DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

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Attacker’s View™ / Modeled attack path

Azure account without MFA → subscription takeover

critical potential impacthigh modeled likelihood3 findings to fix

An account that can change everything in a subscription is protected by its password alone until an MFA method is registered. Microsoft asks for MFA at Azure sign-in, and an account with no method is asked to set one up, which whoever holds the password can do. Registering MFA for the account, or removing a role it does not need, closes this.

Follow the possible attack.

Saved model · not observed activity
  1. Research

    A finding to fix

    Attacker identifies 7 subscription Owner(s) through public sources such as LinkedIn job titles.

    Technique & evidence details

    Gather Victim Org Information: Identify Roles T1591.004 ↗

  2. Steal credentials

    A finding to fix

    An account that controls a whole subscription has no MFA method registered. Attacker signs in with its stolen or guessed password and, when Azure asks for MFA, sets up a method of their own.

    Technique & evidence details

    Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004 ↗

  3. Keep access

    Modeled progression

    With Owner or an access-administrator role, the attacker grants a new identity the same access. Resetting the first account's password no longer shuts them out.

    Technique & evidence details

    Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles T1098.003 ↗

    This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.

  4. Business impact

    Modeled progression

    Attacker has full subscription Owner. Options include: (a) exfiltrate every storage account / database / Key Vault, (b) modify NSGs to expose internal resources, (c) deploy ransomware across managed VMs, (d) delete all resources (irreversible without backups), or (e) revoke all OTHER Owner role assignments and ransom the subscription back.

    Technique & evidence details

    Data Destruction T1485 ↗

    This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.

Scenario, not incident evidence.

The sequence models what could happen. Findings show observed settings or signals; they do not prove that an attacker completed a step. A passing check, accepted risk or missing observation does not independently establish that a path is closed.

Where to intervene

Review the contributing findings

Open this scan’s action plan →

Inspect the evidence and remediation for each control. After making changes, rescan and review fresh results before considering the risk reduced.

  • Should fixNeeds fixingWho can get in

    MFA registration is not protected

    What this means

    Anyone who gets the password of an account that has no MFA yet can register their own phone as its second step, and keep signing in as that person. No Conditional Access policy in force protects registering sign-in methods.

    What to do

    Add a Conditional Access policy that requires an existing second step, or a one-time pass you issue to new staff, before anyone registers a sign-in method from outside your trusted locations.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 30 minutes
    Before you change it
    Someone with no MFA method yet cannot register one from outside your trusted locations without a Temporary Access Pass. Guests are left out because a Temporary Access Pass does not work for them.
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Conditional Access: secure security info registration

    Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Policies

    Now: No enforcing policy targets Register security information→Should be: An enabled policy: All users (guests and emergency access accounts excluded), User actions = Register security information, outside trusted locations, Grant: multifactor authentication

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Entra admin center → Protection → Conditional Access → Create new policy from templates → Securing security info registration (or New policy)
    2. Users: All users; exclude All guest and external users, and your emergency access accounts
    3. Target resources → User actions → Register security information
    4. Conditions → Locations: include Any location, exclude All trusted locations
    5. Grant → Require authentication strength → Multifactor authentication
    6. Turn it on in Report-only first, issue a Temporary Access Pass to anyone who has not registered yet, then switch it On

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • No Conditional Access policy protects registering sign-in methods — 2 Conditional Access policies reviewed; none targets the Register security information user action

    How an attacker would use it

    With a phished or reused password, the attacker signs in to an account that has no MFA yet and is offered registration. They register their own authenticator, and from then on the account's MFA prompts go to them.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Register MFA for everyone who controls Azure

    What this means

    1 account that can control your Azure resources has no MFA method registered, so a stolen or guessed password is enough to sign in to it. That access covers a whole subscription. 1 guest also holds these roles. A guest's MFA is set up in their own organization, so it is not judged here; "Review guest role assignments" lists guests with a role of their own.

    What to do

    Have the person behind each account listed sign in and set up an MFA method, such as Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey. Remove the role from any account that no longer needs it.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    MFA methods of accounts with Azure roles

    Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods

    Now: 1 account with an Azure role has no MFA method→Should be: Every account with an Azure role has an MFA method

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. Ask the person behind each account listed to sign in at https://aka.ms/mysecurityinfo and add Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey.
    2. To confirm: Microsoft Entra admin center → Users → [account] → Authentication methods.
    3. If an account no longer needs the access: Azure portal → Subscriptions → [subscription] → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments, and remove it.
    4. If a script or a device signs in with the account, not a person: move that job to a service principal or managed identity, which Microsoft recommends for automation.

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    How an attacker would use it

    Microsoft asks for MFA to sign in to the Azure portal and to change anything in Azure. An account with no method is asked to set one up, and whoever signs in with the password, its owner or someone who stole it, is the one who sets it up, unless a policy protects registering sign-in methods (see "Protect MFA registration"). From then on they hold that account's Azure access.

    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingYour Azure cloud

    Limit subscription Owners

    Subscription:Contoso Production

    What this means

    7 Owners on subscription "Contoso Production" exceeds Microsoft's recommended maximum of 3. Any one of these accounts, if compromised, gives an attacker full control of the subscription. People who are only eligible for Owner through PIM are not counted.

    What to do

    Review each Owner and demote to a scoped role (Contributor, User Access Administrator) where possible.

    Who does it
    Whoever runs your Azure
    How long
    Not estimated
    7 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Owner role assignments

    Azure portal → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM) → Role assignments

    Now: 7 Owners→Should be: At most 3 Owners

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. portal.azure.com → Subscriptions → Contoso Production → Access control (IAM)
    2. Filter to role: Owner
    3. For each assignment, evaluate if a less-privileged role suffices (Contributor for ops, Reader for monitoring, User Access Administrator for IAM-only).

    Evidence · 7 recorded items

    How an attacker would use it

    An Owner can read all resources, modify any configuration, and reassign roles. One compromised Owner credential = full subscription takeover.

    Learn more ↗

Understand the pattern

Further reading