Attacker’s View™ / Modeled attack path
Domain spoofing → wire transfer / invoice fraud
This attack does NOT require any access to your tenant. Anyone on the internet can send email pretending to be from your domain — your customers and your own staff are the victims. The only defense is publishing enforcing DMARC (p=quarantine or p=reject) so receiving mail servers know to reject spoofed mail.
Follow the possible attack.
Saved model · not observed activityResearch
Modeled progressionAttacker scrapes your domain's executive contacts and AP/AR vendor relationships from LinkedIn, company website, and press releases.
Technique & evidence details
Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002 ↗
This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.
Get in
A finding to fixAttacker sends mail with a forged From header matching your CEO/CFO. Because your domain publishes no enforcing DMARC, receiving mail servers have no instructions to reject the spoof.
- Needs attentionEnforce DMARC ↗Tenant-wide check
- Needs attentionSPF includes a name that has no SPF record ↗Tenant-wide check
Technique & evidence details · 1 more checks
Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 ↗
No DKIM signing key published · Needs attention · Tenant-wide check ↗Avoid detection
A finding to fixWithout anti-phishing impersonation protection, the spoofed mail isn't flagged as a CEO-impersonation attempt by Defender for Office.
Technique & evidence details
Hide Artifacts T1564 ↗
Business impact
Modeled progressionForged wire-transfer or vendor-banking-change instructions are sent to your finance team or your customers. Funds are diverted to attacker-controlled accounts before discovery.
Technique & evidence details
Financial Theft T1657 ↗
This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.
The sequence models what could happen. Findings show observed settings or signals; they do not prove that an attacker completed a step. A passing check, accepted risk or missing observation does not independently establish that a path is closed.
Where to intervene
Review the contributing findings
Inspect the evidence and remediation for each control. After making changes, rescan and review fresh results before considering the risk reduced.
- SeriousNeeds fixingEmail sent in your name
Enforce DMARC
What this means
contoso.com: DMARC is published but set to p=none for contoso.com — monitoring mode only. Spoofed email is not blocked. Move to p=quarantine after reviewing reports. Also checked: contoso.onmicrosoft.com (warn).
What to do
Move from p=none → p=quarantine after reviewing aggregate reports.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- About 10 minutes
2 evidence rowsTechnical detailsevidence
Learn more ↗Evidence · 2 recorded items
- _dmarc.contoso.com — v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]
- _dmarc.contoso.onmicrosoft.com — No DMARC record found
- SeriousNeeds fixingEmail sent in your name
SPF includes a name that has no SPF record
What this means
SPF issues for contoso.com: Record ends in ~all (soft fail) — receivers typically deliver but mark as suspicious. Move to -all for stronger protection. spf.protection.outlook.com is named in the record and has no SPF record, or more than one. A receiver that gets as far as that name returns PermError, and SPF effectively fails open.
What to do
Adjust SPF record. Test changes with a tool like dmarcian SPF Surveyor before publishing.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- Not estimated
2 evidence rowsTechnical detailssetting, evidence
The setting
SPF TXT record at contoso.com
Your DNS provider (GoDaddy / Cloudflare / Route 53 / etc.) → DNS records → Edit TXT record
Now: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all→Should be: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all (≤10 DNS lookups)
Open in the admin portal ↗Learn more ↗Evidence · 2 recorded items
- contoso.com — v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
- spf.protection.outlook.com — Named in the record, and has no SPF record of its own (or more than one)
- SeriousNeeds fixingEmail sent in your name
No DKIM signing key published
What this means
No DKIM signing key is published for contoso.com under Microsoft 365's two names, selector1 and selector2. Mail from contoso.com is not signed in your own name. Microsoft 365 still signs the mail it sends, but under your onmicrosoft.com name, which does not count for DMARC. So DMARC for contoso.com rests on SPF alone, and SPF breaks when mail is forwarded.
What to do
Enable DKIM signing for the domain in the Defender portal — this publishes the two required CNAMEs (you publish them at your DNS provider) and turns on signing.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- About 20 minutes
2 evidence rowsTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
DKIM signing for contoso.com
Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Email authentication settings → DKIM
Now: No signing key published under selector1 or selector2→Should be: Enabled — both selector1 and selector2 CNAMEs published, signing toggled ON
Open in the admin portal ↗Steps
- security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Email authentication settings → DKIM
- Select contoso.com
- Microsoft shows you the two CNAME records — publish them at your DNS provider
- Return to portal and toggle 'Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signatures' to ON
Learn more ↗Evidence · 2 recorded items
- selector1._domainkey.contoso.com — No key found
- selector2._domainkey.contoso.com — No key found
- Should fixNeeds a lookEmail sent in your name
Turn on anti-phishing protection
What this means
Judged: Office365 AntiPhish Default. Office365 AntiPhish Default: EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection are all false, so no impersonation protection covers your people or domains. 1 to tighten.
What to do
Fix: impersonation protection. Add your executives and your own domain to impersonation protection.
- Who does it
- Your IT person or provider
- How long
- About 15 minutes
1 evidence rowTechnical detailssetting, steps, evidence
The setting
Anti-phishing policy
Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-phishing
Now: impersonation protection = off→Should be: Enabled = true; EnableSpoofIntelligence = true; HonorDmarcPolicy = true; at least one impersonation protection on
Open in the admin portal ↗PowerShell
Connect-ExchangeOnline Get-AntiPhishPolicy | Format-List Name, Enabled, EnableSpoofIntelligence, HonorDmarcPolicy, EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection, EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection
Evidence · 1 recorded item
- Office365 AntiPhish Default — EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection are all false, so no impersonation protection covers your people or domains
Understand the pattern