Block legacy authentication — Policy is not enforcing; Client application coverage is incomplete or unspecified; The grant does not establish mandatory MFA
    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Block legacy authentication

    What this means

    No supported baseline for a legacy-authentication block was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Block device code flow

    What this means

    Nothing in this tenant blocks device code flow. An attacker starts the flow, sends the victim a genuine microsoft.com sign-in page and a genuine 8-character code, and the victim — who sees no fake domain and no suspicious attachment — completes MFA for them. The access token lands with the attacker, already MFA-satisfied.

    What to do

    Create a Conditional Access policy blocking the device code flow for all users, excluding only shared-device accounts that genuinely need it.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Hardware that has no browser and signs in by device code — Teams Rooms panels, some conference-room systems, printers and IoT devices — will stop authenticating. Filter sign-in logs on the device-code flow before enforcing, and put any accounts you find into an excluded group rather than leaving the flow open tenant-wide.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access — block device code flow

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No enabled policy blocks the deviceCodeFlow transfer method→Should be: An enabled policy: All users, All resources, Authentication flows = Device code flow, Grant: Block access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies → New policy
    2. Name: 'Block device code flow'
    3. Assignments → Users: All users (Exclude: break-glass, and any shared-device account group)
    4. Assignments → Target resources: All resources
    5. Conditions → Authentication flows → Configure: Yes → select 'Device code flow'
    6. Access controls → Grant: Block access
    7. Enable in Report-only briefly to confirm nothing legitimate uses it, then switch to On
    8. Microsoft also ships this as a managed policy named 'Block device code flow' — if it is present in your list, turning that one on is enough

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • No Conditional Access policy blocks device code flow — 2 Conditional Access policies exist; none scopes conditions.authenticationFlows.transferMethods to deviceCodeFlow with a block grant

    How an attacker would use it

    The attacker requests a device code from Microsoft, then asks the victim — over Teams, email or a phone call posing as IT — to open microsoft.com/devicelogin and enter it. Every element the victim checks is authentic: real domain, real certificate, real MFA prompt. The attacker collects the resulting refresh token and reads mail, files and Teams as that user, with MFA already satisfied.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Restrict guest invitations

    What this means

    ANY user (including guests themselves) can invite new guests. A single compromised account or rogue guest can create persistent attacker-controlled guest accounts. This is the loosest possible setting.

    What to do

    Restrict guest invitations to admins (or to a 'Guest Inviter' role assigned to specific business users) and ensure the default guest role is 'Guest user' (not 'User').

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Before you change it
    Business users who currently invite their own guests will need to request invitations through IT or via the Guest Inviter role. Communicate the change to avoid frustration.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    External collaboration settings — guest invitations

    Entra admin center → Identity → External Identities → External collaboration settings

    Now: Guest invite setting: Anyone in the organization can invite guest users including guests and non-members→Should be: 'Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users' and default guest role 'Guest user'

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → External Identities → External collaboration settings
    2. Guest invite settings: select 'Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users'
    3. Guest user access: select 'Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects'

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • allowInvitesFrom — everyone

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker compromises any user account. From that account, invites a guest tied to [email protected]. When IT resets the compromised account's password, the guest remains — and the attacker now has persistent access via an account no one is watching.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Require MFA to join or register devices

    What this means

    The tenant device-registration MFA switch is off and no enabled Conditional Access policy targets the register-or-join-device user action. Other sign-in protections may still apply; this identifies a gap in dedicated registration MFA controls.

    What to do

    Review MFA for device registration using either the tenant setting or Conditional Access. Review exclusions and test the impact before enforcement.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    New MFA requirements can affect user-driven enrollment. Validate your enrollment methods and emergency-access procedure before changing enforcement.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Device registration MFA

    Entra admin center → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings

    Now: notRequired→Should be: Required through the tenant setting or an appropriately scoped Conditional Access policy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Open Entra ID → Devices → Overview → Device settings and review the device-registration MFA setting.
    2. If using Conditional Access, target the 'Register or join devices' user action and require MFA or an MFA authentication strength. Review emergency-access exclusions explicitly.
    3. For the Conditional Access route, set the tenant device-registration MFA switch to No as Microsoft requires; test in report-only before enabling the CA policy.

