DemoContoso Ltd is a fictional company. The grade, the findings and the attack paths came from Tenant Strike’s engine reading made-up data.

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← All attack paths in this snapshot

Attacker’s View™ / Modeled attack path

Domain spoofing → wire transfer / invoice fraud

critical potential impacthigh modeled likelihood4 findings to fix

This attack does NOT require any access to your tenant. Anyone on the internet can send email pretending to be from your domain — your customers and your own staff are the victims. The only defense is publishing enforcing DMARC (p=quarantine or p=reject) so receiving mail servers know to reject spoofed mail.

Follow the possible attack.

Saved model · not observed activity
  1. Research

    Modeled progression

    Attacker scrapes your domain's executive contacts and AP/AR vendor relationships from LinkedIn, company website, and press releases.

    Technique & evidence details

    Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002 ↗

    This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.

  2. Get in

    A finding to fix

    Attacker sends mail with a forged From header matching your CEO/CFO. Because your domain publishes no enforcing DMARC, receiving mail servers have no instructions to reject the spoof.

    Technique & evidence details · 1 more checks

    Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 ↗

    No DKIM signing key published · Needs attention · Tenant-wide check ↗
  3. Avoid detection

    A finding to fix

    Without anti-phishing impersonation protection, the spoofed mail isn't flagged as a CEO-impersonation attempt by Defender for Office.

    Technique & evidence details

    Hide Artifacts T1564 ↗

  4. Business impact

    Modeled progression

    Forged wire-transfer or vendor-banking-change instructions are sent to your finance team or your customers. Funds are diverted to attacker-controlled accounts before discovery.

    Technique & evidence details

    Financial Theft T1657 ↗

    This is a modeled continuation with no directly linked check.

Scenario, not incident evidence.

The sequence models what could happen. Findings show observed settings or signals; they do not prove that an attacker completed a step. A passing check, accepted risk or missing observation does not independently establish that a path is closed.

Where to intervene

Review the contributing findings

Open this scan’s action plan →

Inspect the evidence and remediation for each control. After making changes, rescan and review fresh results before considering the risk reduced.

  • SeriousNeeds fixingEmail sent in your name

    Enforce DMARC

    What this means

    contoso.com: DMARC is published but set to p=none for contoso.com — monitoring mode only. Spoofed email is not blocked. Move to p=quarantine after reviewing reports. Also checked: contoso.onmicrosoft.com (warn).

    What to do

    Move from p=none → p=quarantine after reviewing aggregate reports.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 10 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailsevidence

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • _dmarc.contoso.com — v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]
    • _dmarc.contoso.onmicrosoft.com — No DMARC record found
    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingEmail sent in your name

    SPF includes a name that has no SPF record

    What this means

    SPF issues for contoso.com: Record ends in ~all (soft fail) — receivers typically deliver but mark as suspicious. Move to -all for stronger protection. spf.protection.outlook.com is named in the record and has no SPF record, or more than one. A receiver that gets as far as that name returns PermError, and SPF effectively fails open.

    What to do

    Adjust SPF record. Test changes with a tool like dmarcian SPF Surveyor before publishing.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    Not estimated
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, evidence

    The setting

    SPF TXT record at contoso.com

    Your DNS provider (GoDaddy / Cloudflare / Route 53 / etc.) → DNS records → Edit TXT record

    Now: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all→Should be: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all (≤10 DNS lookups)

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • contoso.com — v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
    • spf.protection.outlook.com — Named in the record, and has no SPF record of its own (or more than one)
    Learn more ↗
  • SeriousNeeds fixingEmail sent in your name

    No DKIM signing key published

    What this means

    No DKIM signing key is published for contoso.com under Microsoft 365's two names, selector1 and selector2. Mail from contoso.com is not signed in your own name. Microsoft 365 still signs the mail it sends, but under your onmicrosoft.com name, which does not count for DMARC. So DMARC for contoso.com rests on SPF alone, and SPF breaks when mail is forwarded.

    What to do

    Enable DKIM signing for the domain in the Defender portal — this publishes the two required CNAMEs (you publish them at your DNS provider) and turns on signing.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 20 minutes
    2 evidence rows
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    DKIM signing for contoso.com

    Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Email authentication settings → DKIM

    Now: No signing key published under selector1 or selector2→Should be: Enabled — both selector1 and selector2 CNAMEs published, signing toggled ON

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    Steps

    1. security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Email authentication settings → DKIM
    2. Select contoso.com
    3. Microsoft shows you the two CNAME records — publish them at your DNS provider
    4. Return to portal and toggle 'Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signatures' to ON

    Evidence · 2 recorded items

    • selector1._domainkey.contoso.com — No key found
    • selector2._domainkey.contoso.com — No key found
    Learn more ↗
  • Should fixNeeds a lookEmail sent in your name

    Turn on anti-phishing protection

    What this means

    Judged: Office365 AntiPhish Default. Office365 AntiPhish Default: EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection are all false, so no impersonation protection covers your people or domains. 1 to tighten.

    What to do

    Fix: impersonation protection. Add your executives and your own domain to impersonation protection.

    Who does it
    Your IT person or provider
    How long
    About 15 minutes
    1 evidence row
    Technical detailssetting, steps, evidence

    The setting

    Anti-phishing policy

    Microsoft Defender portal → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-phishing

    Now: impersonation protection = off→Should be: Enabled = true; EnableSpoofIntelligence = true; HonorDmarcPolicy = true; at least one impersonation protection on

    Open in the admin portal ↗

    PowerShell

    Connect-ExchangeOnline
    Get-AntiPhishPolicy | Format-List Name, Enabled, EnableSpoofIntelligence, HonorDmarcPolicy, EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection, EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection

    Evidence · 1 recorded item

    • Office365 AntiPhish Default — EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection are all false, so no impersonation protection covers your people or domains

Understand the pattern

Further reading