DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

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External Attack Surface

What the internet can see

Open ports, certificates, lookalike domains

Measured score

25

Partial assessment · 2 left out of the score

23Total
9Need attention
6In good shape
6Do not apply
2Not verified
3Critical
0Suppressed

Needs attention (9)

  • SeriousNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Close exposed management ports

    What this means

    1 remote-management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. Each is a direct attack surface — credential spray, exploit kits, and ransomware affiliates routinely scan the entire IPv4 space for these. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Put management interfaces behind a VPN, Tailscale/ZeroTier-style mesh, or an identity-aware proxy. If business need requires public access (rare), at minimum: source-IP allowlist at the network edge AND enforce MFA at the application layer.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 2 hours
    Before you change it
    Removing public RDP/SSH means admins working from home need a different access path (VPN, bastion, ZTNA agent). Inventory current admin usage patterns before the cutover.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Public-facing remote-management services (1 endpoint(s))

    Your firewall / cloud security group / hosting provider control panel

    Now: 1 management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet→Should be: 0 management endpoints (RDP/SMB/Telnet/WinRM/VNC), control panels (cPanel/WHM/Control Web Panel/Webmin) or FTP reachable from the public internet; access only via VPN, bastion, or identity-aware proxy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Identify the device/server hosting each exposed port (the IP + hostname above)
    2. At the firewall: restrict the port to known admin source IPs (VPN, jumphost) or block entirely
    3. For RDP specifically: deploy Azure Bastion / RDS Gateway / a SaaS jumphost instead
    4. For SMB: there is essentially no business reason to expose 445 — block it
    5. For VPN gateways: prefer cloud-managed (Entra ID conditional access in front) over device-managed
    6. For a hosting control panel (cPanel/WHM/Control Web Panel/Webmin): ask the host to restrict the panel to your office/VPN addresses, and never sign in over the plain-HTTP port
    7. For FTP: switch to SFTP or FTPS and turn off plain FTP — most hosts support this already

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • vpn.contoso.com (203.0.113.42):3389 — RDP — Microsoft Terminal Services 10.0.17763 · Remote Desktop reachable from the internet is one of the commonest ways ransomware gets in: the sign-in can be guessed at from anywhere · observed 2026-11-09

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker scans IPv4 space for port 3389. Finds your VPS. Tries 'admin/admin', 'Administrator/Welcome1!', then a 10,000-password dictionary. Lands inside the host in hours. From there, harvests credentials, pivots to AD, deploys ransomware. This is the modal ransomware attack pattern.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Close exposed database ports

    What this means

    1 database endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. This is the textbook 'leaked MongoDB' / 'open Elasticsearch' scenario — treat every one as a potential data-breach incident waiting to be discovered. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Block all database ports at the network edge. Databases should be accessible only from the application tier within a private network.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 1 hour
    Before you change it
    Anything currently connecting to the database from outside your network will fail. Inventory legitimate connections (analytics tools, BI dashboards) first; route them through a VPN or bastion.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Public-facing database services (1 endpoint(s))

    Your firewall / cloud security group / hosting provider control panel

    Now: 1 database endpoint(s) (Mongo/Elasticsearch/Redis/SQL/etc.) reachable from the public internet→Should be: 0 database ports reachable from the public internet; databases reachable only from the application tier via private networking

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Identify the cloud account / data center hosting each database
    2. Apply Network Security Group / security group / firewall rule blocking the port from the internet
    3. Re-test with `curl` or `nmap` from an external IP to verify
    4. If the application that uses the database is also cloud-hosted, use private networking (VNet/VPC peering) instead of public IPs
    5. If on-prem: move the DB behind your perimeter firewall, not in the DMZ

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker runs a Shodan query for 'mongodb' or 'product:Elasticsearch port:9200'. Finds your database in the results. Connects. Either no password is set (Mongo/Elasticsearch default) or a default-weak credential lets them in. Reads or downloads the entire database. Many ransomware groups now do this as a one-step attack: dump → delete → ransom note in a 'README' document.

  • SeriousNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Certificates past their expiry date

    What this means

    1 certificate(s) on record have passed their expiry date. The record may be older than this scan, so a certificate may have been renewed since. If it has not, browsers and apps refuse to connect to that service. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Check each service. If its certificate has not been renewed, renew it now and fix whatever should have renewed it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    TLS certificate(s) past their expiry date on public services (1)

    The hosting environment / load balancer / CDN serving each affected service (ACM, Let's Encrypt automation, IIS, nginx, etc.)