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • Require MFA to register or join devices — notRequired
    • Conditional Access for device registration — No enabled device-registration user-action policy was found

    How an attacker would use it

    An attacker using a compromised account may attempt to register a device. Requiring MFA at registration adds a barrier. Registration alone does not establish Intune compliance, hybrid join, or a bypass of device-based Conditional Access.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    User MFA registration gaps

    What this means

    MFA is not registered for 2 of 9 assessed non-admin member accounts (22%) in Microsoft's report. This is a registration gap, not proof that a password-only sign-in would succeed.

    What to do

    Review these accounts and help active users register an appropriate MFA method. Check enforcement separately and preserve tested emergency access.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes

    2 observed affected resources · 2 evidence rows shown

    2 affected accounts

    Verify registration for each account below. Microsoft’s report can lag a change; a missing account does not confirm a fix. Other accounts remain open.

    Evidence · 2 recorded items
    • [email protected] — Last sign-in 1 day ago · MFA registration reported false; effective sign-in enforcement was not evaluated
    • [email protected] — Last sign-in 1 day ago · MFA registration reported false; effective sign-in enforcement was not evaluated
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    MFA registration

    Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → Registration campaign

    Now: 2 of 9 assessed non-admin member accounts not registered→Should be: Active accounts have suitable registered authentication methods

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    MFA registration is not protected

    What this means

    Anyone who gets the password of an account that has no MFA yet can register their own phone as its second step, and keep signing in as that person. No Conditional Access policy in force protects registering sign-in methods.

    What to do

    Add a Conditional Access policy that requires an existing second step, or a one-time pass you issue to new staff, before anyone registers a sign-in method from outside your trusted locations.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Someone with no MFA method yet cannot register one from outside your trusted locations without a Temporary Access Pass. Guests are left out because a Temporary Access Pass does not work for them.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access: secure security info registration

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No enforcing policy targets Register security information→Should be: An enabled policy: All users (guests and emergency access accounts excluded), User actions = Register security information, outside trusted locations, Grant: multifactor authentication

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Create new policy from templates → Securing security info registration (or New policy)
    2. Users: All users; exclude All guest and external users, and your emergency access accounts
    3. Target resources → User actions → Register security information
    4. Conditions → Locations: include Any location, exclude All trusted locations
    5. Grant → Require authentication strength → Multifactor authentication
    6. Turn it on in Report-only first, issue a Temporary Access Pass to anyone who has not registered yet, then switch it On

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • No Conditional Access policy protects registering sign-in methods — 2 Conditional Access policies reviewed; none targets the Register security information user action

    How an attacker would use it

    With a phished or reused password, the attacker signs in to an account that has no MFA yet and is offered registration. They register their own authenticator, and from then on the account's MFA prompts go to them.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Require phishing-resistant MFA for admins

    What this means

    No Conditional Access policy requires phishing-resistant MFA for admins. They can sign in with a text code or an app approval, which a fake sign-in page can relay.

    What to do

    Register a passkey or Windows Hello for Business for every admin first, plus two break-glass accounts, then require the built-in "Phishing-resistant MFA" authentication strength for admin roles in Conditional Access.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1.5 hours
    Before you change it
    An admin with no passkey, Windows Hello or certificate registered cannot sign in once the policy is on. Keep break-glass accounts excluded and protected separately.
    0 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access: require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Create new policy from templates → Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for administrators

    Now: Admins can satisfy MFA with a method that can be phished→Should be: Admin roles must use the Phishing-resistant MFA strength

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → enable Passkey (FIDO2)
    2. Have each admin register a passkey or Windows Hello for Business
    3. Create the template policy in Report-only, check the sign-in logs, then turn it on

    How an attacker would use it

    Phishing kits put a proxy between the admin and Microsoft's sign-in page. The admin types the code or approves the prompt, and the kit keeps the session. A passkey only answers the real Microsoft site, so the kit gets nothing.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Admins can stay signed in for weeks

    What this means

    Your administrators can stay signed in for weeks. If someone steals a signed-in session, it keeps working until it expires. No Conditional Access policy limits how long their sessions last.

