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The sign-in page is really Microsoft's. The code on it isn't yours.

Tenant Strike2 min read

New phishing kits skip the fake login page and send people to the real Microsoft one, with a code from the attacker. Here's what your team should watch for, and the setting that blocks it.

For years the advice has been to check the address before you sign in. This attack passes that test, because the sign-in page really is Microsoft's.

It's called device code phishing, and we first covered it here. The feature it abuses is a legitimate one, built for things like conference room screens and smart TVs that don't have a keyboard. The device shows a short code, you type that code into Microsoft's page on your phone, and the device gets signed in.

An attacker can start that process, then get you to type the code. You complete your password and your multi-factor check on the genuine site, and their device ends up signed in as you.

It's getting more common

CrowdStrike reported seeing 15 times more of these attacks in the first half of this year than in the second half of last year. One kit in the news this month shows how these attacks arrive.

LevelBlue's researchers call it Wazza, and they describe emails sent from already-compromised accounts, with PDF attachments about invoices, contracts and documents that need urgent review. The final page looks like Adobe, DocuSign or OneDrive, then walks the person through entering the code.

Notice the detail about compromised accounts. The email may really come from a vendor you know, because that vendor got caught first.

One rule for your team

Tell people this, in about these words: "If an email, document or website gives you a code and asks you to enter it on a Microsoft page, stop and call IT. A document will never need that."

Legitimate uses exist, like signing in on a meeting room device. But in those cases you're standing in front of the device and you started it yourself. Nobody needs a code to read a PDF.

One setting for your IT provider

Microsoft's own guidance is to get as close as possible to a complete block on device code sign-in. If your company doesn't use it, ask for a Conditional Access policy that blocks it. Start by reviewing who has used it recently, and make a small, documented exception for anything that truly needs it, such as older meeting room equipment.

That one policy shuts down this attack, whichever kit comes next. Tenant Strike checks whether your Microsoft 365 tenant blocks device code sign-in, along with the rest of your Conditional Access setup, without changing anything.

AI-researched from public sources. We label AI-assisted writing — see our trust page.

See your own risk

Want this for your own Microsoft cloud?

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