DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

Run it on your own tenant →

Turn findings into progress

Your action plan

Recommended fixes, grouped by effort and ordered with their prerequisites. Review each change before applying it.

Recommended actions

77One for each result that needs attention

Quick wins

3Start with a focused work session

Estimated effort

About 27 hrFor 53 fixes; 24 not estimated. Allow time for testing and coordination.

Current posture

46/100Partial assessment · 132 measured · 23 not verified

Review → make the change in Microsoft → verify. Tenant Strike reads your settings. It does not apply these changes. Projected score improvements assume the recommended fixes work; a fresh assessment is needed to confirm the result. Planned fixes stay open until evidence shows otherwise.

Quick wins: 3 fixes

Start here: the fixes that do the most good for the least work. A fix with no time estimate is counted as a short one.

Effort
About 1 hr
1 not estimated
Projected
49
Lift
+3
  1. SeriousIdentity

    Require MFA for all users

    What this means

    No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for modern user sign-ins was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    2 attack paths weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.
    Learn more ↗
  2. SeriousIdentity

    Enable Security Defaults or Conditional Access

    What this means

    Security Defaults is disabled. 2 policies reviewed. No universal MFA baseline candidate was established. A universal legacy-authentication block was not established.

    What to do

    Ask your IT administrator to review the existing baseline and its exceptions. Use Security Defaults or tested Conditional Access policies appropriate to the tenant.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    Identity protection baseline

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  3. SeriousApps & Consent

    Restrict user app consent

    What this means

    User consent is fully open — any user can grant any OAuth app any permission including Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, and Directory.ReadWrite.All. This is the worst possible consent posture and the basis for illicit-consent attacks.

    What to do

    Change to 'Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers, for selected permissions' AND enable the admin consent workflow.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Users who currently consent to apps will need to request admin consent instead. Inform users and ensure a reviewer is monitoring requests.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    User consent settings for enterprise applications

    Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → User consent settings

    Now: Allow user consent for apps (legacy — all permissions)→Should be: Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers, for selected permissions

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions
    2. User consent settings → 'Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers, for selected permissions'
    3. Admin consent requests → Set 'Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to' → Yes
    4. Configure reviewers for incoming consent requests
    Learn more ↗

This week: 73 fixes

Fit these around other work: more short fixes, and fixes that take up to about two hours.

Effort
About 23 hr
23 not estimated
Projected
99
Lift
+53
  1. SeriousAzure

    Block anonymous container access

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 blob container in subscription "Contoso Production" has Blob or Container anonymous-access settings. Effective public access depends on the account setting and network restrictions and was not demonstrated by this check.

    What to do

    Set publicAccess to None on each container. If anonymous access is genuinely required, document it as an exception with rationale.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Container public access level

    Storage account → Containers → [container] → Change access level

    Now: Container→Should be: Private (None)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Storage account → Containers → [container]
    2. Change access level → Private (no anonymous access) → OK

    PowerShell

    az storage container set-permission --account-name <storage> --name <container> --public-access off
    Learn more ↗
  2. SeriousAzure

    Block SSH from the internet

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows SSH (TCP/22) from the internet.

    What to do

    Restrict the source to specific IP ranges, or replace direct SSH access with Azure Bastion / VPN.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Inbound SSH (TCP/22) source

    Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]

    Now: Source: * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0→Should be: Source: specific IP range, VirtualNetwork, or use Azure Bastion

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
    2. Source: change from '*'/'Internet' to specific IP range or 'VirtualNetwork'
    3. Save. For admin access at scale, deploy Azure Bastion per VNet.

    PowerShell

    az network nsg rule update --nsg-name <nsg> -g <rg> --name <rule> --source-address-prefixes <allowed-ip-range>
    Learn more ↗
  3. SeriousAzure

    Narrow SQL firewall rules

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 broad firewall rule on SQL Servers in subscription "Contoso Production".

    What to do

    Remove the all-IPs / all-Azure-services rule. Use VNet rules (private endpoints) or narrow IP allowlists scoped to the specific clients that need access.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    SQL Server firewall rules

    SQL server → Security → Networking

    Now: 1 broad rule (e.g. allow-all: All IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0 → 255.255.255.255))→Should be: No 0.0.0.0/0 or AllowAllWindowsAzureIps rules; use private endpoints or narrow IP allowlists

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. SQL Server → Security → Networking
    2. Public network access: Selected networks (or Disabled if using private endpoints only)
    3. Remove rules with 0.0.0.0/0 → 255.255.255.255 or the 'AllowAllWindowsAzureIps' rule.
    4. Add specific IP ranges for the clients that legitimately need access.

    PowerShell

    az sql server firewall-rule delete --server <server> -g <rg> --name <rule>
    Learn more ↗
  4. SeriousExternal Attack Surface

    Close exposed database ports

    What this means

    1 database endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. This is the textbook 'leaked MongoDB' / 'open Elasticsearch' scenario — treat every one as a potential data-breach incident waiting to be discovered. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Block all database ports at the network edge. Databases should be accessible only from the application tier within a private network.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 1 hour
    Before you change it
    Anything currently connecting to the database from outside your network will fail. Inventory legitimate connections (analytics tools, BI dashboards) first; route them through a VPN or bastion.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Public-facing database services (1 endpoint(s))

    Your firewall / cloud security group / hosting provider control panel

    Now: 1 database endpoint(s) (Mongo/Elasticsearch/Redis/SQL/etc.) reachable from the public internet→Should be: 0 database ports reachable from the public internet; databases reachable only from the application tier via private networking

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Identify the cloud account / data center hosting each database
    2. Apply Network Security Group / security group / firewall rule blocking the port from the internet
    3. Re-test with `curl` or `nmap` from an external IP to verify
    4. If the application that uses the database is also cloud-hosted, use private networking (VNet/VPC peering) instead of public IPs
    5. If on-prem: move the DB behind your perimeter firewall, not in the DMZ
  5. SeriousExternal Attack Surface

    Close exposed management ports

    What this means

    1 remote-management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. Each is a direct attack surface — credential spray, exploit kits, and ransomware affiliates routinely scan the entire IPv4 space for these. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Put management interfaces behind a VPN, Tailscale/ZeroTier-style mesh, or an identity-aware proxy. If business need requires public access (rare), at minimum: source-IP allowlist at the network edge AND enforce MFA at the application layer.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 2 hours
    Before you change it
    Removing public RDP/SSH means admins working from home need a different access path (VPN, bastion, ZTNA agent). Inventory current admin usage patterns before the cutover.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Public-facing remote-management services (1 endpoint(s))

    Your firewall / cloud security group / hosting provider control panel

    Now: 1 management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet→Should be: 0 management endpoints (RDP/SMB/Telnet/WinRM/VNC), control panels (cPanel/WHM/Control Web Panel/Webmin) or FTP reachable from the public internet; access only via VPN, bastion, or identity-aware proxy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Identify the device/server hosting each exposed port (the IP + hostname above)
    2. At the firewall: restrict the port to known admin source IPs (VPN, jumphost) or block entirely
    3. For RDP specifically: deploy Azure Bastion / RDS Gateway / a SaaS jumphost instead
    4. For SMB: there is essentially no business reason to expose 445 — block it
    5. For VPN gateways: prefer cloud-managed (Entra ID conditional access in front) over device-managed
    6. For a hosting control panel (cPanel/WHM/Control Web Panel/Webmin): ask the host to restrict the panel to your office/VPN addresses, and never sign in over the plain-HTTP port
    7. For FTP: switch to SFTP or FTPS and turn off plain FTP — most hosts support this already
    Learn more ↗
  6. SeriousDevices

    Require BitLocker on Windows

    What this means

    2 Windows devices report BitLocker disabled. Each unencrypted device is a data-breach incident waiting for a theft or loss.

    What to do

    Make BitLocker mandatory via a compliance policy setting. Devices that fail will be marked non-compliant and (with a CA policy) blocked from corp resources until encrypted.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1.5 hours
    Before you change it
    Devices currently unencrypted will be marked non-compliant. Users will need to enable BitLocker (15-60 min per device depending on disk size). Push the policy with a grace period so users have time.
    3 attack paths weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    BitLocker / disk encryption policy

    Intune admin center → Endpoint security → Disk encryption

    Now: 2 Windows devices with BitLocker disabled, 0 with unknown status (of 4 total)→Should be: BitLocker required by compliance policy and enabled on all Windows devices

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. intune.microsoft.com → Devices → Compliance policies
    2. Open your Windows compliance policy (or create one)
    3. System Security → Encryption → 'Require encryption of data storage' → Require
    4. Save
    5. Then: Devices → Configuration profiles → Create profile → Windows → Endpoint protection → BitLocker base settings → Enable
    Learn more ↗
  7. SeriousIdentity

    Require MFA for admins

    What this means

    No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for the 14 reference administrator roles (every role Microsoft marks privileged is one of the 14 reference roles) was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. Policy "Require MFA for admins" would meet it but leaves out 1 reference administrator role (Conditional Access Administrator). This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.
    Learn more ↗
  8. SeriousExternal Attack Surface

    Certificates past their expiry date

    What this means

    1 certificate(s) on record have passed their expiry date. The record may be older than this scan, so a certificate may have been renewed since. If it has not, browsers and apps refuse to connect to that service. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Check each service. If its certificate has not been renewed, renew it now and fix whatever should have renewed it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    TLS certificate(s) past their expiry date on public services (1)

    The hosting environment / load balancer / CDN serving each affected service (ACM, Let's Encrypt automation, IIS, nginx, etc.)