    What to do

    Make admin sessions end after a working day: a Conditional Access policy for your admin roles, on all resources, that makes them sign in again every few hours (no more than 24) and never keeps their browser signed in.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Admins are asked to sign in again more often, and a browser no longer keeps them signed in after it is closed. Nothing else changes for other users.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access: sign-in frequency and persistent browser session for administrators

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No sign-in frequency or persistent browser session set→Should be: An enabled policy: admin roles (or All users), All resources, Session: Sign-in frequency 24 hours or less, Persistent browser session Never persistent

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → New policy
    2. Users: Directory roles → the same admin roles your admin MFA policy covers (exclude your emergency access accounts)
    3. Target resources: All resources
    4. Session → Sign-in frequency → Periodic reauthentication → for example 8 hours (no more than 24)
    5. Session → Persistent browser session → Never persistent
    6. Turn it on in Report-only first, check the sign-in logs, then switch it On

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • No Conditional Access policy limits admin sessions — 2 Conditional Access policies reviewed; none sets sign-in frequency or a persistent browser session

    How an attacker would use it

    A fake sign-in page that relays the real one, or malware on an admin's computer, takes the signed-in session rather than the password. With no session limit the attacker can keep using it for weeks without passing MFA again.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Find sign-ins where no second factor was required

    What this means

    3 successful sign-ins by 2 accounts in the last 30 days required only one factor. Microsoft did not require a second factor. The person may still have used Windows Hello or a passkey, and a policy may have relied on a managed device, so check why before changing anything.

    What to do

    Open a few of these sign-ins and read the Authentication details and Conditional Access tabs to see what was used and why one factor was enough. If no policy meant to allow it, require MFA for all users and all cloud apps.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1 hour
    Before you change it
    A new MFA policy prompts everyone it covers, including accounts that have not registered a method. Register people first and keep an emergency access account excluded.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access: require MFA

    Entra admin center → Monitoring & health → Sign-in logs → filter Authentication requirement = Single-factor authentication

    Now: 3 successful sign-ins requiring one factor in the last 30 days, 2 accounts, 0 admins→Should be: Single-factor sign-ins only where a policy allows them on purpose

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Monitoring & health → Sign-in logs
    2. Add the filter Authentication requirement = Single-factor authentication, and open the sign-ins below
    3. On each, read the Conditional Access tab, then close the gap with a policy in Report-only first

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • [email protected] — 2 sign-ins · Office 365 Exchange Online, Office 365 SharePoint Online · last 2026-11-09
    • [email protected] — 1 sign-in · Microsoft Teams · last 2026-11-10

    How an attacker would use it

    If the one factor required is a password, a phished or leaked password is enough. The attacker signs in as the person, and the sign-in looks like every other one in the log.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Conditional Access policies stuck in Report-only

    What this means

    1 policy has sat in Report-only for 60+ days — the oldest for 95 days. Report-only evaluates the policy on every sign-in, writes the verdict to the sign-in log, and then lets the sign-in through anyway. These policies appear in the portal as configured protection and enforce nothing. Either promote them to On or turn them Off, so the policy list reflects what is actually being enforced.

    What to do

    For each policy: review its Report-only impact, then switch it to On. If the review shows it would break something you are not ready to fix, turn it Off and note why — leaving it in Report-only just disguises the gap.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Promoting a policy to On starts enforcing it immediately, on the next sign-in. That is the point — but it is also why the Policy impact review comes first. Service accounts and legacy clients are the usual breakage.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access — policy state

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies → (policy) → Enable policy

    Now: 1 policy in Report-only for 60+ days (oldest 95 days)→Should be: Every policy is either On (enforcing) or Off — none parked in Report-only long-term

