Apps & Consent
Apps with access to your data
Outside apps, their permissions and secrets
Measured score
57
Assessed results
Needs attention (5)
- SeriousNeeds fixingApps with access to your data
Restrict user app consent
What this means
User consent is fully open — any user can grant any OAuth app any permission including Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, and Directory.ReadWrite.All. This is the worst possible consent posture and the basis for illicit-consent attacks.
What to do
Change to 'Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers, for selected permissions' AND enable the admin consent workflow.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- About 30 minutes
- Before you change it
- Users who currently consent to apps will need to request admin consent instead. Inform users and ensure a reviewer is monitoring requests.
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
User consent settings for enterprise applications
Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → User consent settings
Now: Allow user consent for apps (legacy — all permissions)→Should be: Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers, for selected permissions
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions
- User consent settings → 'Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers, for selected permissions'
- Admin consent requests → Set 'Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to' → Yes
- Configure reviewers for incoming consent requests
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Allow user consent for ALL apps (legacy default) — Worst posture: any user can consent to any app with any permissions, including mail/file read-write. This is the default illicit-consent-attack surface.
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Attacker registers a malicious app called 'Calendar Helper' in their tenant. Sends users a link to the consent screen requesting Mail.ReadWrite + Files.ReadWrite.All. User clicks Accept (it's just a Microsoft sign-in page!). App now reads mail via Graph using the user's permissions. No password was captured — MFA was already passed when the user signed in. Persistent until the consent is manually revoked.
- Should fixNeeds a lookApps with access to your data
Enable the admin consent workflow
What this means
Admin consent workflow is DISABLED. If you've restricted user consent (recommended), users currently have no in-product way to request admin approval — they'll either go without legitimate apps or look for workarounds (personal accounts, shadow IT).
What to do
Enable the admin consent workflow and assign reviewers (e.g. your IT or security team).
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- About 10 minutes
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Admin consent workflow
Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → Admin consent settings
Now: Disabled→Should be: Enabled with reviewers assigned
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → Admin consent settings
- Set 'Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to' → Yes
- Reviewers: add your IT admin group or specific reviewers
- Selected users will receive email notifications for requests: Yes
- Reminders enabled: Yes
- Consent request expires after: 30 days
Learn more ↗Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Admin consent workflow — Disabled
- Should fixNeeds fixingApps with access to your data
Long-lived app credentials
What this means
1 app credential(s) have validity longer than 1 year. Industry guidance is to rotate every 12 months; long-lived secrets that leak (via committed source code, support tickets, screenshots) remain exploitable for years.
What to do
Replace with shorter-lived secrets (≤ 12 months) or, better, federated identity credentials (no secret at all).
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- About 30 minutes
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, evidence
The setting
App registration credential lifetime
Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → App registrations → (each app) → Certificates & secrets
Now: 1 credential(s) with >365-day validity→Should be: ≤ 12 months validity, or federated identity credentials
Open in the admin portal ↗Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Contoso Intranet — Secret "prod" — 731-day validity
Learn more ↗How an attacker would use it
Attacker who finds a leaked long-lived secret (in old git history, exposed config, support ticket) has years of access before it rotates.
- Should fixNeeds a lookApps with access to your data
Review delegated app consent grants
What this means
1 dangerous delegated scope was granted for individual users. No classified tenant-wide dangerous grant was found.
What to do
Review each grant and revoke any the business does not recognize; then restrict future user consent.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- Not estimated
- Before you change it
- Users of a revoked app lose its access until an admin re-consents deliberately.
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Permissions (delegated)
Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → (app) → Permissions
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- Entra admin center → Enterprise applications
- Open each flagged app → Permissions
- Revoke the delegated grants you do not recognize
- Tighten user consent under Consent and permissions → User consent settings
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- InvoiceSync Connector — Microsoft Graph: Mail.ReadWrite — 1 user with user-specific consent · Publisher: UNVERIFIED
How an attacker would use it
A compromised application may use its delegated grants to access user data. Actual access depends on the user, token state, applicable policies and API-specific restrictions; this scan does not establish exploitation or MFA bypass.
- MinorNeeds a lookApps with access to your data
Expired app credentials still present
What this means
1 expired credential(s) are still attached to app registrations. Cleanup hygiene — they can't be used but they clutter your credential inventory.
What to do
Delete the expired credential entries via the portal or Graph API.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- Not estimated
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, evidence
The setting
App registration credentials
Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → App registrations → (each app) → Certificates & secrets
Now: 1 expired credential(s) still attached→Should be: Expired credentials removed
Open in the admin portal ↗Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Contoso Intranet — Expired secret "prod"
In good shape (7)
- In good shapeApps with access to your data
Keep owners of powerful apps to app administrators
None of the 0 app(s) registered in this tenant holds a high-risk Microsoft Graph application permission.
- In good shapeApps with access to your data
Review high-risk app permissions
2 apps that are yours or a vendor's were reviewed. 0 have known broad application grants. 0 need additional permission review. This checks grants, not effective access; API-specific restrictions and business need require review.
Technical detailssetting
Learn more ↗The setting
Enterprise application permissions
Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → Application → Permissions
Now: 0 broad-grant applications; 0 requiring additional review→Should be: Reviewed least-privilege grants and complete permission evidence
Open in the admin portal ↗ - In good shapeApps with access to your data
Review apps that hold admin roles
No enabled app outside Microsoft's own holds a privileged admin role.
- In good shapeApps with access to your data
Retire dormant app identities that still hold access
All 2 app identities outside Microsoft's own first-party service principals have signed in within the last 90 days.
- In good shapeApps with access to your data
Review new outside apps given access
No app from another organization was given access to company data in the last 30 days.
- In good shapeApps with access to your data
Credentials attached to service principals
Reviewed 2 third-party and customer apps; no credentials that could sign in as an app are attached to any service principal.
Technical detailssteps
Steps
- Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → (flagged app)
- Review Certificates & secrets on the SERVICE PRINCIPAL (use Graph: GET /servicePrincipals/{id} keyCredentials, passwordCredentials)
- Remove any credential your team cannot account for
- If unaccounted for, treat as an incident: review the app's sign-in logs
How an attacker would use it
An attacker with a foothold adds their own password to an existing enterprise app and keeps authenticating as that app — quiet, durable access that survives every user-account remediation.
- In good shapeApps with access to your data
Tighten app registration redirect URIs
All 1 redirect URI across 1 app registration are exact https addresses (or documented native-client loopback entries), and no app issues access tokens via the implicit flow. Redirect URI hostnames were not cross-checked against dangling DNS records on this scan, because no subdomain takeover data was available — treat that dimension as unassessed rather than clear.