    Now: 1 certificate(s) past their expiry date on record→Should be: 0 expired certificates; auto-renewal job verified green

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  9. SeriousAzure

    Block RDP from the internet

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 NSG rule in subscription "Contoso Production" allows RDP (TCP/3389) from the internet.

    What to do

    Restrict the source to specific IP ranges, or replace with Azure Bastion. Ransomware crews commonly get in this way, so fix this first if you see it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Inbound RDP (TCP/3389) source

    Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]

    Now: Source: * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0→Should be: Source: specific IP range, or remove rule and use Azure Bastion

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Network security group → Inbound security rules → [rule]
    2. Source: change to specific IP range or remove the rule
    3. Deploy Azure Bastion for admin access (no RDP exposed publicly).

    PowerShell

    az network nsg rule update --nsg-name <nsg> -g <rg> --name <rule> --source-address-prefixes <allowed-ip>
    Learn more ↗
  10. SeriousDevices

    Fix noncompliant devices

    What this means

    2 of 5 devices (40%) are actively non-compliant. Each represents a control you've defined that's currently being violated.

    What to do

    Review each non-compliant device: address the specific failing setting (disk encryption, OS version, antivirus, etc.) or remove the device from Intune if it's no longer in use.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1 hour
    1 other fix unblocked
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Intune device compliance status

    Intune admin center → Devices → All devices (filter by Compliance: Not compliant)

    Now: 2 non-compliant, 0 in grace period, 0 not evaluated (of 5 enrolled)→Should be: 0 devices in noncompliant / conflict / error state

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. intune.microsoft.com → Reports → Device compliance → Noncompliant devices
    2. Drill into each device → see specific policy items failing
    3. Common fixes: re-encrypt disk, update OS, enable Defender, restart agent

    PowerShell

    # Trigger a sync from PowerShell on a Windows device:
    Get-ScheduledTask -TaskPath "\Microsoft\Windows\EnterpriseMgmt\*" | Where-Object {$_.TaskName -eq 'PushLaunch'} | Start-ScheduledTask
    Learn more ↗
  11. Should fixDevices

    Set compliance policies per platform

    What this means

    1 OS platform with enrolled devices has no assigned compliance policy: iOS. Devices on these platforms cannot be evaluated for compliance, so CA policies requiring 'compliant device' will treat them inconsistently.

    What to do

    Create a compliance policy for each missing platform. Start with the Intune compliance baseline as a template.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Devices already enrolled that fail the new policy will be marked non-compliant. Use a grace period (Actions for noncompliance) so users have 7+ days to remediate before access is blocked.
    1 other fix unblocked
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Intune compliance policies

    Intune admin center → Devices → Compliance policies → Policies

    Now: No assigned compliance policy for: iOS→Should be: At least one compliance policy assigned for every enrolled OS platform

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. intune.microsoft.com → Devices → Compliance policies → Create policy
    2. Platform: select the missing platform → Create
    3. Use the Microsoft baseline as a starting point
    4. Assign to All users / All devices
    Learn more ↗
  12. SeriousDevices

    Require compliant devices

    What this means

    No Conditional Access policy requires a compliant device for any application. Your compliance evaluation is purely descriptive — it tells you who's non-compliant but doesn't prevent non-compliant (or attacker-controlled, unenrolled) devices from accessing corp data.

    What to do

    Create a CA policy requiring 'Compliant device' (or 'Hybrid Azure AD joined device') for access to all cloud apps, or at minimum for sensitive apps (Exchange, SharePoint, finance apps).

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 45 minutes
    Before you change it
    Users on non-Intune-enrolled devices will be blocked from sign-in. This is the intended behavior but will affect: BYOD users without Intune enrollment, kiosks, contractors with their own devices. Plan exceptions or alternative paths (MAM-only, App Protection Policies, etc.) before enforcing.
    2 attack paths weakenedBefore this step: Set compliance policies per platform, Fix noncompliant devices
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access — require compliant device grant

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: 1 CA policy enabled, none requiring compliant or hybrid-joined device→Should be: At least one enabled CA policy granting access only when the device is marked compliant or hybrid-joined

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Conditional Access → New policy
    2. Name: 'Require compliant device — all apps'
    3. Users: All users; Exclude: break-glass account, service accounts that use modern auth from non-Intune systems
    4. Cloud apps: All cloud apps (or scope to Exchange/SharePoint first)
    5. Grant: Grant access → Require device to be marked as compliant (and/or Require Hybrid Azure AD joined device) → Require one of the selected controls
    6. Enable in Report-only for 2 weeks first, review impact, then switch On
    Learn more ↗
  13. SeriousEmail

    Enforce DMARC

    What this means

    contoso.com: DMARC is published but set to p=none for contoso.com — monitoring mode only. Spoofed email is not blocked. Move to p=quarantine after reviewing reports. Also checked: contoso.onmicrosoft.com (warn).

    What to do

    Move from p=none → p=quarantine after reviewing aggregate reports.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical details
  14. SeriousAzure

    Register MFA for everyone who controls Azure

    What this means

    1 account that can control your Azure resources has no MFA method registered, so a stolen or guessed password is enough to sign in to it. That access covers a whole subscription. 1 guest also holds these roles. A guest's MFA is set up in their own organization, so it is not judged here; "Review guest role assignments" lists guests with a role of their own.

    What to do

    Have the person behind each account listed sign in and set up an MFA method, such as Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey. Remove the role from any account that no longer needs it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    MFA methods of accounts with Azure roles

    Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods

    Now: 1 account with an Azure role has no MFA method→Should be: Every account with an Azure role has an MFA method

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Ask the person behind each account listed to sign in at https://aka.ms/mysecurityinfo and add Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey.
    2. To confirm: Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods.
    3. If an account no longer needs the access: Azure portal → Subscriptions → [subscription] → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments, and remove it.
    4. If a script or a device signs in with the account, not a person: move that job to a service principal or managed identity, which Microsoft recommends for automation.
    Learn more ↗
  15. SeriousEmail

    No DKIM signing key published

    What this means

    No DKIM signing key is published for contoso.com under Microsoft 365's two names, selector1 and selector2. Mail from contoso.com is not signed in your own name. Microsoft 365 still signs the mail it sends, but under your onmicrosoft.com name, which does not count for DMARC. So DMARC for contoso.com rests on SPF alone, and SPF breaks when mail is forwarded.

    What to do

    Enable DKIM signing for the domain in the Defender portal — this publishes the two required CNAMEs (you publish them at your DNS provider) and turns on signing.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    DKIM signing for contoso.com

    Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Email authentication settings → DKIM

    Now: No signing key published under selector1 or selector2→Should be: Enabled — both selector1 and selector2 CNAMEs published, signing toggled ON

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Email authentication settings → DKIM
    2. Select contoso.com
    3. Microsoft shows you the two CNAME records — publish them at your DNS provider
    4. Return to portal and toggle 'Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signatures' to ON
    Learn more ↗
  16. SeriousAzure

    Back up virtual machines

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    In subscription "Contoso Production": 1 of 1 virtual machine has no Azure Backup protection at all. No Recovery Services vault or Backup vault exists anywhere in the scanned subscriptions, so there is no Azure-native restore point for any of these machines. If these machines are protected by a third-party backup product such as Veeam, Datto or Rubrik, that protection leaves no trace in Azure Resource Manager and is invisible to this scan — in that case this finding can be dismissed.

    What to do

    Create (or reuse) a Recovery Services vault in the same region and enable backup on each machine with a daily policy. For machines that already have a policy, repair the stopped or failing job rather than re-enrolling.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Backup adds storage cost proportional to the protected data and retention period, and the first full backup places load on the VM's disks. Nothing about the running workload changes.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Backup

    Virtual machine → Operations → Backup

    Now: Not configured→Should be: Enabled, with a healthy daily recovery point

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Business Continuity Center (or Backup center) → Backup
    2. Datasource type: Azure Virtual machines → select or create a Recovery Services vault
    3. Choose a backup policy (the default daily policy retains 30 days) → Enable backup
    4. For machines that already show a policy: Backup → Backup jobs, and resolve the failing or stopped job
    Learn more ↗
  17. SeriousIdentity

    Block legacy authentication

    What this means

    No supported baseline for a legacy-authentication block was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.
    Learn more ↗
  18. SeriousIdentity

    Block device code flow

    What this means

    Nothing in this tenant blocks device code flow. An attacker starts the flow, sends the victim a genuine microsoft.com sign-in page and a genuine 8-character code, and the victim — who sees no fake domain and no suspicious attachment — completes MFA for them. The access token lands with the attacker, already MFA-satisfied.