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies
    2. Open each policy listed in the evidence → Policy impact tab
    3. Review which sign-ins would have been blocked or challenged over the last 30 days
    4. If the impact is acceptable: Enable policy → On → Save
    5. If it would break something: fix that first, or set Enable policy → Off and record the decision
    6. Check the Created by column — policies marked 'Microsoft' are managed by Microsoft and normally enable themselves; if one is still Report-only well past 45 days, someone has held it back deliberately

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    An unenforced policy is worse than a missing one, because the tenant stops looking. The control shows up on the audit spreadsheet and in the portal, so nobody re-tests it — while every sign-in it was supposed to challenge sails through untouched.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Review recent privileged changes

    What this means

    2 privileged changes were made in your tenant. 1 of these granted an app access or added credentials to an app identity — the two changes that let someone back in after a password reset. Every item below is also normal administration; the point is to confirm each one was you or your IT provider. Reviewed 12 days of audit history.

    What to do

    Work down the list and confirm each change was expected. Anything you do not recognise — especially an app consent or a new app secret — should be revoked before anything else, because it survives a password reset.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 9 minutes
    Before you change it
    Revoking an app consent stops that app working for everyone until it is re-consented. Confirm what the app is used for before removing it.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Microsoft Entra audit logs

    Entra admin center → Monitoring & health → Audit logs

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Monitoring & health → Audit logs
    2. Filter by the date and activity shown above to see the full record, including the IP address
    3. For an app consent you do not recognise: Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → the app → Permissions → Review permissions → revoke
    4. For an app secret you do not recognise: Identity → Applications → App registrations → the app → Certificates & secrets → delete it
    5. For an unexpected role addition: Identity → Roles & admins → the role → remove the member

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    How an attacker would use it

    Having got one password, the attacker's next move is to stop needing it. Consenting an app or adding a secret to an existing app registration gives them their own key — one that a password reset, an MFA rollout, and a revoked session all leave untouched.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Emergency access (break-glass) accounts

    What this means

    No Global Administrator is excluded from any enabled Conditional Access policy: all 2 standing Global Administrators are inside the same policy set that governs everyone else. A mistyped policy, an expired federation certificate or an MFA provider outage would lock every administrator out of this tenant at once, and recovery then runs through Microsoft support rather than through you. This is an availability risk, not a vulnerability — nothing here is exploitable; the escape hatch is simply missing. Assessed 2 standing Global Administrators against 1 enabled Conditional Access policy; 1 report-only policy was ignored because a report-only policy cannot block a sign-in. We checked excludeUsers, excludeGroups (expanded transitively) and excludeRoles on every enabled policy. Entra ID has no attribute marking an account as break-glass, so this check looks for the configuration Microsoft's emergency-access guidance asks for — a cloud-only account with a standing Global Administrator assignment, explicitly excluded from every enabled Conditional Access policy that would otherwise apply to it, and with no interactive sign-in in the last 90 days. An account whose sign-in activity could not be read is not counted. Weaker signals (no licences, no mailbox, naming convention) are shown per account but do not decide the result, because a forgotten former-employee admin looks identical on those.

    What to do

    Create two cloud-only Global Administrator accounts, exclude both from every enabled Conditional Access policy, give each its own passkey or certificate held by a different person, and alert on any sign-in by them.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 45 minutes
    Before you change it
    Excluding an account from Conditional Access means MFA and device-compliance rules stop applying to it — that is the point, and it is why the account must sign in with its own phishing-resistant method and be monitored. Expect these accounts to surface in other findings too: they are dormant by design (stale admin accounts) and often have passwords set never to expire, which the password-expiry check flags. Those are known, intentional collisions, not contradictions.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access — policy user exclusions