    Now: 1 certificate(s) past their expiry date on record→Should be: 0 expired certificates; auto-renewal job verified green

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • contoso.com:443 — contoso.com — ran out on 2026-11-02, before it was last seen · observed 2026-11-09
  • Should fixNeeds a lookWhat the internet can see

    Certificates expiring within 30 days

    What this means

    1 certificate(s) expire within 30 days — schedule replacement. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Schedule renewal.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    TLS certificate(s) expiring within 30 days (1)

    The hosting environment / load balancer / CDN serving each affected service

    Now: 1 certificate(s) expiring within 30 days→Should be: Renewals scheduled or automated well before the 30-day mark

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

  • Should fixNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Self-signed TLS certificates

    What this means

    2 public-facing service(s) use self-signed certificates. Users get security warnings, and the certificate provides no authentication of identity — making MitM attacks indistinguishable from normal connection. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Replace with a CA-issued certificate (Let's Encrypt is free for any public hostname).

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    Self-signed TLS certificate(s) on public services (2)

    The hosting environment / load balancer / CDN serving each affected service

    Now: 2 service(s) presenting self-signed certificates to the public internet→Should be: All public services present certificates issued by a trusted CA (Let's Encrypt, ACM, commercial CA)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • vpn.contoso.com:3389 — vpn.contoso.com — issuer matches subject (self-signed) · observed 2026-11-09
    • vpn.contoso.com:443 — vpn.contoso.com — issuer matches subject (self-signed) · observed 2026-11-09
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Mail-capable lookalike domains

    What this means

    1 domain close to contoso.com was registered in the last year and is set up for email. New lookalikes set up for email are a common start to invoice fraud. Check that you recognise each one.

    What to do

    Review each mail-capable lookalike. If it's not yours: report it to the registrar / hosting provider for abuse, and make sure your own DMARC is at p=reject so spoofing your EXACT domain fails (note: DMARC doesn't stop lookalike domains — user awareness and monitoring do). Consider defensively registering the closest lookalikes and common alternate TLDs.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    Mail-capable lookalike domains (1)

    Registrar abuse reporting for each domain; your DMARC policy; defensive registration

    Now: 1 lookalike domain (names withheld in this sample)→Should be: No unaffiliated mail-capable domain impersonates yours

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • Lookalike domain 1 (name withheld in this sample) — Set up for email, registered in May 2026

    How an attacker would use it

    An attacker registers a near-identical domain and emails your finance team or customers from it. Because it's a different domain, your SPF/DKIM/DMARC don't apply — the mail is 'legitimately' sent from the lookalike, and only a careful reader spots the difference.

  • Should fixNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Retire outdated TLS versions

    What this means

    1 public service(s) still offer deprecated SSL/TLS protocols. These are vulnerable to downgrade attacks (an on-path attacker forces the weak version), fail PCI-DSS, and break for modern clients. Disable everything below TLS 1.2. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Disable SSLv2/SSLv3/TLS 1.0/TLS 1.1 at each service (web server, load balancer, CDN, or appliance) and require TLS 1.2+ (ideally 1.3). Verify with SSL Labs afterward.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Very old clients (legacy point-of-sale, ancient Android/IE) that only speak TLS 1.0 will stop connecting — which is the point, but confirm you don't depend on any.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    Services offering deprecated TLS/SSL (1)

    TLS configuration of each affected web server / load balancer / CDN / appliance

    Now: vpn.contoso.com:3389 (TLS 1.0)→Should be: TLS 1.2 minimum (prefer 1.3); SSLv2/SSLv3/TLS 1.0/1.1 disabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • vpn.contoso.com:3389 — Still offers TLS 1.0 · observed 2026-11-09
  • Should fixNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Patch internet-facing services

    What this means

    3 CVE match(es) across the internet-facing footprint — 3 not scored. No severity score was found for any of them; that does not make them minor. Each is inferred from software a public index saw on the address, not tested against the service. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Patch or upgrade each affected service. For products you can't immediately patch (legacy appliances, vendor-managed software), restrict the port at the firewall and pursue vendor support.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 3 hours
    Before you change it
    Patches and upgrades can introduce compatibility regressions. Apply in a non-production environment first if possible.
    3 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Internet-facing services with known CVEs (top: CVE-2019-0708 on vpn.contoso.com)

    The hosting environment for each affected service (cloud VM, on-prem server, appliance admin panel) — firewall as a stop-gap

    Now: 3 CVE match(es) (0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium), 3 not scored→Should be: All internet-facing services patched above the affected version range, or restricted to known-IP allowlists

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. For each CVE: read the NVD entry (linked) to confirm applicability
    2. Identify the device hosting the service (cloud VM, on-prem server, appliance)
    3. Patch to a version above the affected range, OR
    4. Restrict the service to known-IP allow-lists at the network edge until patch is available
    5. Subscribe to vendor security advisories so future CVEs are caught faster

    Evidence · 3 recorded items

    How an attacker would use it

    Each match is a published vulnerability that a public index ties to software it saw on one of these addresses. The index is open to anyone, so an attacker can read the same list and use it to choose what to try. A match does not show that anyone has tried.