    What to do

    Create a Conditional Access policy blocking the device code flow for all users, excluding only shared-device accounts that genuinely need it.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Hardware that has no browser and signs in by device code — Teams Rooms panels, some conference-room systems, printers and IoT devices — will stop authenticating. Filter sign-in logs on the device-code flow before enforcing, and put any accounts you find into an excluded group rather than leaving the flow open tenant-wide.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access — block device code flow

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No enabled policy blocks the deviceCodeFlow transfer method→Should be: An enabled policy: All users, All resources, Authentication flows = Device code flow, Grant: Block access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies → New policy
    2. Name: 'Block device code flow'
    3. Assignments → Users: All users (Exclude: break-glass, and any shared-device account group)
    4. Assignments → Target resources: All resources
    5. Conditions → Authentication flows → Configure: Yes → select 'Device code flow'
    6. Access controls → Grant: Block access
    7. Enable in Report-only briefly to confirm nothing legitimate uses it, then switch to On
    8. Microsoft also ships this as a managed policy named 'Block device code flow' — if it is present in your list, turning that one on is enough
    Learn more ↗
  19. SeriousEmail

    SPF includes a name that has no SPF record

    What this means

    SPF issues for contoso.com: Record ends in ~all (soft fail) — receivers typically deliver but mark as suspicious. Move to -all for stronger protection. spf.protection.outlook.com is named in the record and has no SPF record, or more than one. A receiver that gets as far as that name returns PermError, and SPF effectively fails open.

    What to do

    Adjust SPF record. Test changes with a tool like dmarcian SPF Surveyor before publishing.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    SPF TXT record at contoso.com

    Your DNS provider (GoDaddy / Cloudflare / Route 53 / etc.) → DNS records → Edit TXT record

    Now: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all→Should be: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all (≤10 DNS lookups)

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  20. SeriousAzure

    Limit subscription Owners

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    7 Owners on subscription "Contoso Production" exceeds Microsoft's recommended maximum of 3. Any one of these accounts, if compromised, gives an attacker full control of the subscription. People who are only eligible for Owner through PIM are not counted.

    What to do

    Review each Owner and demote to a scoped role (Contributor, User Access Administrator) where possible.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Owner role assignments

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments

    Now: 7 Owners→Should be: At most 3 Owners

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
    2. Filter to role: Owner
    3. For each assignment, evaluate if a less-privileged role suffices (Contributor for ops, Reader for monitoring, User Access Administrator for IAM-only).
    Learn more ↗
  21. SeriousAzure

    Restrict storage network access

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows access from all networks.

    What to do

    Set the network firewall default action to Deny, add specific IP / VNet allowlists, and remove any IP rule that covers every address.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Firewall default action

    Storage account → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks

    Now: Allow (all networks)→Should be: Deny (selected networks)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Storage account → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
    2. Public network access → Enabled from selected virtual networks and IP addresses
    3. Add the IPs / VNets that legitimately need access → Save
    Learn more ↗
  22. SeriousAzure

    Restrict Key Vault network access

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" accepts connections from any network.

    What to do

    Limit each Key Vault to the networks that need it, or disable public network access and use private endpoints.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Public network access

    Key Vault → Networking

    Now: Allow public access from all networks→Should be: Specific virtual networks and IP addresses, or disabled with private endpoints

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Key Vault → Networking → Firewalls and virtual networks
    2. Allow public access from specific virtual networks and IP addresses, and add the ones that need the vault
    3. Or disable public access and configure private endpoints under Private endpoint connections.
    Learn more ↗
  23. SeriousIdentity

    Restrict guest invitations

    What this means

    ANY user (including guests themselves) can invite new guests. A single compromised account or rogue guest can create persistent attacker-controlled guest accounts. This is the loosest possible setting.

    What to do

    Restrict guest invitations to admins (or to a 'Guest Inviter' role assigned to specific business users) and ensure the default guest role is 'Guest user' (not 'User').

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Before you change it
    Business users who currently invite their own guests will need to request invitations through IT or via the Guest Inviter role. Communicate the change to avoid frustration.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    External collaboration settings — guest invitations

    Entra admin center → Identity → External Identities → External collaboration settings

    Now: Guest invite setting: Anyone in the organization can invite guest users including guests and non-members→Should be: 'Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users' and default guest role 'Guest user'

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → External Identities → External collaboration settings
    2. Guest invite settings: select 'Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users'
    3. Guest user access: select 'Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects'
    Learn more ↗
  24. SeriousAzure

    Require HTTPS on App Services

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 App Service in subscription "Contoso Production" allows plaintext HTTP.

    What to do

    Toggle 'HTTPS Only' to On for each App Service.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    HTTPS Only

    App Service → Settings → TLS/SSL settings → Protocol settings

    Now: Off→Should be: On

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    az webapp update --name <name> --resource-group <rg> --https-only true
    Learn more ↗
  25. Should fixEmail

    Turn on anti-phishing protection

    What this means

    Judged: Office365 AntiPhish Default. Office365 AntiPhish Default: EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection are all false, so no impersonation protection covers your people or domains. 1 to tighten.

    What to do

    Fix: impersonation protection. Add your executives and your own domain to impersonation protection.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    2 attack paths weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Anti-phishing policy

    Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-phishing

    Now: impersonation protection = off→Should be: Enabled = true; EnableSpoofIntelligence = true; HonorDmarcPolicy = true; at least one impersonation protection on

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    Connect-ExchangeOnline
    Get-AntiPhishPolicy | Format-List Name, Enabled, EnableSpoofIntelligence, HonorDmarcPolicy, EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection, EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection
  26. Should fixIdentity

    MFA registration is not protected

    What this means

    Anyone who gets the password of an account that has no MFA yet can register their own phone as its second step, and keep signing in as that person. No Conditional Access policy in force protects registering sign-in methods.

    What to do

    Add a Conditional Access policy that requires an existing second step, or a one-time pass you issue to new staff, before anyone registers a sign-in method from outside your trusted locations.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Someone with no MFA method yet cannot register one from outside your trusted locations without a Temporary Access Pass. Guests are left out because a Temporary Access Pass does not work for them.
    2 attack paths weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access: secure security info registration

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No enforcing policy targets Register security information→Should be: An enabled policy: All users (guests and emergency access accounts excluded), User actions = Register security information, outside trusted locations, Grant: multifactor authentication

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Create new policy from templates → Securing security info registration (or New policy)
    2. Users: All users; exclude All guest and external users, and your emergency access accounts
    3. Target resources → User actions → Register security information
    4. Conditions → Locations: include Any location, exclude All trusted locations
    5. Grant → Require authentication strength → Multifactor authentication
    6. Turn it on in Report-only first, issue a Temporary Access Pass to anyone who has not registered yet, then switch it On
    Learn more ↗
  27. Should fixDevices

    Onboard devices to Defender

    What this means

    4 Windows devices are enrolled in Intune but no Defender for Endpoint or Defender for Business license is detected on the tenant. Endpoints run with built-in AV only — no EDR signal feeds your security team.

    What to do

    Add Defender for Business (bundled with M365 Business Premium) or Defender for Endpoint Plan 1/2.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    2 attack paths weakened
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    Defender for Endpoint / Business licensing

    Microsoft 365 admin center → Billing → Purchase services (then onboard in Microsoft Defender portal → Settings → Endpoints)

    Now: 4 Windows devices enrolled; no Defender for Endpoint or Defender for Business licence detected in the tenant→Should be: Defender for Business or Defender for Endpoint P1/P2 licensed and provisioned

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  28. Should fixApps & Consent

    Enable the admin consent workflow

    What this means

    Admin consent workflow is DISABLED. If you've restricted user consent (recommended), users currently have no in-product way to request admin approval — they'll either go without legitimate apps or look for workarounds (personal accounts, shadow IT).

    What to do

    Enable the admin consent workflow and assign reviewers (e.g. your IT or security team).

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Admin consent workflow

    Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → Admin consent settings

    Now: Disabled→Should be: Enabled with reviewers assigned

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → Admin consent settings
    2. Set 'Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to' → Yes
    3. Reviewers: add your IT admin group or specific reviewers
    4. Selected users will receive email notifications for requests: Yes
    5. Reminders enabled: Yes
    6. Consent request expires after: 30 days
    Learn more ↗
  29. Should fixEmail

    Detected phishing is not quarantined

    What this means

    Judged: Default. Mail Microsoft detects as phishing goes to people's Junk Email folder, where they can still open it, instead of quarantine. 1 to tighten.