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: 0 of 2 standing Global Administrators are excluded from any enabled policy→Should be: 2 cloud-only emergency access accounts excluded from every enabled Conditional Access policy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Users → New user: create two cloud-only accounts on the tenant's *.onmicrosoft.com domain
    2. Assign each one Global Administrator permanently — NOT PIM-eligible, since an eligible role cannot be activated if PIM or Conditional Access is what has broken
    3. Register a passkey (FIDO2 security key) on each, or certificate-based authentication if you already run a PKI, using a method your other admin accounts do not use; Microsoft's mandatory MFA for admin portals applies to these accounts too, so a password alone will not get in
    4. Store each account's key with a different person, in a separate secure location
    5. Protection → Conditional Access → open every enabled policy → Users → Exclude → add both accounts (a dedicated 'Emergency access' group is easier to keep in sync than per-policy user exclusions)
    6. Set an alert on sign-ins by these accounts (Entra sign-in logs → alert rule) so a use is never silent
    7. Test both accounts on a schedule — Microsoft suggests every 90 days, and after every Conditional Access change

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • [email protected] — cloud-only · not excluded from any of the 1 enabled policy · still in scope of 1 enabled policy · signed in interactively within the last 90 days (2026-11-11T10:32:22.308Z)
    • [email protected] — cloud-only · not excluded from any of the 1 enabled policy · still in scope of 1 enabled policy · signed in interactively within the last 90 days (2026-11-11T10:32:22.308Z)

    How an attacker would use it

    Most lockouts here are self-inflicted, but the attacker version is worse: an intruder who reaches one Global Administrator can tighten Conditional Access — require a compliant device, or a location nobody is in — and lock out every remaining admin while keeping their own session. With no excluded emergency account, the defenders' only route back is a Microsoft support ticket, and the attacker owns the tenant for the duration.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Limit what ordinary users can create

    What this means

    Ordinary users can register applications and create security groups. These are Microsoft's defaults, and an attacker who gets into one ordinary account can do the same.

    What to do

    Switch off what your users do not need. Administrators and the roles made for the job (Application Developer, for example) keep the ability.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    People who register applications or create security groups today will need an administrator or a role that allows it. Check who has done so recently before switching these off.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Default user role permissions

    Entra admin center → Entra ID → Users → User settings

    Now: Users can register applications; Users can create security groups→Should be: None of these left open to ordinary users

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Entra ID → Users → User settings → 'Users can register applications' → No
    2. entra.microsoft.com → Entra ID → Groups → General → 'Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell' → No

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • Users can register applications — An attacker in one ordinary account can register an app, give it a secret, and keep access after the password is reset
    • Users can create security groups — Security groups decide access. Groups anyone can create and fill end up granting access nobody reviewed

    How an attacker would use it

    From one phished mailbox the attacker registers an application in the tenant, adds a secret to it and grants it what that user may grant. The password is reset and the sessions revoked, and the application's secret still works.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    Admin accounts with mailboxes

    What this means

    3 privileged accounts have a mailbox. Best practice is dedicated cloud-only admin accounts with NO mailbox — that way phishing the admin requires guessing a UPN that's not in any directory, never appears as a sender, and is never on a public CC.

    What to do

    Create dedicated admin accounts (e.g. `[email protected]`) without mailbox licenses. Move privileged role assignments to the new accounts; demote or remove privilege from the everyday accounts.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1 hour
    Before you change it
    If the admin uses Outlook to manage email AND also clicks 'open admin portal', they'll now need to sign in with a different account. Workflow change.
    3 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Privileged users — mailbox attached

    Entra admin center → Identity → Users → All users (review listed admin accounts)

    Now: 3 privileged accounts with a mailbox attached→Should be: Privileged accounts are dedicated cloud-only identities with no mailbox license

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Create a new user without an M365 mailbox license: admin.<name>@<yourdomain>
    2. Assign the same privileged roles to the new account
    3. Remove the privileged roles from the existing mailbox-attached account
    4. Add the new admin account to your tenant-wide MFA Conditional Access policy

    Evidence · 3 recorded items

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker finds the admin's email address from a public source, sends a targeted phishing email, and captures the admin's password. A cloud-only admin with no mailbox has no public sender history to make this easy.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Sign out idle web sessions

    What this means

    No idle session timeout is set. Someone who walks away from a shared or home computer leaves Outlook on the web, SharePoint and the admin centers signed in.

