DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

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Apps & Consent

Apps with access to your data

Outside apps, their permissions and secrets

Measured score

57

Assessed results

12Total
5Need attention
7In good shape
1Critical
0Suppressed

Needs attention (5)

  • Should fixNeeds fixingApps with access to your data

    Long-lived app credentials

    What this means

    1 app credential(s) have validity longer than 1 year. Industry guidance is to rotate every 12 months; long-lived secrets that leak (via committed source code, support tickets, screenshots) remain exploitable for years.

    What to do

    Replace with shorter-lived secrets (≤ 12 months) or, better, federated identity credentials (no secret at all).

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    App registration credential lifetime

    Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → App registrations → (each app) → Certificates & secrets

    Now: 1 credential(s) with >365-day validity→Should be: ≤ 12 months validity, or federated identity credentials

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker who finds a leaked long-lived secret (in old git history, exposed config, support ticket) has years of access before it rotates.

    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookApps with access to your data

    Review delegated app consent grants

    What this means

    1 dangerous delegated scope was granted for individual users. No classified tenant-wide dangerous grant was found.

    What to do

    Review each grant and revoke any the business does not recognize; then restrict future user consent.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    Before you change it
    Users of a revoked app lose its access until an admin re-consents deliberately.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Permissions (delegated)

    Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → (app) → Permissions

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Enterprise applications
    2. Open each flagged app → Permissions
    3. Revoke the delegated grants you do not recognize
    4. Tighten user consent under Consent and permissions → User consent settings

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • InvoiceSync Connector — Microsoft Graph: Mail.ReadWrite — 1 user with user-specific consent · Publisher: UNVERIFIED

    How an attacker would use it

    A compromised application may use its delegated grants to access user data. Actual access depends on the user, token state, applicable policies and API-specific restrictions; this scan does not establish exploitation or MFA bypass.

  • MinorNeeds a lookApps with access to your data

    Expired app credentials still present

    What this means

    1 expired credential(s) are still attached to app registrations. Cleanup hygiene — they can't be used but they clutter your credential inventory.

    What to do

    Delete the expired credential entries via the portal or Graph API.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    App registration credentials

    Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → App registrations → (each app) → Certificates & secrets

    Now: 1 expired credential(s) still attached→Should be: Expired credentials removed

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

In good shape (7)
  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Keep owners of powerful apps to app administrators

    None of the 0 app(s) registered in this tenant holds a high-risk Microsoft Graph application permission.

  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Review high-risk app permissions

    2 apps that are yours or a vendor's were reviewed. 0 have known broad application grants. 0 need additional permission review. This checks grants, not effective access; API-specific restrictions and business need require review.

    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    Enterprise application permissions

    Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → Application → Permissions

    Now: 0 broad-grant applications; 0 requiring additional review→Should be: Reviewed least-privilege grants and complete permission evidence

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Review apps that hold admin roles

    No enabled app outside Microsoft's own holds a privileged admin role.

  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Retire dormant app identities that still hold access

    All 2 app identities outside Microsoft's own first-party service principals have signed in within the last 90 days.

  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Review new outside apps given access

    No app from another organization was given access to company data in the last 30 days.

  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Credentials attached to service principals

    Reviewed 2 third-party and customer apps; no credentials that could sign in as an app are attached to any service principal.

    Technical detailssteps

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → (flagged app)
    2. Review Certificates & secrets on the SERVICE PRINCIPAL (use Graph: GET /servicePrincipals/{id} keyCredentials, passwordCredentials)
    3. Remove any credential your team cannot account for
    4. If unaccounted for, treat as an incident: review the app's sign-in logs

    How an attacker would use it

    An attacker with a foothold adds their own password to an existing enterprise app and keeps authenticating as that app — quiet, durable access that survives every user-account remediation.

  • In good shapeApps with access to your data

    Tighten app registration redirect URIs

    All 1 redirect URI across 1 app registration are exact https addresses (or documented native-client loopback entries), and no app issues access tokens via the implicit flow. Redirect URI hostnames were not cross-checked against dangling DNS records on this scan, because no subdomain takeover data was available — treat that dimension as unassessed rather than clear.