    What to do

    Set the phishing action to quarantine.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Anti-spam inbound policy

    Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-spam → Anti-spam inbound policy

    Now: PhishSpamAction = MoveToJmf→Should be: AllowedSenderDomains and AllowedSenders empty; PhishSpamAction = Quarantine; HighConfidencePhishAction = Quarantine; SpamAction and HighConfidenceSpamAction = MoveToJmf or Quarantine

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    Connect-ExchangeOnline
    Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy | Format-List Name, AllowedSenderDomains, AllowedSenders, SpamAction, HighConfidenceSpamAction, PhishSpamAction, HighConfidencePhishAction
    Learn more ↗
  30. Should fixSharing & Collaboration

    Restrict OneDrive sync to domain-joined devices

    What this means

    OneDrive sync is permitted on ANY device. Users can install OneDrive on personal laptops, home desktops, or borrowed machines and pull a full local copy of all files they can access. That data then escapes all tenant controls — BitLocker, remote wipe, CA, audit logging.

    What to do

    Limit OneDrive sync to devices joined to your on-premises domains, or hold sync to compliant devices with a Conditional Access policy.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    Users on personal/BYOD devices will lose the ability to sync OneDrive locally. They can still access files via OneDrive web. For BYOD-heavy organizations, consider Intune App Protection Policies as an alternative.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    OneDrive sync restriction to domain-joined computers

    SharePoint admin center → Settings → Sync → 'Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains'

    Now: Disabled (any device can sync)→Should be: Enabled (listed domains only)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → SharePoint admin center → Settings → Sync
    2. 'Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains' OR
    3. Set 'isUnmanagedSyncAppForTenantRestricted' via Graph PATCH

    Microsoft Graph

    PATCH /beta/admin/sharepoint/settings
    { "isUnmanagedSyncAppForTenantRestricted": true }
    Learn more ↗
  31. Should fixSharing & Collaboration

    Restrict Teams external access

    What this means

    Judged: Global. Global: AllowFederatedUsers is true and AllowedDomains is empty, so Teams external access is open to every Teams organization. 1 to tighten.

    What to do

    Limit Teams external access to the partner domains you work with, and block trial organizations.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Teams external access: allowed domains

    Teams admin center → Users → External access → Teams and Skype for Business users in external organizations

    Now: AllowFederatedUsers is true and AllowedDomains is empty, so Teams external access is open to every Teams organization→Should be: Allow only specific external domains; ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants = Blocked

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    Connect-MicrosoftTeams
    Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | Format-List AllowFederatedUsers, AllowedDomains, ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants
    # Choose the partner domains in the Teams admin center, then:
    Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants Blocked
  32. Should fixIdentity

    Admins can stay signed in for weeks

    What this means

    Your administrators can stay signed in for weeks. If someone steals a signed-in session, it keeps working until it expires. No Conditional Access policy limits how long their sessions last.

    What to do

    Make admin sessions end after a working day: a Conditional Access policy for your admin roles, on all resources, that makes them sign in again every few hours (no more than 24) and never keeps their browser signed in.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Admins are asked to sign in again more often, and a browser no longer keeps them signed in after it is closed. Nothing else changes for other users.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access: sign-in frequency and persistent browser session for administrators

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No sign-in frequency or persistent browser session set→Should be: An enabled policy: admin roles (or All users), All resources, Session: Sign-in frequency 24 hours or less, Persistent browser session Never persistent

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → New policy
    2. Users: Directory roles → the same admin roles your admin MFA policy covers (exclude your emergency access accounts)
    3. Target resources: All resources
    4. Session → Sign-in frequency → Periodic reauthentication → for example 8 hours (no more than 24)
    5. Session → Persistent browser session → Never persistent
    6. Turn it on in Report-only first, check the sign-in logs, then switch it On
    Learn more ↗
  33. Should fixIdentity

    User MFA registration gaps

    What this means

    MFA is not registered for 2 of 9 assessed non-admin member accounts (22%) in Microsoft's report. This is a registration gap, not proof that a password-only sign-in would succeed.

    What to do

    Review these accounts and help active users register an appropriate MFA method. Check enforcement separately and preserve tested emergency access.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    MFA registration

    Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → Registration campaign

    Now: 2 of 9 assessed non-admin member accounts not registered→Should be: Active accounts have suitable registered authentication methods

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  34. Should fixApps & Consent

    Long-lived app credentials

    What this means

    1 app credential(s) have validity longer than 1 year. Industry guidance is to rotate every 12 months; long-lived secrets that leak (via committed source code, support tickets, screenshots) remain exploitable for years.

    What to do

    Replace with shorter-lived secrets (≤ 12 months) or, better, federated identity credentials (no secret at all).

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    App registration credential lifetime

    Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → App registrations → (each app) → Certificates & secrets

    Now: 1 credential(s) with >365-day validity→Should be: ≤ 12 months validity, or federated identity credentials

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  35. Should fixExternal Attack Surface

    Mail-capable lookalike domains

    What this means

    1 domain close to contoso.com was registered in the last year and is set up for email. New lookalikes set up for email are a common start to invoice fraud. Check that you recognise each one.

    What to do

    Review each mail-capable lookalike. If it's not yours: report it to the registrar / hosting provider for abuse, and make sure your own DMARC is at p=reject so spoofing your EXACT domain fails (note: DMARC doesn't stop lookalike domains — user awareness and monitoring do). Consider defensively registering the closest lookalikes and common alternate TLDs.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    Mail-capable lookalike domains (1)

    Registrar abuse reporting for each domain; your DMARC policy; defensive registration

    Now: 1 lookalike domain (names withheld in this sample)→Should be: No unaffiliated mail-capable domain impersonates yours

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  36. Should fixAzure

    Limit service principal scope

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production": 1 app holds Contributor over all of it. An app's secret or certificate can leak, and whoever has it gets this access.

    What to do

    Demote each service principal to a scoped role on only the resource group(s) it actually needs. Use Reader for monitoring-only ones. Remove User Access Administrator and Role Based Access Control Administrator unless the app's job is to manage access.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Service principal role assignments (subscription scope and above)

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments → filter Type=Service principal

    Now: 1 app with Contributor over the whole subscription→Should be: Service principals scoped to specific resource group(s) — none holds these roles at the subscription, a management group or the root

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
    2. Filter by Type: Service principal
    3. For each one listed: remove the assignment and re-assign at the specific resource group it needs. An assignment held at a management group or the root is removed there, not on the subscription.
    Learn more ↗
  37. Should fixAzure

    Enable Key Vault purge protection

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 Key Vault in subscription "Contoso Production" lacks purge protection.

    What to do

    Enable both soft delete (retains deleted vaults/keys for 90 days) AND purge protection (prevents force-delete during retention).

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Soft delete + purge protection

    Key Vault → Properties

    Now: Soft delete on, purge protection: off→Should be: Both enabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Key Vault → Properties
    2. Soft-delete → Enabled (cannot be disabled once on — Microsoft default since 2020)
    3. Purge protection → Enabled (irreversible — confirm before enabling on prod vaults)

    PowerShell

    az keyvault update --name <vault> --enable-purge-protection true
    Learn more ↗
  38. Should fixAzure

    Alert on critical operations

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production" has no Activity Log alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes.

    What to do

    Create an Activity Log alert for each kind of change listed, with this subscription in its scope, and send it to an action group that emails the people who look after security.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Activity Log alert rules

    Azure portal → Monitor → Alerts → + Create → Alert rule

    Now: No alert for role assignment changes or for security and policy changes→Should be: An alert for role assignment changes and one for security and policy changes

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Monitor → Alerts → + Create → Alert rule
    2. Scope: this subscription
    3. Condition: Signal type = Activity Log → choose operation → save
    4. Action group: email/SMS/webhook to security on-call

    PowerShell

    # Repeat per critical operation:
    az monitor activity-log alert create -n "Alert-${operation}" -g <rg> --scope /subscriptions/<sub-id> --condition category=Administrative operationName=${operation}
    Learn more ↗
  39. Should fixAzure

    Forward the Activity Log

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production" does not send its Activity Log anywhere, so Azure deletes it after 90 days.

    What to do

    Add a diagnostic setting to the subscription that sends at least the Administrative and Security categories to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Subscription diagnostic setting (Activity Log export)

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Activity log → Export Activity Logs → Add diagnostic setting

    Now: No diagnostic setting→Should be: At least one diagnostic setting that sends the Administrative and Security categories to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Activity log
    2. Export Activity Logs (in the top toolbar)
    3. Add diagnostic setting → tick every category, or at least Administrative and Security → choose a destination: a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub → Save

    PowerShell

    az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription create --subscription 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 --name ActivityLog-to-LA --location global --workspace <workspace-id> --logs '[{"category":"Administrative","enabled":true},{"category":"Security","enabled":true},{"category":"ServiceHealth","enabled":true},{"category":"Alert","enabled":true},{"category":"Recommendation","enabled":true},{"category":"Policy","enabled":true},{"category":"Autoscale","enabled":true},{"category":"ResourceHealth","enabled":true}]'
    Learn more ↗
  40. Should fixAzure

    Enable Defender for Cloud plans

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    Subscription "Contoso Production" has no paid Defender for Cloud plan (only the free configuration recommendations are active).

