DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

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← All attack paths in this snapshot

Attacker’s View™ / Modeled attack path

Internet-exposed admin surface → credential reuse → tenant takeover

critical potential impactmedium modeled likelihood3 findings to fix

This scenario links observed internet exposure to possible credential reuse and Microsoft 365 access. Exposed services and configuration gaps motivate investigation, but do not establish a working entry point, a successful sign-in or tenant compromise. Verify service reachability and effective access controls before deciding how to respond.

Follow the possible attack.

Saved model · not observed activity
  1. Research

    A finding to fix

    An attacker could discover the management ports identified in this saved exposure snapshot using public internet data. Observed ports do not establish whether the service is currently reachable or vulnerable.

    Technique & evidence details

    Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002 ↗

  2. Get in

    A finding to fix

    An attacker could attempt password spraying or credential reuse against an exposed management service. The scan does not test authentication, MFA enforcement or whether an attempt would succeed.

    Technique & evidence details

    External Remote Services T1133 ↗

  3. Steal credentials

    A finding to fix

    An attacker could test reused credentials against Microsoft 365. Policy and registration snapshots do not establish whether authentication would permit access; MFA and session behavior require separate verification.

    Technique & evidence details

    Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004 ↗

  4. Move across

    A finding to fix

    An attacker could attempt access from an unmanaged device. The linked finding identifies a device-compliance policy gap; it does not establish that sign-in would succeed or go undetected. Other access controls and monitoring require separate verification.

    Technique & evidence details

    Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004 ↗

  5. Business impact

    Modeled progression

    If the preceding steps succeed and the compromised account has sufficient access, possible impacts include mailbox access, file theft or disruption to connected endpoints. The scan does not confirm compromise or these outcomes.

    Technique & evidence details

    Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 ↗

    This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.

Scenario, not incident evidence.

The sequence models what could happen. Findings show observed settings or signals; they do not prove that an attacker completed a step. A passing check, accepted risk or missing observation does not independently establish that a path is closed.

Where to intervene

Review the contributing findings

Open this scan’s action plan →

Inspect the evidence and remediation for each control. After making changes, rescan and review fresh results before considering the risk reduced.

  • SeriousNeeds a lookWho can get in

    Require MFA for all users

    What this means

    No supported baseline for mandatory MFA for modern user sign-ins was established. 2 policies reviewed; none is an enforcing candidate for the required users or roles, all applications and client types with mandatory grants. This is a baseline gap, not proof that every sign-in is unprotected.

    What to do

    Review policy assignments, grant alternatives and excluded accounts with your IT administrator. Preserve emergency access; verify its separate protection instead of removing exclusions just to pass a scan.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access policies

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: Supported baseline not established→Should be: Effective scope verified, including protected emergency access

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Review policies and their user, role, application, client, location and device scopes.
    2. Check whether MFA is mandatory or an alternative to another grant control.
    3. Use Conditional Access What If and sign-in logs for representative users, admins and excluded accounts.
    4. Test changes in report-only mode and verify emergency access before enforcing them.

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingLaptops and phones

    Require compliant devices

    What this means

    No Conditional Access policy requires a compliant device for any application. Your compliance evaluation is purely descriptive — it tells you who's non-compliant but doesn't prevent non-compliant (or attacker-controlled, unenrolled) devices from accessing corp data.

    What to do

    Create a CA policy requiring 'Compliant device' (or 'Hybrid Azure AD joined device') for access to all cloud apps, or at minimum for sensitive apps (Exchange, SharePoint, finance apps).

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 45 minutes
    Before you change it
    Users on non-Intune-enrolled devices will be blocked from sign-in. This is the intended behavior but will affect: BYOD users without Intune enrollment, kiosks, contractors with their own devices. Plan exceptions or alternative paths (MAM-only, App Protection Policies, etc.) before enforcing.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access — require compliant device grant

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: 1 CA policy enabled, none requiring compliant or hybrid-joined device→Should be: At least one enabled CA policy granting access only when the device is marked compliant or hybrid-joined

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. entra.microsoft.com → Protection → Conditional Access → New policy
    2. Name: 'Require compliant device — all apps'
    3. Users: All users; Exclude: break-glass account, service accounts that use modern auth from non-Intune systems
    4. Cloud apps: All cloud apps (or scope to Exchange/SharePoint first)
    5. Grant: Grant access → Require device to be marked as compliant (and/or Require Hybrid Azure AD joined device) → Require one of the selected controls
    6. Enable in Report-only for 2 weeks first, review impact, then switch On

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • No CA policy requires compliant device — 1 CA policies enabled, none make a compliant or hybrid-joined device mandatory for access

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker phishes a user's password. From their own laptop (unenrolled, unmanaged, perhaps compromised) they sign in and access mail, SharePoint, Teams. Your enrolled-device controls — compliance, BitLocker, Defender — protect zero data in this scenario because the access happens from a device they were never installed on.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingWhat the internet can see

    Close exposed management ports

    What this means

    1 remote-management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet. Each is a direct attack surface — credential spray, exploit kits, and ransomware affiliates routinely scan the entire IPv4 space for these. Port and service data as observed on 2026-11-09 (Shodan index, not a live probe).

    What to do

    Put management interfaces behind a VPN, Tailscale/ZeroTier-style mesh, or an identity-aware proxy. If business need requires public access (rare), at minimum: source-IP allowlist at the network edge AND enforce MFA at the application layer.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your website and domain
    How long
    About 2 hours
    Before you change it
    Removing public RDP/SSH means admins working from home need a different access path (VPN, bastion, ZTNA agent). Inventory current admin usage patterns before the cutover.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Public-facing remote-management services (1 endpoint(s))

    Your firewall / cloud security group / hosting provider control panel

    Now: 1 management endpoint(s) reachable from the public internet→Should be: 0 management endpoints (RDP/SMB/Telnet/WinRM/VNC), control panels (cPanel/WHM/Control Web Panel/Webmin) or FTP reachable from the public internet; access only via VPN, bastion, or identity-aware proxy

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Identify the device/server hosting each exposed port (the IP + hostname above)
    2. At the firewall: restrict the port to known admin source IPs (VPN, jumphost) or block entirely
    3. For RDP specifically: deploy Azure Bastion / RDS Gateway / a SaaS jumphost instead
    4. For SMB: there is essentially no business reason to expose 445 — block it
    5. For VPN gateways: prefer cloud-managed (Entra ID conditional access in front) over device-managed
    6. For a hosting control panel (cPanel/WHM/Control Web Panel/Webmin): ask the host to restrict the panel to your office/VPN addresses, and never sign in over the plain-HTTP port
    7. For FTP: switch to SFTP or FTPS and turn off plain FTP — most hosts support this already

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • vpn.contoso.com (203.0.113.42):3389 — RDP — Microsoft Terminal Services 10.0.17763 · Remote Desktop reachable from the internet is one of the commonest ways ransomware gets in: the sign-in can be guessed at from anywhere · observed 2026-11-09

    How an attacker would use it

    Attacker scans IPv4 space for port 3389. Finds your VPS. Tries 'admin/admin', 'Administrator/Welcome1!', then a 10,000-password dictionary. Lands inside the host in hours. From there, harvests credentials, pivots to AD, deploys ransomware. This is the modal ransomware attack pattern.

    Learn more ↗

Understand the pattern

Further reading