    What to do

    Turn on Idle session timeout in the Microsoft 365 admin center and set it to 3 hours or less.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    People on shared or unmanaged computers are signed out after the idle period, and it replaces any separate Outlook on the web and SharePoint timeouts. Desktop and mobile apps are not affected, nor are managed devices, single sign-on from a joined device or anyone who chose "Stay signed in".
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Idle session timeout

    Microsoft 365 admin center → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy → Idle session timeout

    Now: Off→Should be: On, 3 hours or less

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy → Idle session timeout (turning it on the first time needs a Global Administrator)
    2. Turn it on and choose 3 hours or less → Save
    3. It applies to the whole organisation. To limit it to unmanaged devices, use a Conditional Access policy with app enforced restrictions (needs Entra ID P1)

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • Microsoft 365 idle session timeout — Not set for the organisation (0 other policies)

    How an attacker would use it

    The next person at a hotel business-centre computer or a shared reception desk opens the tab the last user left, and reads their mail with no password.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Review local administrator defaults for device join

    What this means

    Review the local administrator defaults for device join: the join policy adds all Global Administrators as local administrators; the join policy adds all joining users as local administrators. Confirm these assignments match your device-management needs; this policy read does not establish current local group membership.

    What to do

    Turn off 'Global administrator role is added as local administrator', make registering users standard users (grant local admin through Intune or the 'Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator' role instead), and scope who may join devices if you use Autopilot.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    Changing join defaults may affect future enrollment and software installation. Review existing device local groups separately and grant necessary access deliberately through device management.
    5 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Local administrator settings for Microsoft Entra joined devices

    Entra admin center → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings → Manage Additional local administrators on all Microsoft Entra joined devices

    Now: the join policy adds all Global Administrators as local administrators; the join policy adds all joining users as local administrators→Should be: Global administrator role not added as local admin; registering user not local admin (standard user); join limited to the users or groups that need it

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings
    2. 'Global administrator role is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join' → No
    3. 'Registering user is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join' → None (or Selected)
    4. 'Users may join devices to Microsoft Entra' → Selected, if you enrol through Autopilot or IT

    Evidence · 5 recorded items

    • Users may join devices to Microsoft Entra — All users
    • Users may register their devices with Microsoft Entra — All users
    • Maximum number of devices per user — 50
    • Join policy adds Global Administrators as local administrators — Yes
    • Registering user becomes local administrator on the device — All users

    How an attacker would use it

    Broad local administrator access can increase the impact of account compromise on endpoints. Review privileged sign-ins and device protection separately; this policy read does not prove credential theft or an endpoint-control bypass.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Review the tenant setting for Windows LAPS backups

    What this means

    Microsoft Entra password backup for Windows LAPS is disabled. Review whether you manage supported Windows devices and use Entra for backups. This does not establish shared passwords, missing rotation, or the absence of another password-management solution.

    What to do

    If using Microsoft Entra for Windows LAPS backups, enable the tenant setting and deploy a client policy to rotate and back up local administrator passwords.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Applies to supported Entra-joined or hybrid-joined Windows devices. Review existing password-management tools and pilot the client policy before deployment.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)

    Entra admin center → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings

    Now: No→Should be: Yes, with an Intune LAPS policy assigned to Windows devices

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings → 'Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)' → Yes
    2. intune.microsoft.com → Endpoint security → Account protection → Create policy → Windows LAPS
    3. Set the backup directory to Microsoft Entra ID, choose a password rotation policy and assign it to supported Windows devices; verify successful backups.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) — No
    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Do not expire passwords

    What this means

    Password expiry is not set on 2 of 2 domains. Microsoft documents that a password is then valid for 90 days. Setting it to never expire removes the doubt.

    What to do

    Set passwords to never expire, and rely on MFA and on changing a password when it is known to be exposed.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    Nothing breaks. Check that MFA is in place first: with no expiry, MFA is what limits the use of a stolen password.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Password expiration policy

    Microsoft 365 admin center → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy → Password expiration policy

    Now: Not set (Microsoft documents 90 days)→Should be: Set passwords to never expire (recommended)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy
    2. Password expiration policy → tick 'Set passwords to never expire (recommended)'
    3. Save
    4. The setting is held on each domain. If a domain named here is still listed after the next scan, set it with the PowerShell command in this finding.