    What to do

    Enable at least Defender for Cloud Servers + Storage at Standard tier — they catch the highest-impact attack patterns (server EDR, ransomware on storage).

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Defender for Cloud workload plans

    Microsoft Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Contoso Production → Defender plans

    Now: No paid plan (configuration recommendations only)→Should be: ≥Servers Plan 2 + Storage Standard (catches the highest-impact attack patterns)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Microsoft Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Contoso Production → Defender plans
    2. Enable: Servers Plan 2 (or Plan 1), Storage, SQL servers on machines, App Service
    3. Save.
    Learn more ↗
  41. Should fixIdentity

    Require phishing-resistant MFA for admins

    What this means

    No Conditional Access policy requires phishing-resistant MFA for admins. They can sign in with a text code or an app approval, which a fake sign-in page can relay.

    What to do

    Register a passkey or Windows Hello for Business for every admin first, plus two break-glass accounts, then require the built-in "Phishing-resistant MFA" authentication strength for admin roles in Conditional Access.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1.5 hours
    Before you change it
    An admin with no passkey, Windows Hello or certificate registered cannot sign in once the policy is on. Keep break-glass accounts excluded and protected separately.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access: require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Create new policy from templates → Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for administrators

    Now: Admins can satisfy MFA with a method that can be phished→Should be: Admin roles must use the Phishing-resistant MFA strength

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → enable Passkey (FIDO2)
    2. Have each admin register a passkey or Windows Hello for Business
    3. Create the template policy in Report-only, check the sign-in logs, then turn it on
    Learn more ↗
  42. Should fixIdentity

    Sign out idle web sessions

    What this means

    No idle session timeout is set. Someone who walks away from a shared or home computer leaves Outlook on the web, SharePoint and the admin centers signed in.

    What to do

    Turn on Idle session timeout in the Microsoft 365 admin center and set it to 3 hours or less.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    People on shared or unmanaged computers are signed out after the idle period, and it replaces any separate Outlook on the web and SharePoint timeouts. Desktop and mobile apps are not affected, nor are managed devices, single sign-on from a joined device or anyone who chose "Stay signed in".
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Idle session timeout

    Microsoft 365 admin center → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy → Idle session timeout

    Now: Off→Should be: On, 3 hours or less

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy → Idle session timeout (turning it on the first time needs a Global Administrator)
    2. Turn it on and choose 3 hours or less → Save
    3. It applies to the whole organisation. To limit it to unmanaged devices, use a Conditional Access policy with app enforced restrictions (needs Entra ID P1)
    Learn more ↗
  43. Should fixIdentity

    Review recent privileged changes

    What this means

    2 privileged changes were made in your tenant. 1 of these granted an app access or added credentials to an app identity — the two changes that let someone back in after a password reset. Every item below is also normal administration; the point is to confirm each one was you or your IT provider. Reviewed 12 days of audit history.

    What to do

    Work down the list and confirm each change was expected. Anything you do not recognise — especially an app consent or a new app secret — should be revoked before anything else, because it survives a password reset.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 9 minutes
    Before you change it
    Revoking an app consent stops that app working for everyone until it is re-consented. Confirm what the app is used for before removing it.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Microsoft Entra audit logs

    Entra admin center → Monitoring & health → Audit logs

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Monitoring & health → Audit logs
    2. Filter by the date and activity shown above to see the full record, including the IP address
    3. For an app consent you do not recognise: Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications → the app → Permissions → Review permissions → revoke
    4. For an app secret you do not recognise: Identity → Applications → App registrations → the app → Certificates & secrets → delete it
    5. For an unexpected role addition: Identity → Roles & admins → the role → remove the member
    Learn more ↗
  44. Should fixEmail

    Enable Safe Links

    What this means

    Judged: Built-In Protection Policy. Built-In Protection Policy: AllowClickThrough is true (people can click through to a flagged site). 1 to tighten. Exceptions to Built-in protection, and which people a preset policy covers, are not readable through Microsoft's configuration snapshots.

    What to do

    Turn on or tighten: AllowClickThrough. Microsoft's Standard and Strict presets set these.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Safe Links policy

    Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Safe Links

    Now: AllowClickThrough = true→Should be: EnableSafeLinksForEmail/Teams/Office = true; AllowClickThrough = false; ScanUrls = true

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    Connect-ExchangeOnline
    Get-SafeLinksPolicy | Format-List Name, EnableSafeLinksForEmail, EnableSafeLinksForTeams, EnableSafeLinksForOffice, AllowClickThrough, ScanUrls
  45. Should fixIdentity

    Require MFA to join or register devices

    What this means

    The tenant device-registration MFA switch is off and no enabled Conditional Access policy targets the register-or-join-device user action. Other sign-in protections may still apply; this identifies a gap in dedicated registration MFA controls.

    What to do

    Review MFA for device registration using either the tenant setting or Conditional Access. Review exclusions and test the impact before enforcement.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    New MFA requirements can affect user-driven enrollment. Validate your enrollment methods and emergency-access procedure before changing enforcement.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Device registration MFA

    Entra admin center → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings

    Now: notRequired→Should be: Required through the tenant setting or an appropriately scoped Conditional Access policy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Open Entra ID → Devices → Overview → Device settings and review the device-registration MFA setting.
    2. If using Conditional Access, target the 'Register or join devices' user action and require MFA or an MFA authentication strength. Review emergency-access exclusions explicitly.
    3. For the Conditional Access route, set the tenant device-registration MFA switch to No as Microsoft requires; test in report-only before enabling the CA policy.
    Learn more ↗
  46. Should fixIdentity

    Limit what ordinary users can create

    What this means

    Ordinary users can register applications and create security groups. These are Microsoft's defaults, and an attacker who gets into one ordinary account can do the same.

    What to do

    Switch off what your users do not need. Administrators and the roles made for the job (Application Developer, for example) keep the ability.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    People who register applications or create security groups today will need an administrator or a role that allows it. Check who has done so recently before switching these off.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Default user role permissions

    Entra admin center → Entra ID → Users → User settings

    Now: Users can register applications; Users can create security groups→Should be: None of these left open to ordinary users

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Entra ID → Users → User settings → 'Users can register applications' → No
    2. entra.microsoft.com → Entra ID → Groups → General → 'Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell' → No
    Learn more ↗
  47. Should fixLogging & Alerting

    Use a monitored notification mailbox

    What this means

    Tenant notification contact gaps: No 'Technical contact' email(s) configured — service health incidents and major change announcements go to the tenant's original sign-up contact only; No Security & Compliance notification contact configured — security advisories from Microsoft (including breach notifications) may not reach your security team. Use monitored shared mailboxes ([email protected], alerts@) so notifications survive personnel changes.

    What to do

    Set the technical and security notification addresses to monitored shared mailboxes (or distribution lists) that survive individual personnel changes. Also: in each admin's personal Message Center preferences, ensure they're subscribed to relevant categories.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    If you change the technical contact to a shared mailbox that no one watches, you've moved the problem rather than fixed it. The shared mailbox needs an owner who reviews it (or it forwards to a SIEM that does).
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Tenant technical & security notification contacts

    Microsoft 365 admin center → Settings → Org settings → Organization profile → Data location and contact information

    Now: Technical: (none); Security & Compliance: (none)→Should be: Both technical and security/compliance contacts set to monitored shared mailboxes on a corporate domain

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → Settings → Org settings → Organization profile → Data location and contact information
    2. Set 'Technology contact' to a monitored shared mailbox (e.g. [email protected])
    3. Set 'Security and Compliance' contact
    4. Then: admin.microsoft.com → Health → Message center → Edit preferences
    5. Subscribe a shared mailbox to weekly digest + critical change notifications
    6. Then (for each admin): admin.microsoft.com → Health → Service health → 'Preferences' → 'Email me when incidents/advisories occur' → On

    PowerShell

    Connect-MgGraph
    Update-MgOrganization -OrganizationId (Get-MgOrganization).Id -TechnicalNotificationMails @('[email protected]') -SecurityComplianceNotificationMails @('[email protected]')
    Learn more ↗
  48. Should fixExternal Attack Surface

    Certificates expiring within 30 days

    What this means

    1 certificate(s) expire within 30 days — schedule replacement. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Schedule renewal.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    TLS certificate(s) expiring within 30 days (1)

    The hosting environment / load balancer / CDN serving each affected service

    Now: 1 certificate(s) expiring within 30 days→Should be: Renewals scheduled or automated well before the 30-day mark

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  49. Should fixIdentity

    Conditional Access policies stuck in Report-only

    What this means

    1 policy has sat in Report-only for 60+ days — the oldest for 95 days. Report-only evaluates the policy on every sign-in, writes the verdict to the sign-in log, and then lets the sign-in through anyway. These policies appear in the portal as configured protection and enforce nothing. Either promote them to On or turn them Off, so the policy list reflects what is actually being enforced.