    Learn more ↗
  • MinorNeeds a lookWhat the internet can see

    DNSSEC not enabled

    What this means

    contoso.com does not publish DNSSEC (no DS record in the parent zone). Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison a resolver's cache or sit on the network path can forge answers for your domain — redirecting mail (MX) or web traffic (A) to infrastructure they control.

    What to do

    Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider / registrar. Most (Cloudflare, Route 53, Azure DNS) enable it with one click, then publish the DS record to your registrar.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    A botched DNSSEC rollout (mismatched DS after a key rotation) can make the domain unresolvable. Follow the provider's guided flow and verify before/after.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    DNSSEC for contoso.com

    Your DNS provider → DNSSEC (enable), then your registrar → add the DS record

    Now: DNSSEC not enabled (no DS record)→Should be: DNSSEC enabled and DS record published at the registrar

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • DS record for contoso.com — No DS record published in the parent zone
    Learn more ↗

Not verified (2)

  • Not verifiedWhat the internet can see

    Stay off threat blocklists

    What this means

    The malware blocklist (URLhaus) could not be downloaded on this scan, so your 4 hostname(s) were not checked.

    How to check it

    Nothing to fix on this evidence. The next scan downloads the lists again.

  • Not verifiedWhat the internet can see

    Publish a security contact (security.txt)

    What this means

    contoso.com/.well-known/security.txt could not be read from outside (HTTP 301), so whether a security contact is published is not known.

    How to check it

    Nothing to fix on this evidence. If a security.txt is published, make sure whatever sits in front of the website lets an anonymous visitor read it — a reporter gets the same answer we did.

In good shape (6)
  • In good shapeWhat the internet can see

    External attack-surface inventory

    Discovered 3 internet-facing IP(s) across 1 domain(s), with 6 unique port(s) open. 0 host(s) sit behind a CDN.

    Technical detailsevidence

    Evidence · 3 recorded items

  • In good shapeWhat the internet can see

    Lock down exposed admin panels

    No admin panel was recognised on 2 HTTP services with a title, server header or banner, as indexed by Shodan; 1 other web service had no HTTP metadata and was not assessed.

  • In good shapeWhat the internet can see

    Registered lookalike domains

    11 more domains close to contoso.com are registered and not flagged: 5 are set up for email but were registered over a year ago, so they are most likely unrelated businesses; 6 are not set up for email. They are listed so you can check that you recognise them.

    Technical detailsevidence

    Evidence · 11 recorded items

    • Lookalike domain 1 (name withheld in this sample) — Set up for email, registered in May 2020
    • Lookalike domain 2 (name withheld in this sample) — Set up for email, registered in July 2025
    • Lookalike domain 3 (name withheld in this sample) — Set up for email, registered in September 2021
    • Lookalike domain 4 (name withheld in this sample) — Set up for email, registered in July 2021
    • Lookalike domain 5 (name withheld in this sample) — Set up for email, registered in June 2022
    • Lookalike domain 6 (name withheld in this sample) — Registered, not set up for email
    • Lookalike domain 7 (name withheld in this sample) — Registered, not set up for email
    • Lookalike domain 8 (name withheld in this sample) — Registered, not set up for email
    • Lookalike domain 9 (name withheld in this sample) — Registered, not set up for email
    • Lookalike domain 10 (name withheld in this sample) — Registered, not set up for email
    • Lookalike domain 11 (name withheld in this sample) — Registered, not set up for email
  • In good shapeWhat the internet can see

    Keep domain registration healthy

    No problem found in 1 domain registration(s).

    Technical detailsevidence

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • contoso.com — Expires 2027-08-31; not on hold; transfer lock on
  • In good shapeWhat the internet can see

    Resolve flagged hosts

    None of your internet-facing hosts carry a high-risk Shodan tag (compromised, malware, database, ics, …).

  • In good shapeWhat the internet can see

    Keep internet-facing servers on a supported version

    None of the 7 internet-facing service(s) on record announced a Windows or Exchange version, so nothing was found to be past support. A server that announces no version cannot be judged from outside.

Does not apply (6)
  • Does not applyWhat the internet can see

    Remove dangling DNS records

    No verified domains were available to enumerate subdomains for.

  • Does not applyWhat the internet can see

    Send recommended security headers

    No probed web assets to evaluate (enable asset fingerprinting and declare your web/portal URLs).

  • Does not applyWhat the internet can see

    Keep the public website on software its maker still supports

    The home page of contoso.com could not be read from outside (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so there was no announced software to judge.

  • Does not applyWhat the internet can see

    Send the website's home page with browser protections switched on

    The home page of contoso.com gave no page to judge (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so its browser protections were not read.

  • Does not applyWhat the internet can see

    Keep the website's platform and plugins up to date

    The home page of contoso.com gave no page to read (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so the parts it is built from were not listed.

  • Does not applyWhat the internet can see

    Keep the website's PHP on a release with the latest security fixes

    The home page of contoso.com could not be read from outside (it answered with a redirect that was not followed), so whether it runs PHP is not known.