    PowerShell

    # Microsoft Graph PowerShell, signed in with Domain.ReadWrite.All
    Update-MgDomain -DomainId contoso.com -PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 2147483647
    Update-MgDomain -DomainId contoso.onmicrosoft.com -PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 2147483647

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • contoso.com — No expiry setting. Microsoft documents 90 days where it is empty.
    • contoso.onmicrosoft.com — No expiry setting. Microsoft documents 90 days where it is empty.

    How an attacker would use it

    People made to change a password every few months use a pattern: a season and a year, or the old password with the last digit raised. An attacker who knows one old password, or just the pattern, guesses the current one in a handful of tries.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Keep password lockout and banned passwords tight

    What this means

    Password protection could be tighter: the custom banned password list is empty. Password spraying tries a few likely passwords against many accounts, and these two controls decide how much each guess costs.

    What to do

    Keep the lockout threshold at 10 or lower and the duration at 60 seconds or more. With Entra ID P1, enforce a custom list of your company, product and place names.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Before you change it
    A lower threshold locks out people who mistype repeatedly, though smart lockout tells familiar locations from unfamiliar ones. A new banned term applies the next time someone changes a password, and an update can take several hours to reach everyone.
    4 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Password protection

    Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → Password protection

    Now: the custom banned password list is empty→Should be: Threshold 10 or lower, duration 60 seconds or more, custom list filled in and enforced

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Authentication methods → Password protection
    2. Lockout threshold → 10 or lower; Lockout duration in seconds → 60 or higher
    3. Enforce custom list → Yes, then add your company name, products and city

    Evidence · 4 recorded items

    • Failed sign-ins before lockout — 10 (Microsoft's default, never changed)
    • Lockout duration in seconds — 60 (Microsoft's default, never changed)
    • Custom banned password list — Empty
    • Password protection for on-premises Active Directory (only with the agent installed) — On, mode Audit

    How an attacker would use it

    The attacker tries the company name and the season against every mailbox, a few attempts per account per hour, staying under the lockout threshold until one works.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Decide who can create Microsoft 365 Groups

    What this means

    Every user can create Microsoft 365 Groups. This is Microsoft's default, and it is a choice rather than a mistake: each group is a Team, a SharePoint site and a mailbox that nobody reviews when it is made.

    What to do

    If you want a review step, limit creation to a named group. If people making their own Teams suits you, keep the default and review groups some other way, such as expiry or access reviews.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    People outside the named group can no longer create Teams or Planner plans themselves and have to ask. Microsoft's guidance is that the people who keep the ability need Entra ID P1.
    3 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Group.Unified directory settings

    Entra admin center → Groups → General

    Now: every user can create Microsoft 365 Groups→Should be: Guests cannot own groups; creation limited to a named group if you want a review step

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Groups → General → 'Users can create Microsoft 365 groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell' → No
    2. Name a security group of approved creators in GroupCreationAllowedGroupId (PowerShell, see the link below)
    3. Set AllowGuestsToBeGroupOwner to false (PowerShell)

    PowerShell

    Connect-MgGraph -Scopes Directory.ReadWrite.All
    $s = Get-MgGroupSetting | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -eq 'Group.Unified' }
    # Review $s.Values, then update EnableGroupCreation, GroupCreationAllowedGroupId and AllowGuestsToBeGroupOwner

    Evidence · 3 recorded items

    • Every user can create Microsoft 365 Groups — Yes (Microsoft's default, never changed)
    • A group whose members can still create them — None
    • Guests can own groups — No (Microsoft's default, never changed)
    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Finish the authentication methods migration

    What this means

    The move to stronger sign-in methods is unfinished: the registration campaign is off.