    What to do

    For each policy: review its Report-only impact, then switch it to On. If the review shows it would break something you are not ready to fix, turn it Off and note why — leaving it in Report-only just disguises the gap.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Promoting a policy to On starts enforcing it immediately, on the next sign-in. That is the point — but it is also why the Policy impact review comes first. Service accounts and legacy clients are the usual breakage.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access — policy state

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies → (policy) → Enable policy

    Now: 1 policy in Report-only for 60+ days (oldest 95 days)→Should be: Every policy is either On (enforcing) or Off — none parked in Report-only long-term

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies
    2. Open each policy listed in the evidence → Policy impact tab
    3. Review which sign-ins would have been blocked or challenged over the last 30 days
    4. If the impact is acceptable: Enable policy → On → Save
    5. If it would break something: fix that first, or set Enable policy → Off and record the decision
    6. Check the Created by column — policies marked 'Microsoft' are managed by Microsoft and normally enable themselves; if one is still Report-only well past 45 days, someone has held it back deliberately
    Learn more ↗
  50. Should fixExternal Attack Surface

    Retire outdated TLS versions

    What this means

    1 public service(s) still offer deprecated SSL/TLS protocols. These are vulnerable to downgrade attacks (an on-path attacker forces the weak version), fail PCI-DSS, and break for modern clients. Disable everything below TLS 1.2. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Disable SSLv2/SSLv3/TLS 1.0/TLS 1.1 at each service (web server, load balancer, CDN, or appliance) and require TLS 1.2+ (ideally 1.3). Verify with SSL Labs afterward.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Very old clients (legacy point-of-sale, ancient Android/IE) that only speak TLS 1.0 will stop connecting — which is the point, but confirm you don't depend on any.
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    Services offering deprecated TLS/SSL (1)

    TLS configuration of each affected web server / load balancer / CDN / appliance

    Now: vpn.contoso.com:3389 (TLS 1.0)→Should be: TLS 1.2 minimum (prefer 1.3); SSLv2/SSLv3/TLS 1.0/1.1 disabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  51. Should fixApps & Consent

    Review delegated app consent grants

    What this means

    1 dangerous delegated scope was granted for individual users. No classified tenant-wide dangerous grant was found.

    What to do

    Review each grant and revoke any the business does not recognize; then restrict future user consent.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    Before you change it
    Users of a revoked app lose its access until an admin re-consents deliberately.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Permissions (delegated)

    Entra admin center → Enterprise applications → (app) → Permissions

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Enterprise applications
    2. Open each flagged app → Permissions
    3. Revoke the delegated grants you do not recognize
    4. Tighten user consent under Consent and permissions → User consent settings
  52. Should fixExternal Attack Surface

    Self-signed TLS certificates

    What this means

    2 public-facing service(s) use self-signed certificates. Users get security warnings, and the certificate provides no authentication of identity — making MitM attacks indistinguishable from normal connection. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Replace with a CA-issued certificate (Let's Encrypt is free for any public hostname).

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    Self-signed TLS certificate(s) on public services (2)

    The hosting environment / load balancer / CDN serving each affected service

    Now: 2 service(s) presenting self-signed certificates to the public internet→Should be: All public services present certificates issued by a trusted CA (Let's Encrypt, ACM, commercial CA)

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  53. Should fixAzure

    Use managed identities

    What this means

    0% managed-identity coverage on compute (0 of 2). Target ≥80%.

    What to do

    Enable system-assigned managed identity on each compute resource that authenticates to other Azure services. Removes the need to store credentials in app config / Key Vault references.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Managed identity (Identity blade)

    Azure portal → Virtual machines / App Services → [resource] → Identity → System assigned → On

    Now: 0% coverage (0/2 resources have managed identity enabled)→Should be: ≥80% of compute resources with system-assigned managed identity enabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Virtual machines / App Services → [resource]
    2. Identity blade → System assigned → On → Save
    3. Update the resource's app code to use DefaultAzureCredential (idiomatic for both Azure SDKs).
    Learn more ↗
  54. Should fixAzure

    Use private endpoints for storage

    What this means

    0% of storage accounts use private endpoints (0 of 1). Target ≥80%.

    What to do

    Add private endpoints to storage accounts that hold sensitive data. Then disable public network access on those accounts.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Private endpoint connections

    Storage account → Networking → Private endpoint connections

    Now: 0% coverage (0/1)→Should be: ≥80% coverage

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Storage account → Networking → Private endpoint connections → + Private endpoint
    2. Bind to a subnet in your application's VNet
    3. After private endpoint is connected: Public network access → Disabled.
    Learn more ↗
  55. Should fixAzure

    Require Entra-only sign-in for SQL

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 SQL Server in subscription "Contoso Production" still accepts SQL logins next to Entra sign-in.

    What to do

    Move applications and people to Entra sign-in, then turn on Microsoft Entra-only authentication for each server.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Before you change it
    Anything still connecting with a SQL login stops working as soon as this is on, including the server's own SQL admin login. Find those connections first.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Support only Microsoft Entra authentication for this server

    SQL server → Security → Microsoft Entra ID

    Now: SQL logins and Entra sign-in→Should be: Entra sign-in only

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. SQL server → Security → Microsoft Entra ID
    2. Confirm an Entra admin is set
    3. Tick Support only Microsoft Entra authentication for this server → Save

    PowerShell

    az sql server ad-only-auth enable --resource-group <rg> --name <server>
    Learn more ↗
  56. Should fixIdentity

    Emergency access (break-glass) accounts

    What this means

    No Global Administrator is excluded from any enabled Conditional Access policy: all 2 standing Global Administrators are inside the same policy set that governs everyone else. A mistyped policy, an expired federation certificate or an MFA provider outage would lock every administrator out of this tenant at once, and recovery then runs through Microsoft support rather than through you. This is an availability risk, not a vulnerability — nothing here is exploitable; the escape hatch is simply missing. Assessed 2 standing Global Administrators against 1 enabled Conditional Access policy; 1 report-only policy was ignored because a report-only policy cannot block a sign-in. We checked excludeUsers, excludeGroups (expanded transitively) and excludeRoles on every enabled policy. Entra ID has no attribute marking an account as break-glass, so this check looks for the configuration Microsoft's emergency-access guidance asks for — a cloud-only account with a standing Global Administrator assignment, explicitly excluded from every enabled Conditional Access policy that would otherwise apply to it, and with no interactive sign-in in the last 90 days. An account whose sign-in activity could not be read is not counted. Weaker signals (no licences, no mailbox, naming convention) are shown per account but do not decide the result, because a forgotten former-employee admin looks identical on those.

    What to do

    Create two cloud-only Global Administrator accounts, exclude both from every enabled Conditional Access policy, give each its own passkey or certificate held by a different person, and alert on any sign-in by them.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 45 minutes
    Before you change it
    Excluding an account from Conditional Access means MFA and device-compliance rules stop applying to it — that is the point, and it is why the account must sign in with its own phishing-resistant method and be monitored. Expect these accounts to surface in other findings too: they are dormant by design (stale admin accounts) and often have passwords set never to expire, which the password-expiry check flags. Those are known, intentional collisions, not contradictions.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access — policy user exclusions

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: 0 of 2 standing Global Administrators are excluded from any enabled policy→Should be: 2 cloud-only emergency access accounts excluded from every enabled Conditional Access policy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Users → New user: create two cloud-only accounts on the tenant's *.onmicrosoft.com domain
    2. Assign each one Global Administrator permanently — NOT PIM-eligible, since an eligible role cannot be activated if PIM or Conditional Access is what has broken
    3. Register a passkey (FIDO2 security key) on each, or certificate-based authentication if you already run a PKI, using a method your other admin accounts do not use; Microsoft's mandatory MFA for admin portals applies to these accounts too, so a password alone will not get in
    4. Store each account's key with a different person, in a separate secure location
    5. Protection → Conditional Access → open every enabled policy → Users → Exclude → add both accounts (a dedicated 'Emergency access' group is easier to keep in sync than per-policy user exclusions)
    6. Set an alert on sign-ins by these accounts (Entra sign-in logs → alert rule) so a use is never silent
    7. Test both accounts on a schedule — Microsoft suggests every 90 days, and after every Conditional Access change
    Learn more ↗
  57. Should fixEmail

    MTA-STS not published

    What this means

    contoso.com receives mail but has no MTA-STS policy. Sending servers fall back to opportunistic TLS, which an on-path attacker can strip (STARTTLS downgrade) to read or alter inbound email in transit — including password resets and invoices.

    What to do

    Publish an MTA-STS policy: a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> plus a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt (start in mode=testing, then enforce). Microsoft 365 supports MTA-STS for hosted domains.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 45 minutes
    Before you change it
    Enforcing MTA-STS before your MX/TLS certs are correct can defer legitimate mail. Publish mode=testing first and watch TLS-RPT reports.
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    MTA-STS for contoso.com

    DNS: TXT at _mta-sts.contoso.com + an mta-sts.<domain> HTTPS policy endpoint

    Now: (no MTA-STS policy)→Should be: v=STSv1; id=<timestamp> + policy at mode=enforce

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  58. Should fixIdentity

    Find sign-ins where no second factor was required

    What this means

    3 successful sign-ins by 2 accounts in the last 30 days required only one factor. Microsoft did not require a second factor. The person may still have used Windows Hello or a passkey, and a policy may have relied on a managed device, so check why before changing anything.

    What to do

    Open a few of these sign-ins and read the Authentication details and Conditional Access tabs to see what was used and why one factor was enough. If no policy meant to allow it, require MFA for all users and all cloud apps.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1 hour
    Before you change it
    A new MFA policy prompts everyone it covers, including accounts that have not registered a method. Register people first and keep an emergency access account excluded.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Conditional Access: require MFA

    Entra admin center → Monitoring & health → Sign-in logs → filter Authentication requirement = Single-factor authentication

    Now: 3 successful sign-ins requiring one factor in the last 30 days, 2 accounts, 0 admins→Should be: Single-factor sign-ins only where a policy allows them on purpose

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Monitoring & health → Sign-in logs
    2. Add the filter Authentication requirement = Single-factor authentication, and open the sign-ins below
    3. On each, read the Conditional Access tab, then close the gap with a policy in Report-only first
    Learn more ↗
  59. Should fixIdentity

    Admin accounts with mailboxes

    What this means

    3 privileged accounts have a mailbox. Best practice is dedicated cloud-only admin accounts with NO mailbox — that way phishing the admin requires guessing a UPN that's not in any directory, never appears as a sender, and is never on a public CC.

    What to do

    Create dedicated admin accounts (e.g. `[email protected]`) without mailbox licenses. Move privileged role assignments to the new accounts; demote or remove privilege from the everyday accounts.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 1 hour
    Before you change it
    If the admin uses Outlook to manage email AND also clicks 'open admin portal', they'll now need to sign in with a different account. Workflow change.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Privileged users — mailbox attached

    Entra admin center → Identity → Users → All users (review listed admin accounts)

    Now: 3 privileged accounts with a mailbox attached→Should be: Privileged accounts are dedicated cloud-only identities with no mailbox license

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Create a new user without an M365 mailbox license: admin.<name>@<yourdomain>
    2. Assign the same privileged roles to the new account
    3. Remove the privileged roles from the existing mailbox-attached account
    4. Add the new admin account to your tenant-wide MFA Conditional Access policy
    Learn more ↗
  60. MinorAzure

    Encrypt VM disks

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    Encryption at host is off on 1 virtual machine in subscription "Contoso Production", so its temporary disk and caches are not encrypted. Azure already encrypts its managed disks.

    What to do

    Enable encryption-at-host on each VM (preferred — requires VM stop). For VMs that can't stop, fall back to Azure Disk Encryption (BitLocker / dm-crypt), which Microsoft plans to retire in September 2028.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Encryption at host

    Virtual machine → Disks → Additional settings (or per-disk Encryption settings)

    Now: Off. Azure encrypts the managed disks; temporary disks and caches are not encrypted→Should be: On, or Azure Disk Encryption

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Stop the VM (required for encryption-at-host)
    2. portal.azure.com → Virtual machines → [VM] → Disks → Additional settings
    3. Encryption at host → Enabled → Save → Start VM

    PowerShell

    az vm update --name <vm> --resource-group <rg> --set securityProfile.encryptionAtHost=true
    Learn more ↗
  61. MinorIdentity

    Do not expire passwords

    What this means

    Password expiry is not set on 2 of 2 domains. Microsoft documents that a password is then valid for 90 days. Setting it to never expire removes the doubt.

    What to do

    Set passwords to never expire, and rely on MFA and on changing a password when it is known to be exposed.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    Nothing breaks. Check that MFA is in place first: with no expiry, MFA is what limits the use of a stolen password.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Password expiration policy

    Microsoft 365 admin center → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy → Password expiration policy

    Now: Not set (Microsoft documents 90 days)→Should be: Set passwords to never expire (recommended)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → Settings → Org settings → Security & privacy
    2. Password expiration policy → tick 'Set passwords to never expire (recommended)'
    3. Save
    4. The setting is held on each domain. If a domain named here is still listed after the next scan, set it with the PowerShell command in this finding.

    PowerShell

    # Microsoft Graph PowerShell, signed in with Domain.ReadWrite.All
    Update-MgDomain -DomainId contoso.com -PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 2147483647
    Update-MgDomain -DomainId contoso.onmicrosoft.com -PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 2147483647
    Learn more ↗
  62. MinorIdentity

    Give every Global Administrator an outside contact

    What this means

    1 of 2 enabled Global Administrators has no contact route outside the tenant: no alternate email on another domain and no phone number. If the tenant is locked or breached, your own team has no way to reach that admin from the directory.

    What to do

    Add an alternate email on a different domain and a phone number to each Global Administrator's profile, and have them register the same details as recovery methods.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    Nothing, though other people in the directory can see contact fields, so use details that are fit for work.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    User profile: contact information

    Entra admin center → Identity → Users → All users → (admin) → Properties → Contact information

    Now: 1 Global Administrator without an outside contact→Should be: Every Global Administrator has an alternate email on another domain or a phone number

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Users → All users → open the admin → Properties → Edit properties
    2. Contact information → Other emails: add an address outside this tenant; Mobile phone: add a number
    3. Ask the admin to register the same email and phone at aka.ms/mysecurityinfo
    Learn more ↗
  63. MinorSharing & Collaboration

    Block guest re-sharing

    What this means

    Guests may pass on items shared with them, but only to guests who already exist in your directory (you have none).

    What to do

    Disable guest re-sharing tenant-wide. Guests can still ask the document owner to invite additional collaborators directly.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 5 minutes
    Before you change it
    Workflows where a guest forwards a shared document to another contact at their own org will break. They'll need to request an additional direct invite from the document owner.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    SharePoint guest re-sharing

    SharePoint admin center → Policies → Sharing → More external sharing settings → 'Allow guests to share items they don't own'

    Now: On (guests can re-share)→Should be: Off

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. admin.microsoft.com → SharePoint admin center → Policies → Sharing
    2. Under 'External sharing' → 'More external sharing settings'
    3. 'Allow guests to share items they don't own' → Off
    4. Save

    Microsoft Graph

    PATCH /beta/admin/sharepoint/settings
    { "isResharingByExternalUsersEnabled": false }
    Learn more ↗
  64. MinorIdentity

    Keep password lockout and banned passwords tight

    What this means

    Password protection could be tighter: the custom banned password list is empty. Password spraying tries a few likely passwords against many accounts, and these two controls decide how much each guess costs.

    What to do

    Keep the lockout threshold at 10 or lower and the duration at 60 seconds or more. With Entra ID P1, enforce a custom list of your company, product and place names.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Before you change it
    A lower threshold locks out people who mistype repeatedly, though smart lockout tells familiar locations from unfamiliar ones. A new banned term applies the next time someone changes a password, and an update can take several hours to reach everyone.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Password protection

    Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → Password protection

    Now: the custom banned password list is empty→Should be: Threshold 10 or lower, duration 60 seconds or more, custom list filled in and enforced

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Authentication methods → Password protection
    2. Lockout threshold → 10 or lower; Lockout duration in seconds → 60 or higher
    3. Enforce custom list → Yes, then add your company name, products and city
    Learn more ↗
  65. MinorEmail

    TLS-RPT not published

    What this means

    contoso.com has no TLS-RPT record, so you get no reports when senders fail to deliver over TLS — you'd be blind to an active downgrade or a broken MX certificate.

    What to do

    Add a TLS-RPT TXT record so you receive aggregate TLS-failure reports.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    TLS-RPT for contoso.com

    DNS: TXT at _smtp._tls.contoso.com

    Now: (no TLS-RPT record)→Should be: v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:[email protected]

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  66. MinorIdentity

    Review local administrator defaults for device join

    What this means

    Review the local administrator defaults for device join: the join policy adds all Global Administrators as local administrators; the join policy adds all joining users as local administrators. Confirm these assignments match your device-management needs; this policy read does not establish current local group membership.

    What to do

    Turn off 'Global administrator role is added as local administrator', make registering users standard users (grant local admin through Intune or the 'Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator' role instead), and scope who may join devices if you use Autopilot.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    Before you change it
    Changing join defaults may affect future enrollment and software installation. Review existing device local groups separately and grant necessary access deliberately through device management.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Local administrator settings for Microsoft Entra joined devices

    Entra admin center → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings → Manage Additional local administrators on all Microsoft Entra joined devices

    Now: the join policy adds all Global Administrators as local administrators; the join policy adds all joining users as local administrators→Should be: Global administrator role not added as local admin; registering user not local admin (standard user); join limited to the users or groups that need it

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings
    2. 'Global administrator role is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join' → No
    3. 'Registering user is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join' → None (or Selected)
    4. 'Users may join devices to Microsoft Entra' → Selected, if you enrol through Autopilot or IT
    Learn more ↗
  67. MinorIdentity

    Decide who can create Microsoft 365 Groups

    What this means

    Every user can create Microsoft 365 Groups. This is Microsoft's default, and it is a choice rather than a mistake: each group is a Team, a SharePoint site and a mailbox that nobody reviews when it is made.