    What to do

    Set the registration campaign to Microsoft managed or Enabled, for all users.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Methods enabled only in the legacy MFA or SSPR policy stop working at Migration Complete, so check the modern policy first. The campaign prompts people at sign-in until they register or snooze.
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Authentication methods policy: Manage migration and Registration campaign

    Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → Policies

    Now: the registration campaign is off→Should be: Migration Complete; registration campaign on for all users

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Authentication methods → Policies: confirm every method people rely on is enabled here
    2. Manage migration → Migration Complete
    3. Authentication methods → Registration campaign → State: Microsoft managed or Enabled → Include: All users → Save

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • Authentication methods policy migration — migrationComplete
    • Registration campaign — Off
    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Give every Global Administrator an outside contact

    What this means

    1 of 2 enabled Global Administrators has no contact route outside the tenant: no alternate email on another domain and no phone number. If the tenant is locked or breached, your own team has no way to reach that admin from the directory.

    What to do

    Add an alternate email on a different domain and a phone number to each Global Administrator's profile, and have them register the same details as recovery methods.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    Nothing, though other people in the directory can see contact fields, so use details that are fit for work.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    User profile: contact information

    Entra admin center → Identity → Users → All users → (admin) → Properties → Contact information

    Now: 1 Global Administrator without an outside contact→Should be: Every Global Administrator has an alternate email on another domain or a phone number

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Users → All users → open the admin → Properties → Edit properties
    2. Contact information → Other emails: add an address outside this tenant; Mobile phone: add a number
    3. Ask the admin to register the same email and phone at aka.ms/mysecurityinfo

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    Learn more ↗
In good shape (9)
  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Limit Global Administrators

    2 Global Administrators — within Microsoft's recommended range of 2-4.

    Technical detailssteps, evidence

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Roles & admins
    2. Filter to 'Global Administrator'
    3. For each member: assess whether they need GA or a scoped role

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    How an attacker would use it

    Each Global Admin is a 'crown jewel'. One compromised GA = full tenant takeover: read all email, exfiltrate all files, create persistent backdoor accounts, disable security policies. Fewer GAs = smaller phishing target.

    Learn more ↗
  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Remove stale guest accounts

    No stale guest accounts. (0 enabled guests, all active within 90 days.)

  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Keep trusted locations to your own networks

    1 trusted location(s), none with a public range of 65,536 addresses or more.

  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Stop sign-ins that still use legacy authentication

    No interactive sign-in in the last 30 days used a legacy protocol. Background sign-ins by mail apps are logged separately and were not read.

  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Conditional Access exclusions have outgrown break-glass

    No account is excluded from this tenant's 1 policy that requires MFA or blocks legacy sign-in. Worth noting the other way round: with no break-glass exclusion, a misconfigured policy can lock every administrator out of the tenant.

    Technical details
  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Keep guest accounts out of admin roles

    None of the 3 accounts in privileged admin roles is an enabled guest.

  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Allow only strong MFA methods

    Microsoft Authenticator is enabled for all users, and text message and voice call sign-in are not open to all users. Microsoft requires number matching on every Authenticator push, so there is no setting for it to check.

    Technical detailsevidence

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • Phishing-resistant methods (FIDO2 / Passkeys) — Not enabled — consider for admin accounts at minimum
  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Guard groups that hold admin roles

    No role-assignable groups exist, so no group is a path to a directory role.

  • In good shapeWho can get in

    Remove stale admin accounts

    All 3 privileged accounts have signed in successfully within the last 90 days.

Does not apply (5)
  • Does not applyWho can get in

    Remediate users flagged as at risk

    Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).

  • Does not applyWho can get in

    Block risky sign-ins

    Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).

  • Does not applyWho can get in

    Accounts with credentials in known breaches

    Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).

  • Does not applyWho can get in

    Hold admin roles through PIM, not permanently

    Not evaluated — requires EntraID_P2 (not detected in tenant SKUs).

  • Does not applyWho can get in

    Disable admin password expiration

    This check is retired. It flagged administrator accounts whose password never expires, which is what Microsoft, CISA and CIS recommend. The tenant's password expiry setting is now reported by "Do not expire passwords".