    What to do

    If you want a review step, limit creation to a named group. If people making their own Teams suits you, keep the default and review groups some other way, such as expiry or access reviews.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    People outside the named group can no longer create Teams or Planner plans themselves and have to ask. Microsoft's guidance is that the people who keep the ability need Entra ID P1.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Group.Unified directory settings

    Entra admin center → Groups → General

    Now: every user can create Microsoft 365 Groups→Should be: Guests cannot own groups; creation limited to a named group if you want a review step

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Groups → General → 'Users can create Microsoft 365 groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell' → No
    2. Name a security group of approved creators in GroupCreationAllowedGroupId (PowerShell, see the link below)
    3. Set AllowGuestsToBeGroupOwner to false (PowerShell)

    PowerShell

    Connect-MgGraph -Scopes Directory.ReadWrite.All
    $s = Get-MgGroupSetting | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -eq 'Group.Unified' }
    # Review $s.Values, then update EnableGroupCreation, GroupCreationAllowedGroupId and AllowGuestsToBeGroupOwner
    Learn more ↗
  68. MinorIdentity

    Finish the authentication methods migration

    What this means

    The move to stronger sign-in methods is unfinished: the registration campaign is off.

    What to do

    Set the registration campaign to Microsoft managed or Enabled, for all users.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    Before you change it
    Methods enabled only in the legacy MFA or SSPR policy stop working at Migration Complete, so check the modern policy first. The campaign prompts people at sign-in until they register or snooze.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Authentication methods policy: Manage migration and Registration campaign

    Entra admin center → Protection → Authentication methods → Policies

    Now: the registration campaign is off→Should be: Migration Complete; registration campaign on for all users

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Authentication methods → Policies: confirm every method people rely on is enabled here
    2. Manage migration → Migration Complete
    3. Authentication methods → Registration campaign → State: Microsoft managed or Enabled → Include: All users → Save
    Learn more ↗
  69. MinorIdentity

    Review the tenant setting for Windows LAPS backups

    What this means

    Microsoft Entra password backup for Windows LAPS is disabled. Review whether you manage supported Windows devices and use Entra for backups. This does not establish shared passwords, missing rotation, or the absence of another password-management solution.

    What to do

    If using Microsoft Entra for Windows LAPS backups, enable the tenant setting and deploy a client policy to rotate and back up local administrator passwords.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Applies to supported Entra-joined or hybrid-joined Windows devices. Review existing password-management tools and pilot the client policy before deployment.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)

    Entra admin center → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings

    Now: No→Should be: Yes, with an Intune LAPS policy assigned to Windows devices

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Identity → Devices → Overview → Device settings → 'Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)' → Yes
    2. intune.microsoft.com → Endpoint security → Account protection → Create policy → Windows LAPS
    3. Set the backup directory to Microsoft Entra ID, choose a password rotation policy and assign it to supported Windows devices; verify successful backups.
    Learn more ↗
  70. MinorApps & Consent

    Expired app credentials still present

    What this means

    1 expired credential(s) are still attached to app registrations. Cleanup hygiene — they can't be used but they clutter your credential inventory.

    What to do

    Delete the expired credential entries via the portal or Graph API.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    App registration credentials

    Entra admin center → Identity → Applications → App registrations → (each app) → Certificates & secrets

    Now: 1 expired credential(s) still attached→Should be: Expired credentials removed

    Open in the admin portal ↗
  71. MinorExternal Attack Surface

    DNSSEC not enabled

    What this means

    contoso.com does not publish DNSSEC (no DS record in the parent zone). Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison a resolver's cache or sit on the network path can forge answers for your domain — redirecting mail (MX) or web traffic (A) to infrastructure they control.

    What to do

    Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider / registrar. Most (Cloudflare, Route 53, Azure DNS) enable it with one click, then publish the DS record to your registrar.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    A botched DNSSEC rollout (mismatched DS after a key rotation) can make the domain unresolvable. Follow the provider's guided flow and verify before/after.
    Technical detailssetting

    The setting

    DNSSEC for contoso.com

    Your DNS provider → DNSSEC (enable), then your registrar → add the DS record

    Now: DNSSEC not enabled (no DS record)→Should be: DNSSEC enabled and DS record published at the registrar

    Open in the admin portal ↗
    Learn more ↗
  72. MinorAzure

    Require TLS 1.2 on storage

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" still has its minimum TLS version set below 1.2. Azure Storage stopped accepting TLS 1.0 and 1.1 on 3 February 2026, so the setting no longer lets older connections in. Set it to 1.2 so it matches.

    What to do

    Set minimumTlsVersion to TLS1_2 on each storage account.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Minimum TLS version

    Storage account → Configuration → Minimum TLS version

    Now: TLS1_0→Should be: TLS1_2

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    az storage account update --name <name> --resource-group <rg> --min-tls-version TLS1_2
    Learn more ↗
  73. MinorAzure

    Turn off storage shared key access

    Subscription: Contoso Production

    What this means

    1 storage account in subscription "Contoso Production" allows shared key access, because it has no value set and Microsoft's default is to allow it.

    What to do

    Find out what still signs in with an account key or a SAS token signed by one, move it to Entra, then turn shared key access off.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    Before you change it
    Anything that signs in with an account key or a SAS signed by one gets a 403. Check first for Azure Files without Entra permissions, Azure Cloud Shell file shares, Storage Explorer on file shares, and any service that connects with a connection string.
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Allow storage account key access

    Storage account → Settings → Configuration

    Now: Allowed→Should be: Disabled

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Storage account → Monitoring → Metrics: split Transactions by Authentication to see what uses shared keys
    2. Move those applications to Entra sign-in or a user delegation SAS
    3. Storage account → Settings → Configuration → Allow storage account key access → Disabled → Save
    Learn more ↗

Bigger lifts: 1 fix

Fixes that take longer or wait on an earlier fix. Some need other teams or a planned change window.

Effort
About 3 hr
Projected
100
Lift
+54
  1. Should fixExternal Attack Surface

    Patch internet-facing services

    What this means

    3 CVE match(es) across the internet-facing footprint — 3 not scored. No severity score was found for any of them; that does not make them minor. Each is inferred from software a public index saw on the address, not tested against the service. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Patch or upgrade each affected service. For products you can't immediately patch (legacy appliances, vendor-managed software), restrict the port at the firewall and pursue vendor support.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 3 hours
    Before you change it
    Patches and upgrades can introduce compatibility regressions. Apply in a non-production environment first if possible.
    1 attack path weakened
    Technical detailssetting, steps

    The setting

    Internet-facing services with known CVEs (top: CVE-2019-0708 on vpn.contoso.com)

    The hosting environment for each affected service (cloud VM, on-prem server, appliance admin panel) — firewall as a stop-gap

    Now: 3 CVE match(es) (0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium), 3 not scored→Should be: All internet-facing services patched above the affected version range, or restricted to known-IP allowlists

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. For each CVE: read the NVD entry (linked) to confirm applicability
    2. Identify the device hosting the service (cloud VM, on-prem server, appliance)
    3. Patch to a version above the affected range, OR
    4. Restrict the service to known-IP allow-lists at the network edge until patch is available
    5. Subscribe to vendor security advisories so future CVEs are caught faster
    Learn more ↗
Modeled effect on attack paths

These are projections from the current findings, not verified outcomes.

Projected to close

21

  • Domain spoofing → wire transfer / invoice fraud
  • Endpoint compromise → OneDrive sync fanout → org-wide ransomware
  • Azure account without MFA → subscription takeover
  • Detection and logging gaps → an attacker goes unnoticed
  • Internet-exposed admin surface → credential reuse → tenant takeover
  • Known CVE on public service → web shell → ransomware deployment
  • Password spray → mailbox takeover → business email compromise
  • Lookalike domain set up for email → mail posing as you or a supplier → invoice fraud
  • Fake sign-in page relays an admin's MFA → stolen session → weeks of admin access
  • Database open to the internet → passwords or leaked keys tried from anywhere → data copied out
  • Internet-exposed Azure VM → lateral movement → ransomware
  • Public Azure SQL endpoint → data exfiltration
  • Leaked service-principal secret → subscription-scope cloud takeover
  • Illicit OAuth consent → silent mailbox exfiltration
  • Teams DM phishing → credential / OAuth-grant compromise
  • Account with no MFA → attacker registers their own MFA method → lasting access
  • Laptop lost or stolen → disk read without a password → company files exposed
  • Device code phishing → person completes MFA for the attacker → mailbox and files
  • Leaked or added app credential → signs in as the app → data access with no user or MFA
  • Key Vault open to any network → a stolen sign-in reaches it from anywhere → keys deleted for good
  • Azure storage configuration → possible unauthorized access

Projected to remain

0